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ABSTRACT
K.r. Spencer-Smith: MODALITY AMD TIE TFECRY CD 'DAYIFG
Each of the three main chapters of this thesis is 
concerned with a different style of theorising about the 
semantics of natural langi.iage and in particular with the 
way they would tackle expressions of modality. Yhat unites 
the three approaches is their commitment to the study of a 
language through a systematic theory which will account for­
al 1 its sentences, according to some general principle such 
as: meaning = truth conditions. Tliey djverge widely on the 
implementation of this idea, ie. on the aims and form of a 
theory of meaning. The first promises a very spartan kind 
of theory; there is therefore considerable interest in . 
discovering how such an austere method will manage to 
handle the intricacies of intensionality. "o this end 
several ways of coping are examined in the first charter. 
The second approach permits itself a much richer means of 
describing the semantics of a language. ' Consequently, the 
concern of the second chapter is not so much with coping, 
as with marshalling these more powerful resources into a 
detailed analysis of some of the linguistic manifestations 
of modality. The third approach is, as yet, more often 
critical than constructive. It seeks to replace theories 
of the first two kinds, founded on v/hiat it sees as .an 
unjustified realist metaphyics, with a more cognitive 
semantics. In the course of the thesis, different mani­
festations of modal concepts within sentences of natural 
language are examined, ranging from the ’outermost’, 
sentential operator occurrences to the ’innermost’ occur­
rences where the modality is interwoven into the property 
expressed by a simple predicate. Thus in the last chapter, 
the import of the criticisms raised by the third approach 
is assessed with special reference to dispositional 
predicates.
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• CHAPTER ONE: DAVIDSON AND TRUTH THEORY
1 : INTRODUCTION •
It is important to stress at the outset that Donald 
Davidson approaches the topic of meaning by aiming to 
illuminate the nature of interpretation - more specifically, 
the interpretation of the utterances of speakers of some 
natural language. Interpretation of utterances is the 
linguistic department of the more general project of inter­
preting behaviour - of making sense of people, as McDowell 
puts it. In Davidson's conception of the aeeomplishment of 
the task relating to linguistic behaviour, the interpreter 
will be engaged in the construction of a theory, a process 
in which two inputs figure centrally. The first input will 
consist of that which is to be interpreted: descriptions of 
utterances which the theory must transform into specific­
ations of their content (and force - though I shall largely 
ignore this component of meaning in what follows). Any Cl 
sentence (p, suitably designated, as input must be paired 
with a sentence p of the ML which gives its content(cp.f67j ,. 
p.44). The second input will consist in the evidence upon 
which an interpretative theory can be non-question-beggingly 
founded. The evidence will consist in observation of the 
circumstances in which speakers of the language produce 
various utterances. A speaker's utterance of a sentence is 
taken as prima facie evidence that he holds it true - that 
he believes whatever it is that it expresses(cp. £20], p.322). 
The empirical business of theory construction is to be 
constrained by the principle of charity - that overall the
5pairings (p ...p devised by the theory enable the interpreter 
to ascribe an intelligible set of beliefs and desires to the 
speakers of the language under study(cp,£13j,p.313). This 
brief resume will suffice, I hope, as a background for 
discussion of Davidson's claim that the central component of 
an interpretative theory of meaning for a language will take 
the form of a Tarskian theory of truth for it.
In framing his famous adequacy condition on defini­
tions of truth, Convention T, Tarski laid it down that a 
definition would be acceptable if it was, in effect, an 
interpretative theory - if it paired every sentence cp of the 
CL with a translation p of it into the ML. If it was to 
define a predicate T, with pretentions to being truth, the 
pairings should naturally be of the form T(^,L) ~ p. If 
someone had a theory meeting Tarski's requirement they could 
interpret utterances of sentences from the CL. But as yet 
there would be no philosophical illumination of meaning: 
Convention T assumes that the work is already done, that 
means that p. Davidson's approach promises illumination by 
showing how we can earn ourselves the right to see the 
Tarskian pairings T(Cp,L) s p as interpretative, and thus to 
read them as: cp means in L that p(cp.[22],p.37). The 
extensional form of the Tarskian pairings promises an ideally 
non-question-begging framework for the project, since one 
cannot simply reverse Tarski’s conceptual priorities and get 
meaning out of truth.
(1) T(Snow is white,English) = grass is green 
is true, but hardly interpretative. It is appealing to think 
that by subjecting candidate theories to the kind of empir­
ical testing indicated above, "the construing need to match 
truth with truth throughout the language""* will achieve the
6desired effect of eliminating the true but non-meaning- 
stating theories. But there is a drawback: merely leaving 
the constraints to filter out the bad theories will leave 
you with a semantic theory (or theories, depending on 
indeterminacy) cast in the Tarskian mould which,because it 
is extensional, will have no defence against parasitical 
deformations of its axioms which render it uninterpretative 
(cp.[40J ,p.xvii). In order to gain immunity we must return 
to Tarski’s original approach - reimpose the constraint that 
the pairings cp.,.p are interpretative, the difference being 
that this time it is explained how, not assumed that, this 
is achieved.
By the disquotational qffect of the truth predicate, 
we know that if we write out the pairings in the T(cp,l) = p 
form, we can regard the predicate T as "True". But why 
should we fill the gap this way, rather tha^ using an 
intensional biconditional or, since our interest is not 
especially in defining a truth predicate, with "means that"
- or even "means the same as"? I shall consider the last, 
translational format, in a little while. As to "means that", 
it is unclear how we could use it in a general and systematic 
way. How, for example, could v/e state an axiom for and 
using it? And even for predicates, an axiom
(Vex) ((X is brave means that R(ex,English) is brave) 
is rather dubious. If I say Jones is brave, I don’t mean 
that the reference, in English, of Jones is brave, I mean 
Jones is brave. The same might be said of the intensional 
biconditional - that it is only at the final stage that we 
get properly meaning stating pairings. Another reason, I 
think, relates to the holistic nature of the empirical 
investigation Davidson envisages interpretation to be. It
7is with the interpretative pairings that the theory is 
closest to the evidence, since the data concern the holding 
true of whole sentences. V/hat the theory is putting forward 
for testing, in its T-sentences, are hypotheses about exten­
sional equivalence - the evidence available to the radical 
interpreter relates not .to intensions, but merely to exten­
sions. The requirement of interpretativeness is imposed on 
the theory as a whole, "that the totality of T-sentences 
should.... optimally fit evidence about sentences held true 
by native speakers"(L20j,p.326). There is no point tampering 
with the T-sentences, though of course, if the theory is 
adequate the pairings will be counterfactual supporting, 
will be translational(cp.[22],p.36).
v/e shall return to the question of the form of the 
pairings later. For the moment, let us note the special 
vulnerability which Davidson’s espousal of holism lends to 
the project. Should the Tarskian truth-theoretic format be 
incapable of accomodating a certain natural construction, it 
is not open to the.interpreter, one who aims "to describe 
and understand" a language, to say "So much the worse for 
that idiom". If that should turn out to be the case, since 
for the holist there is no giving the meaning of one sentence 
of a language without giving it for them all, the failure 
would in principle vitiate the semantics proposed for 
sentences not employing the recalcitrant idiom (cp.[l3], 
p.308 and [106],pp.233-4).
When the radical interpreter is banished to the 
jungle he will be well schooled in domestic science: he will 
be acuainted with all the means available to a Tarskian 
truth theorist for treating the various kinds of construc­
tion that occur within his own language. His construction
8of a theory for the alien tongue will be constrained not 
only by such requirements as Charity, but also by certain 
formal principles, and it is to these I now turn. Not any 
old theory of truth will serve the ends of an interpreting 
theory of meaning, and the constraints are designed to 
impose the desired form on candidate theories. They are as 
follows (from Ll7j,p.19). A) Scrutability: "the theory 
[shoufdj provide a method for deciding, given an arbitrary 
sentence, what its meaning is." If the idea of a theory 
which would systematically give the meanings of all the 
sentences of a language can in principle be realised, this 
seems a natural requirement for it to meet, and I shall not 
discuss it further.
B) Learnability, or finitude: "An acceptable theory 
should ... account for the meaning (or conditions of truth) 
of every sentence by analysing it as composed, in truth­
relevant ways, of elements drawn from a finite stock." At 
some level, a semantic theory for a natural language must 
operate on a logically disciplined (though not regimented) 
version bf that language. How much logical form one per­
ceives in a sentence depends initially on ones interests. 
Bardot is a good actress may come out as ^(b), or even just 
an unstructured Y, fo^ : the purposes of some arguments. 
Neither of these forms .would be satisfactory for a semantic 
theory of our language. The policy of welding gnod and 
actress into a single predicate cp would;..re quire an infinity 
of axioms if it were to be generally implemented, since ^ood 
can modify a potential infinity of phrases. And if that, 
then why not simply an infinite list, one axiom for each 
sentence in the language? Such a theory would give the 
meanings, but it would not display the semantic structure
which, must exist if the language is to be learnable by finite 
creatures. Demanding learnability requires of a theory that 
it discern ^  least enough structure to enable the list of 
semantical clauses for the expressions it treats as 
unstructured to be of finite length. Similarly, the number 
of semantical clauses which deal with the compounding of 
expressions must be finite. A minimal imposition of the 
constraint would apply directly to the number of basis and 
recursion clauses of the theory - a reasonable demand on any 
kind of semantic theory - without going into questions about 
speaker's aquisition and mastery of the language. Of course, 
any Iheory could get by with a special axiom for good actress 
treated indivisibly, and thus cheat when interpreting 
Bardot- is a good actress. But if it is to do justice to all 
the other occurences of good and actress, it would somewhere 
have to have the means to tell us what those familiar words 
are doing in that sentence. Such an axiom would be dis- 
pensible in theory, but helpful in practice. In practice, 
simplicity dictates that we take short cuts, suppressing a 
parameter here, welding a phrase up there, when our interest 
is taken by some other construction - on the assumption that 
the longer route is available in principle.
C) Homophony, or Same Concepts: "the statements of 
the truth conditions for individual sentences entailed by 
the theory should ... draw upon the same concepts as the 
sentences whose truth conditions they state," According to 
Wallace ([106],p.226), a homophonie theory is one a) whose 
KL includes its 01 and b) which moreover matches each closed 
sentence of the 01 (mentioned) with itself (used) in the 
T(Y,1) = p biconditionals. One might wish to separate these 
out as two concepts of homophony, freeing the requirement of
10
sentence by sentence sameness of concept - b), in effect - 
for foreign as well as domestic interpretation. C) seems to 
me to be the most problematic of the three constraints.
There are at least two ways of understanding it. The first 
way, consistent with its status as a formal constraint on 
candidate theories of interpretation, is the "natural" 
interpretation Davidson gives it when introducing it. This 
is as*a general constraint, imposed before interpretation 
gets started, eliminating any theory whose form dictates 
that it employ semantic concepts in the statement of the 
truth conditions of any sentence, whatever its subject 
matter (cp.[23],p.248). This seems unexceptionable as long 
as it is not understood as a prohibition on other depart­
ments of semantics (cp.[19j,p.79 - it deems them "irrelevant 
to present purposes", ie. to interpretation). For example, 
when we have reached a certain level of competence, our 
aquisition of new names may proceed via beliefs that are 
semantical in nature, \7hen someone starts to use a freshly 
encountered name, Jones say, the only belief about Jones he 
may have is that Jones is whoever Jones names. Since all 
English speakers have the ability to pick up new names, it 
would therefore be incautious to rule that a full description 
of speakers' competence should not avail itself of semantic 
concepts. But as I have already suggested, when it comes to 
interpretation if someone says merely that Jones did such 
and such, whatever their beliefs about Jones, it would mis­
represent the nature of their utterance to use some such 
phrase as "the bearer of Jones" in the interpretative
pairing. .
A second way of understanding C) would be as pre­
cisely the requirement of interpretativeness. The constraint
11
appeals to the very notion - sameness of concept - which v/e 
expect an account of interpretation to furnish us with, 
khat could he more sensible than to require, when inter­
preting someone’s utterance, rather than for example 
analysing their words, that you should aim to get as close 
to their words with your own as you can. . This is the task 
of "effecting a full reckoning in essentially the same terms 
as speakers themselves employ of the semantic and com­
positional resources of the language", in Wiggins' words 
(D 1 »P*337}. Just as B) demands that a truth theory read 
enough (structure) into sentences, so C) demands that it not 
read' too much .(structure or anything else) into them. But 
to impose it at this stage may suggest that it is superfluous 
because already in force, or else question-begging, if taken 
to require of the interpreter that he have insight into 
whether a concept figuring on the LKS of a T-sentence is the 
same as one used on the RHS. Even if radically interpreting 
English in English, we cannot assume that ([13],p.312). But 
there is another facet of the Davidsonian project to which 
it is relevant: schooling the radical interpreter in 
domestic science, ie. doing truth theory for English in 
English, relying unashamedly on ones native insight into the 
language in order to see how best to handle the various 
parts of speech. The thinking up of ways in which to process 
different locutions is not an empirical matter in the strong 
sense; rather it is the construction of the framework in 
which empirical interpretation can take place. The idea is 
to have plenty of equipment for the jungle, so that when the 
interpreter hypothesises that a certain alien noise is 
adjectival, say, he will know the form of clause it requires. 
Understood in this context, C) is nothing other than a sharp
12
formulation of Tarski’s requirement (though cp.[61],p.348).
In order to fully assess the force of the constraint, 
it is necessary to examine the different stages in the 
project of interpretation. This can be looked at in two 
ways. Firstly, consider how a finished theory would 
semantically process a foreign sentence (or, if all inter­
pretation is ’work in progress’, a theory which is finished 
enough to be generating interpretations). This could be 
either a two-stage or a three-stage affair. Consider the
p
following simplified specimen :
(2a) Um Mitternacht schlug Shem Shaun
f
. I 
i
b) (3e)(schlug(Shem,Shaun,e) ,& um(Mitternacht,e))
T
II 
xl/
c) (3e)(hit(Shem,Shaun,e) & at(midnight,e))
T
III
d) At midnight Shem hit Shaun
I; CL syntax - transformations which eg. insert/delete
variables. II: truth-theoretic interpretation  is true
iff... via eg. the machinery of sequences. Ill: ML syntax. 
Finally, between 2a) and either 2c) or 2d) is induced the
relation  is true iff..., hopefully readable as  means
that....
The second way of looking at it is to consider the 
number of stages in the construction of the semantic com­
ponent of an interpretative theory. For Davidson there are 
two: a direct definition of truth for the disciplined 
sentences of the language, the deep structures (II), and a 
systematic.matching of sentences in surface dress to those 
for which truth has been directly defined ([20],p.320).
Thus in interpreting an OL sentence involving adverbial
13
modification of an action sentence (2a), we might end up 
with a disciplined ML sentence containing explicit quan­
tification over events (2c). Seen in this light the 
following passage of Davidson's suggests that constraint C) 
is operative at stage II, requiring the theorist to tidy 
away any bits of ontology, such as sequences, which his 
theory needs in order to derive T-sentences:
the striking thing about T-sentences is that whatever 
ontological wheels must turn, in the end a T-sentence 
states the truth conditions of a sentence using 
resources no richer than, because the same as, those of 
the sentence itself. Unless the original sentence 
mentions possible worlds, intensional entities, proper­
ties or propositions, the statement of its truth 
conditions does not. ([20],p.319)
So constraint C) would appear to be rather weak, merely 
ensuring that eg. quantification over events is preserved in 
the transition from OL to ML. By contrast, what principally 
constrains stage I is the suitability of the deep structures 
revealed by the transformation rules for handling by the 
truth theory: principle B), and extensionality. Davidson 
acknowledges that the relations at stage I may be very com­
plicated (eg. in [21],p.319).
This (pairing of 2a) with 2c)) .may be all very well 
for a Davidsonian theory mark one, but it hardly seems to 
fit the bill for theories which are to be interpretative in 
the sense of that word cultivated under the revised 
Davidsonian format. The problem is that by imposing the 
interpretativeness constraint on the whole theory, even if 
the best philosophical arguments show it to be necessary 
that: 2c) if and only if 2d), still the divergence in 
explicit structure and ontolog^r will be undesirable. One 
seemingly drastic remedy to this state of affairs would be 
to impose constraint C) as a condition on the first stage.
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This may.seem unattractive in that the deep paraphrases are 
bound to diverge to some extent in their state of discipline, 
and moreover the divergence was precisely that which enabled 
certain surface forms to be handled truth-theoretically. 
However, there is nothing wrong in requiring that C) be met 
as far as possible at stage I - that ceteris paribus, if a 
theory has surface and disciplined forms which are closer 
than those of another it is to be preferred. For, as we 
shall shortly see, even at stage II C) cannot be enforced 
absolutely and without exception. The idea is, then, that 
we should come to semantic investigation with a preference 
for homophonie theories, as Evans puts it (in [38j ,'p.271 ). 
Divergence, such as that between 2a) and 2c), is to be 
tolerated only when unavoidable.
A strategy different to that explicitly adopted by 
Davidson, though perhaps complementary to it, would involve 
the completion of the third stage III, where possible, 
ending up at 2d) rather than 2c), for example. It only 
seems fair that, in interpreting a sentence, we are allowed 
to reverse, in the ML, the discipline imposed in the OL. "In' 
the process of interpretation, the theorist may uncover 
hidden deep structure and ontological commitment of a 
sentence, though these will not show up in the final pairing. 
Since interpretation requires discovering first order 
quantificational structure in a language (cp.[20],p.323), 
for each language there will be transformation rules linking 
the surface with first order structures. In which case the 
interpreter should be reasonably confident that for any deep 
structure which turns up in the ML at stage II, he will be 
able to convert it into a more colloquial form in that, his 
language. Le should still require that homophony be
15
%
preserved, as far as possible, at every stage . For example, 
if the OL contains different sentences All men.are mortal 
and Every man is mortal, whose form is undistinguished by 
the (\/v) notation, it would be preferable to paraphrase them 
using jail v) and (every, y ) respectively, if the precise 
flavour of these sentences is to be recaptured in trans­
lation. It should be noted that this three-stage approach, 
whether it acknowledges it explicitly or not, must involve 
sentences in the KL being mentioned as well as used.
However, there still remains an important dis­
crepancy between the truth conditional approach and 
constraint C).' It concerns the interpretation of con­
textually sensitive material. Our- ordinary notion of truth 
is unpeturbed by such material - we can say for example 
It is true that that is yours, because we are using this 
notion of truth within a particular context of utterance. 
Using this notion as a predicate of sentences we could 
perfectly acceptably say That is yours is true if and only 
if that is yours, ^pcause the correctness of an ascription 
of truth is here itself a matter which will change from 
context to context (cp.'[102j ,p. 128). But the perspective of 
the semantic theorist is acontextual - he must state the 
truth conditions of a sentence, whatever the utterer, time 
etc. of the context might be. And if he is to do this, he 
cannot use words which are like those in the sentence in- 
being contextually sensitive. If, to continue the example, 
he was really using that, the thing he pointed to would 
enter into the truth conditions of any sentence using that 
demonstrative. So, as some have complained (eg.[61j ,p.549) 
and as Davidson is fully aware, truth theory for a language 
with indexicals is going to require the employment of
16
semantical concepts, such as that of being the thing
demonstrated by an utterer u at a time t.
Let us consider the case of ambiguity in a little 
more detail. The occasion where we have difficulty in 
understanding an ambiguous sentence is the exception rather 
than the rule - somehow context prods us in the right 
direction. There are two kinds of case to consider, and 
Davidson has proposed two-kinds of strategy to deal with 
them. In the first, the theorist can match ambiguity with
ambiguity. For this Davidson has suggested a homophonie
approach (at p.316 of [13]). Thus we might have:
(3) (\/u) (Vt) (T^(Schmidt ist komisch,u,t,German) = Schmidt 
is funny at t).
Gupta has assumed that a similar line would be taken on 
structural ambiguity; his example being
(4) T(The president of U.S. was a Democrat,English) = the 
president of U.S. was a Democrat.
Gupta comments on this
as a sentence of English [4)] is ambiguous and it has 
two readings. And the semantic theory can be understood' 
as asserting [4)] on just one of these readings or on 
both these readings. If the former then the theory does 
not take into account the ambiguity of ’the president of 
U.S. was a Democrat’. If the latter then at least one 
reading of [4)J is false (in December 1976). In either 
case the semantic theory that entails [4)] is 
unacceptable. ([48],p.443)
In the case where 4) is .false, Gupta presumably holds that
the RHS is read as false, but on the LES an ambiguous
sentence of English is unambiguously denoted, and truth
truly ascribed to it. But surely one cannot simply ascribe
truth to an ambiguous sentence type, taken out of context
(unless, perhaps, it is true on all its readings. But ex
hypothesi this is not the case here). 3) does not make this
mistake, employing the utterer/time relativised truth
17
predicate. But it does have an anomolous feature. At a 
first glance, it looks as if the theorist is cleverly 
exploiting the match in ambiguity of the word/sentence 
meanings to state the truth conditions of Schmidt ist komisch. 
But how is he using "Schmidt is funny" to do this? Not in 
the ordinary way, intending it in one of. the two senses 
(since he must do justice to both), nor yet as a pun, in 
both senses (since many utterers of the designated German 
sentence would not use it this way), nor vaguely or dis­
junctively, in neither sense in particular. Suppose, for 
example, that someone says John is at the bank, where in the 
context it is. quite generally understood to mean a particular 
financial institution. If John is not at the bank, in this 
sense, then even if he happened to be at the (most salient) 
river bank, the utterance would be counted as false. Once 
an interpretation has been selected, its truth relative to 
a different reading is simply irrelevant. In aiming to 
cover all possible utterances of the sentence, the theorist 
covers none, since he cannot be committed to any one 
particular use (of the interpreting sentence). Although the 
pairing he comes up with seems admirable, it is not clear 
that the theorist can state any correct or coherent con­
dition with 3).
Since structural ambiguity is likely to be handled 
by mapping the surface form onto two disambiguated deep 
structures, and since the approach in 3) cannot anyway 
generalise to the case where the Ml cannot capture the 
ambiguities in the OL, let us turn to Davidson's other 
proposal concerning lexical ambiguity ([17],p.20). As an 
illustration :
(5) (Vu)(Vt)(T (Schmidt ist bose,u,t,German) = (either
18
Schmidt is angry at t and the circumstances surrounding 
u at t meet condition c, or Schmidt is evil at t and 
the circumstances surrounding u at t meet condition c ’)) 
Since 5) is formulated generally, for the interpretation of 
the sentence uttered by any u at any time t, the conditions 
c and c ’ should correspond in some way to the general 
ability of German hearers to move from an utterance of the 
specimen sentence to one or other interpretation. It is 
difficult to see what specific conditions could realistically 
accomplish this task, if not something fairly abstract along 
the lines Zripke suggests, involving the semantical notion 
of utterer*s meaning.CL61J,p.349). For example, the first
T(
disjunct would read: Schmidt is angry at t and bose means, 
in u ’s mouth at t, the same as angry (or: ...and u meant, at
t, that Schmidt is angry).
Even if one can execute the strategy of 5) within a
formal theory (which K.P. Parsons doubts, in [76],p.389), it
has the obvious disadvantage of violating the .'same concepts' 
requirement. Dropping the qualifications for c and c ' in 5) 
would lead to a T-sentence which, although true, would not
I!
be meaning-stating. Not only does Schmidt ist bose not have 
the structure of a disjunction, it doesn't mean that: either 
Schmidt is angry or he is evil. In a given context, it 
usually either means one, or it means the other. An austere 
treatment of ambiguity should therefore aim at disjoining 
T-sentences, thus:
(6) (Vu) (Vt)((T_(Schmidt ist bose,u,t,German) s Schmidt is 
angry at t) or (T^(Schmidt ist bose,u,t,German) =
Schmidt is evil at t)).
But this only highlights the need for the homophony 
destroying constraints c and c ', for 6) allows that
19
It
Schmidt ist bose is true if, say, Schmidt is evil, regard­
less of the sense it was intended in or understood as having 
when uttered. (There is an interesting discrepancy here.
We can say that, for any utterer u and time t, either
II
Schmidt ist bose means, in u ’s mouth at t, that Schmidt is
angry at t or it means, in u ’s mouth at t, that Schmidt is
evil at t. The pairing is right but the truth-theoretic
wrapping is wrong.)
It seems to me that the best way for a truth 
theorist to handle lexical ambiguity is to change tack and 
treat it more along the lines already suggested for 
structural ambiguity. At the level of deep structure there
II It If
is not to be one lexical item bose, but two: bose  ^ and bose  ^
- likewise for komisch. A lexically ambiguous German
sentence is then treated as having two (or more) disciplined 
versions (eg. Eose  ^ (Schmidt) and Bose  ^ (Schmidt).), each 
with its own distinct truth conditions. An utterance of 
Schmidt ist bose by a German speaker is therefore treated as 
in fact one of two .possible utterances.
We have seen something of the shape of the deliver­
ances of a Davidsonian theory of meaning. Let us now com­
pare how a translation manual fares as an interpretative 
theory. The radical translator is subject to the same 
empirical constraints as the radical interpreter; exactly 
the same amount of evidence is available to both of them. 
Moreover, we can adapt the demands of scrutability, finitude 
and homophony to suit the format of the translation manual. 
The translator is interested in defining a function TH from 
expressions of one language to those of another - his own, I 
shall assume in general. The translation manual which 
involves three languages: translated, or source (L^),
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translator’s (L^) and translating, or target (L^), although 
it exhibits the translational format in its full generality, 
is from the radical point of view something derivative, 
obtained from the two language case. One would first have 
to produce a manual from 1^  to in Ig* then translate that 
to: 1^ to in L^, or take some foreign translator’s manual, 
from to in L^, and convert that.
A manual for German to English should aim at defining 
TR(C/2,G) = (//, to be read: the translation of (p from German is 
ly, or more roughly: in German, Cf> means (the same as) Y* 
Consider how the requirement of homophony fares. When 
ordinarily translating from German, it would be quite 
natural to utter the following kind of thing:
(7) ’Jener Hund gehort mir’-means ’That dog belongs to me’. 
You wouldn’t hear the quotation marks, but they must be 
present. This is so because 7) does not require any 
accompanying act of demonstration, and quotation has the 
effect of sealing a demonstrative off from its immediate 
context of utterance (cp. §1.3 below). Unlike the case of 
contextual truth considered earlier, no demonstrative is 
being used (at least, not in the standard manner). In his 
clauses for singular terms, we can therefore expect the 
translator to incorporate both
(8) TR(Schmidt,G) = Schmidt , and
(9) TR(jener,G) = that.
As well as other rules for basic expressions, eg.:
(10) (Vg?)(TR(MenschCp,G) = manTR(CP,G))
(11) (V9?) (TR (moglicherweise#  ^G) = possiblyTR(<p, G) )
the translator will have to treat of structure. One way 
would be'to provide rules which transform syntactic rules of 
into syntactic rules of 1-;^. But v/e may also conceive of
21
translation as operating at stage II of the interpretative 
process considered above. If interpretation at least 
requires the imposition or revelation of quantificational 
structure in the foreign tongue, the requirement applies 
with equal justification to translation^. What reason could 
there be for thinking that translation manuals need be any 
different at stage I, where OL forms are disciplined?
The matching of type with type may give the 
impression that translation is merely a syntactic operation, 
much like the transformations of OL syntax, say. After all, 
both kinds of transformation must preserve meaning, as far 
as possible. 'The difference is that the radical translator’s 
TR function embodies a complex empirical hypothesis about 
what the expressions of L^ mean. A translation manual does 
not make the futile attempt to break out of the circle of 
language; on the contrary, it exploits the understanding an
English speaker has of his ovm language in conveying to him
the meanings of the foreign expressions. 7), or a formal 
version of it served up by manual, enables an English
speaker to understand any German utterance of the German
sentence by supplying him with a sentence which is its 
nearest equivalent in his language. He can, as it were, 
substitute a pattern of noise which he does understand, in 
the mouth of a speaker, for one he does not. Because the 
translator is not using the words (in their normal senses) 
as the interpreter is, he is not obliged to eliminate the 
contextual variability by recourse to concepts not explicitly 
expressed by the foreign sentence. He can aim to pair a 
foreign sentence with one which matches its dependence on 
context in exactly the same way - translation is, where 
possible, character-preserving (in Kaplan’s terminology).
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He thus produces pairings, similar to 4), which comply better 
with the requirement of homophony than those of the inter­
preter. Consider, the case of ambiguity once more. V"nen the 
translator cannot match what he supposes to be an ambiguity
in L-| with a word in we can imagine him producing a dual
clause, such as:
(12) (V9) (TR(bosecp,G) = evilTRpy, G) and TR(bose<p,G) = 
angryTR(QP, G)) .
tr
The translation of a sentence containing bose will bifurcate, 
and serve up two sentences (it means this:..., and it means 
this:...), presenting to the English speaker explicitly as a 
choice what will hopefully be the same choice as is faced 
tacitly by the German speaker. . IVhen he can find a word 
which matches the ambiguity of the foreign word, as with 
komisch and funny, the translator can do what the truth 
theorist could not: treat it in a single clause.
Whether a translation manual can count as a theory 
of meaning depends, as we shall see, on the nature of
quotation, as it is employed in radical translation. More
obviously, it depends on what precisely the requirements are
on a theory of meaning. For example, if it is simply 
required to be, in Wallace’s words, "a theory such that any­
one who knows it is in a position to understand every 
sentence of the language," ([108],p.45; cp. [24],p.131) one 
might think from what has just been said that a translation 
manual will suffice. But it is often held - as Wallace goes 
on to argue - that the form of pairings Cp. ..p which a trans­
lation manual delivers makes it unsuitable to be deemed a 
theory of meaning. The essential point is that a truth- 
theoretic theory of meaning for German in English stares 
facts which relate German sentences to conditions in the
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world, not to sentences in another language. To be clear
about the argument, it should be emphasised that from t?ie
point of view of radically understanding German in English, 
both a truth theory and a translation manual could 
summarise, in their different ways, the same empirical data 
about the meanings of the foreign expressions. The com­
plaint against translation manuals is the parochial nature 
of the facts they state: that whereas one can understand 
Es regnet by knowing, in the appropriate way, that it is 
true in German if and only if it is raining, without knowing 
English in particular, such understanding is not imparted to 
one 'ignorant of English but equipped with the knowledge that 
Es regnet means in German the same as It is rainin^^. A 
French—only speaker who was informed as follows:
(15) L ’énoncé allemand Es regnet est traduit (en anglais)
comme It is raining,
would be in such a position.
What fact does this state:
(14) The German sentence Es regnet translates (into English) 
as It is raining ?
We determine this in part by deciding how we would translate 
this sentence into another language - French, for example.
On the view critical of translation manuals, 14) goes over 
into 15), but an alternative possibility would be:
(15) L ’énonce allemand Es regnet est traduit (en français)
comme II pleut.
It is here that one’s views on the nature of quotation 
become crucial. For, while we must admit that a French-only 
speaker could understand 15) without knowing what Es re^et 
means, the point would be irrelevant to the aspirations of a 
translation manual which delivers 14), if the fact it stages
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thereby would be stated in French by means of 15).
Two things are striking about the proposed trans­
lation of 14) into T5): one quotation (but not the other) 
has been translated, and "English” has become "franpais".
Why should we think that some quotations are translatable?
The short answer to this is: it happens. In translating 
from a German novel, ”Er hat ,Es regnet’ gesagt" would 
become ”He said ^It is raining’”. An actual example, from 
more technical literature: Tarski’s T-sentence ”,es schneit' 
ist eine wahre Aussage dann und nur dann, wenn es schneit” 
has been translated ”’it is snowing’ is a true sentence if 
and only if.it is snowing” ([99],p.269; D 00],p.156). We may 
suspect that there is a principle at work here which sorts 
translatable occurrences of quotation from nontranslatable 
ones, and which has something to do with whether an inter­
pretation is presupposed for the quoted material. But even 
so, what of the shift from English to French in the 
language referred to in the proposed translation? Surely 
"Preserve reference” is an inviolable principle of trans­
lation practice. But consider Hart’s example:
(16) This sentence is in English.
This may go over into German as
(17) Bieser Satz ist auf englisch,
preserving self-reference, but not truth-value, or
(18) 16) ist auf englisch,
preserving reference but not self-reference, or
(19) Bieser Satz ist auf deutsch,
preserving self-reference and truth-value, but changing the 
reference to both language and sentence. Vfnich of 17)-19) 
is the most apposite rendition of 16) will depend on the 
context in which that sentence is produced, .especially on the
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point and purpose of its utterance or inscription (cp.[8], 
p.142) - ie. whether reference or self-reference is more 
important to it. The example serves to illustrate Hart’s 
principle that translation preserves reference if and only 
if it does not preserve self-reference. Since one cannot 
preserve them both, the general directive to preserve 
reference must be qualified to allow cases of self-reference 
to constitute an exception.
The potential significance of Hart’s principle 
becomes even more apparent when w^ e recall that on an 
autonymous view of quotation, a quotation itself may con­
stitute a case of self-reference - a special use of words to 
refer to themselves. The need for an account which discerns 
semantic structure in quotations is evident, as Davidson has 
pointed out, from our ability to process a potential 
infinity of them, in that at least we know what the 
reference of any of them is. On an autonymous view, 
quotation marks do not perform a semantically significant 
function; they serve merely to disambiguate, by signalling 
the presence of the special, autonymous use of the words.
In principle, they are dispensible. The semantically sig­
nificant units are the words concerned, and concatenation.
One thing the autonymous theory has going for it is that in 
spoken language quotation marks are dispensed with (except 
when quote, unquote and so on are used, to emphasise 
reportage of the precise words uttered). To take Beach’s 
example (from [43],p.81), if we hear the two sentences 
Man is an animal and ’Man’ is a noun we know from the con­
tent of the latter that the word man is being used to refer 
to itself, even though nothing signals this explicitly. We 
can even kill two birds with one stone, using and mentioning.
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as is evident from Quine’s well known example
(20) Giorgionne was so-called because of his size.
Giorgionne is being used in two senses :primarily, to refer 
to the man to whom, in the assertion of the sentence, a 
certain property is ascribed; and also to refer to itself, 
in order for that ascription to be intelligible.
The following argument is invalid:
(21) ’Flann O ’Brien’ is a nom de plume
(22) Blann O ’Brien is Brian 0 ’Nolan , so
(23) ’Brian 0 ’Nolan’ is a nom de plume.
In "Refernce and Modality" Ouine draws this conclusion:
"The principle of substitutivity should not be extended to
contexts in which the name to be supplanted occurs without
referring simply to the object" ([89],ppl139-40). The
autonymous theorist agrees with Quine on this, but does not
concur* with him in concluding that a word is not a genuine
constituent of a quotation in which it occurs - as little as
'"corn" is in "unicorn". His whole point is that it occurs,
but is used to refer to itself, not its standard reference
' / 
(if it has one). One phenomenon which the theory cannot
deal with is the mention of expressions which are not words 
- as in McDowell’s example: The machine printed out ’zxwt 
prt gjh’. It is integral to the theory to distinguish 
quotation-as-autonymy and the ’mere mention’ of expressions, 
for which we need some account in terms of pattern (or 
sound) mimicry. ^  hypothesi, the structure we have to 
discern in such cases must be finer than units of a word’s 
length - the letters, numerals or other symbols which com­
prise the mentioned expression. But if we must have this 
more inclusive account, why bother with the autonymous 
theory at all? The answer to this is that - i f  we have not
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seen reason enough already - a spelling account is so 
implausible for the ordinary, central cases of quotation 
(cp.[69J,pp.215-16).
An important question for the autonymous theorist, 
and especially relevant in the context of our general 
discussion, is: what account is to be given of the quotation 
in one language of some foreign, expression or sentence? In 
answering this, it will help to have some perspective on the 
identity conditions of words. There are two naturally com­
peting views of word (type) identity. On one view, words 
are'language-specific entities, whereas semantical relations 
are not language relative. W e 'should not talk of the truth- 
in-English of a sentence, but of an English sentence’s being 
true. , On the other view, these relativities are reversed 
(recall the sketch of Tarski above). Both views can cite 
ordinary locutions in their favour. For the former, we have 
eg. ’’the English word..." etc. (cp. 14) above). For the 
latter, we might say: "The very same word, ’Mist’, means 
something totally different in German". Although there is 
perhaps no firm fact of the matter in dispute here, some 
considerations seem to me to favour the latter view. For 
one thing, it can hardly be denied that the identity of 
symbol tokens, be they inscriptions or even just flags or 
flag-wavings, cannot be tied to one particular language, It 
is uncontroversial that the same pattern of sounds can occur 
in more than one language. As Davidson says, "the sounds 
’Empedokles liebt’ do fairly well as a German or an English 
sentence, in one case saying that Empedokles loved and in 
the other telling us what he did from the top of Etna" ([15], 
p.146). Secondly, as McDowell has pointed out ([69],p.221), 
it is odd to make the identity of a word turn on the identity
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of a language, given the problematic nature of the latter. 
From an intuitive point of view, a natural language is a 
great amorphous thing, with very frayed edges; from a 
Quinean point of view, its individuation is as problematic 
as that of a meaning (I shall return to this briefly in 
81.4).
It would be odd to claim fallaciousness in the 
following syllogism as an.argument in favour of the first 
view, rather than as an elaboration of it:
(24) The word ’ja’ is a personal pronoun in Polish
(25) The word ’ja’ is a sign of affirmation in German
(26) Some word that is a personal pronoun in Polish is a 
sign of affirmation in German.
On the second view, this syllogism is cuite straightforward. 
Now for Geach, who favours a combination of autonymy and the 
first view, "a quotation of the Polish word ’ja’ will not 
also be a quotation of the German word ’ja’, any more than 
any other use of the one word is also use of the other.” 
([43],p.86) But on the second view of word identity, there 
is no quotation simpliciter - quotation, like any other 
semantic relation, is language relative. One can still 
maintain a distinction between autonymy and mere mention on 
the second view because, even though the same words can 
recur in many languages,, most words do not belong to the 
English lexicon, and one can only use a word autonymously, 
ie. to refer-in-Bnglish to itself, if it is picked from that 
lexicon (cp.[69],p.217).
•On neither view of word identity is an autonymous 
view of the mention of foreign, words particularly plausible. 
In writing out his syllogism 24)-26), Geach was writing in 
English, but since ”ja” does not occur in the English
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lexicon, he could not have been using it to self-refer-in- 
English to itself (or as he would prefer to put it, he 
could not have been using an English word autonymously). If 
one wants an autonymous theory, one has to say that he either 
temporarily and subsertentially slipped out of English and 
spoke another language,.or he temporarily extended English 
by taking a foreign word on board. Neither of these two 
options seems particularly attractive, whichever view you 
take. The first means that not only would he have created 
what Kripke calls a ’word salad’ of two languages (syntac­
tically), he would, as the second view would put it, be 
referring-(autonymously)-in-German (or Polish), but 
predicating-in-English. The second also seems ^  hoc, in 
that the idea of a language being extended by the addition 
of a foreign word applies only v/hen its usage has become 
widespread. An account in terms of mimicry is obviously 
far more plausible when foreign words are mentioned (ig­
noring the case of conversations between bilinguals, and so 
on).
Let us now consolidate the position. We have seen 
that there is self-reference enough in a translational 
pairing such as H )  to make possible the shift both in the 
reference to the language and in the reference to words, 
that would occur in moving to 15). This is not yet to say 
that it should occur. Secondly, we have the intimation of 
two distinctions: a semantic one, between mere mention and 
the autonymous use of an expression, and a pragmatic one, 
between uninterpreted and translatable occurrences of quo­
tation. This connection between the two seems unproblematic: 
if an expression is merely mentioned, any use of the whole 
will be a nontranslatable one, for _ex hypothesi we have not
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discerned any words to be translated (the question of not 
preserving reference to the expression, in favour of self- 
reference, 'does not arise). So the sentence from the trans­
lated language - German in 14) - should not be translated 
when passing to 15). We can recognise this to be right on 
independent grounds: there would be no point in a trans­
lation manual if an interpretation of the foreign sentence 
was already presupposed! . But the converse connection is 
implausible: surely someone could be said to have properly 
quoted a word, ie. used it autonymously, without that usage 
having to be translatable. Geach’s ’Man’ is a noun provides 
an example, for here.no interpretation of the word need be 
assumed - it is simply being classified syntactically. But 
this is not the use the translator makes of the sentence 
from the translating language (= Bg). He is not simply 
saying: here is a sentence from one language (1^) and a 
sentence from another (L^), and (I conjecture that) they 
have the same meaning - though what that is is irrelevant. 
■The syntactician, working through his transformations, could 
say that.' But for the translator it is as implausible as it 
would be for an ordinary English speaker making a direct 
speech report, eg. with "He said ’It is raining’", to be 
merely saying in effect, "He produced noises transcribable 
thus...", without presupposing or conveying what those 
noises mean. As Burge conjectures, opposition to this 
rather obvious thought has probably arisen through excessive 
concentration on rigorous proof-theoretic methods in mathe­
matics," where the mention of an expression is considered in 
abstraction from its ordinary.interpretation ([8],p.149).
The translator is using a sentence from his language (in a 
special way) to convey what one from another language means.
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and' there seems no good reason for denying that this usage 
is translatable.
I conclude that as far as the project of interpre­
tation is concerned, manuals of translation have had an 
undeservedly bad press. Both the truth-theoretic and the 
translational approaches elucidate meaning by describing 
what it is to be able to interpret - and in fact we have 
seen that as far as presentation is concerned, translation 
manuals have the edge, eg. in the matter of homophony. One 
might still find constraints on the notion of a theory of 
meaning to disqualify them from that job. Perhaps one 
should say that a theory of meaning is not so much one which 
will impart an understanding of the source language, as that 
it should state what it is that a person knows in knowing 
the language. There are then two important questions to be 
answered: what is it that someone knows when he knows the 
meanings of the sentences of a language, and is that know­
ledge amenable to statement by a finite and scrutable theory? 
For example, if knowing meaning is, paradigmatically, 
knowing relations between words and world, then the truth- 
theoretic method is home and dry. Otherwise we may be left 
wondering, with Bummett, what advantages such a modest theory
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has over a translation manual .
2 : TRUTH-THEORETIC PRELIMINARIES AND THE WALLACE ARG-UrSNT
We ,shall consider four fragments of English or the 
slightly adulterated versions thereof which provide the 
disciplined, base paraphrases of its ordinary sentences. In 
our case, each fragment E^ should be encompassed by its 
successor and any truth theory G for the latter should
build on one for the former, by modifying or generalising it 
if required. We can imagine the theorist striking out in 
other directions from the basic fragment 7'^  than ours - or 
even choosing a different basis. In principle, though, all 
these theories for the different parts of the language 
should be reconcilable into a consistent, total theory for 
the whole language (semantic universality permitting).
If the basic fragment contained.only names, predi­
cates and the classical connectives^ truth, T, could be 
defined directly as a two-place relation, the first argument 
place being taken up by ML expressions designating sentences 
in the fragment and the second by our name for this (sub) 
language,,"E.". But since a theory adequate for English 
must at some stage deal with demonstratives, I will include 
in the simple demonstrative that. As we have already 
seen, this fundamentally affects the form of the T-sentences. 
They will take this shape :
(1) For all utterers u, and all times t, T^(cp,u,t,L) s p. 
Truth is irreducibly relativised to the contextual features 
u and. t, since it .cannot be conceived to attach to a sen­
tence independently of a particular utterer and time. That 
is to say, we cannot recover the simple relation T((p,L) by 
stipulating it equivalent to the LHS of 1) (or anything 
else).
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For simplicity, we shall assume that the reference 
of a proper name oC in is unaffected by contextual fac­
tors. There will be a finite list G^a of clauses such as
(2) B^(Jpnas,u,t,?^) = Jones
For the demonstrative, the following would be something like 
the kind of axiom Davidson has in mind: .
(3) R^(that^,u,t,F^) = ivDem(v,i,u,t)
where 'MvDem(v,i,u,t) " abbreviates "the object v which u 
demonstates in his i-th utterance of that a.t t ” (cp [101] ). 
The numerical index is included to cover the possibility of 
that being used more than once in a single utterance, with 
different referents. I am ignoring a problem raised by 
Taylor for 3), that someone might demonstrate more than one 
object with a single utterance of that. Since this can be 
considered a case of ambiguity - that should have a single 
referent - we could perhaps count it as two utterances made 
simultaneously, and arbitrarily stipulate an ordering of the 
indices of the two that’s. There will be another list G.jb 
for the simple predicates, each clause generalised as before 
for all u and t, though with the assumption that, like the 
names, the predicates are not imbued with any indexicality. 
For example :
(4) 'brave.u.t.pp = is brave.
Recursive clauses for the connectives
(5) q(Not<p,u,t,Fp 5 Hot T^(<p,u,t,Pp,
(5) g.((fiandct'.u.t,?., ) s T^Cçj.u.t.Fq^ and T^(^p,u,t,?p;
complete the definition.
There are basically two ways of extending G^  to cope 
with the next fragment, F\, which incorporates the basic 
quantifiers for all and for some (cp. eg. L38], section II). 
I will not consider the various ways of implementing the
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Fregean., -direct recursion on truth, even though it has the 
advantage over its rival, the standard Tarskian theory Gg, 
of harmonising better with the thought that the sentence (or 
utterance) is the primary semantical unit. Gp introduces 
the notion of truth relative to a sequence, or satisfaction, 
proper names this extra relativity is idle. We 
now have, for all sequences s, and all u and t,
(7) Rgg(Jones,s,u,t,Fp) = Jones.
It is the variables which refer relative to sequences, 
rather as demonstratives assume determinate reference rela­
tive to a context; the i-th variable v. picks out the i-th
member of the senuence, s.: . '> 1
(8) ^sctli'S'U.t.Fg) = 8^.
Seouence- and context-relative truth is defined for thesc
basic predicates, eg.:
(9) T (xis brave, s,u,t,Fp) s (oc, s,u, t,Fp ) is brave.
For existential quantification we have
(10) ?_g(for some Y^cp, s,u,t,F^) s for some y^ (Cp, s(i/y^), 
U,t,i‘2) j
* / 
where s(i/y.) is the sequence which results when y^ evicts
the occupant of the i-th place in s and takes its place.
The clauses 5) and 6) will also require relativisation to
sequences, to allow for the interpretation of complex
predicates, formed with not, and, etc.
The difference between sequence- and context-
relativity (between variables and that), is that the former
is eliminated. Gp defines truth unrelativised to sequences,
T . for closed sentences by assimilating them to predicates, 
c ’ . •
As 0-place predicates, they are either true of all objects, 
or of none; satisfied by all sequences, or none, so
(11) (V'u)(Vt)(T (cp.u.t,?,) 5 Closed(cp) & ( V s (9 , s,u,t, Rj) )
In addition to the apparatus for describing the syntax of 
the GL, the KL must contain enough set theory to describe 
the requisite properties of sequences, such as
(12) (Vs) (Vn) (\/v) (veA —  ^ (3s’) (s’ = s(n/v))).
As Davidson says, the aim of deriving all theorems of
the form of 1) by itself makes no call for conformity with 
extensionality or classical logic. "It invites us to use 
whatever devices we can contrive appropriately to bridge the 
gap between sentence mentioned and sentence used" ([19],pp. 
78-79). Dut when we come to consider the next fragment F,., 
which contains (sentence modifying) intensional idioms, 
there is a well-known obstacle to bridging that gap in the
shape of what I shall term "the Wallace argument". To ac­
cord with previous discussions of the argument, I will omit 
the indexicality parameters for the moment. By analogy with 
5), the natural suggestion for Gn, is a homophonie clause for 
any of these modifiers, schematically represented by
(13) Tgc(g%ts,iy) 2 OTg^ Cp.G.F^ ).
The problem Wallace primarily raised about this concerns the 
lack of inferential connections between the RKS of 13) and 
the rest of the theory, adequate for us to continue seman­
tically processing the mentioned 01 sentence ([106],p.241). 
For example, it would be illegitimate to substitute material 
equivalents established as such by 0^ within the intensional 
context created by the occurrence of □  in the Ml. A way 
round this would be to adopt a version of the weak rule of 
inference characteristic of all classical modal systems:
(RE) If he., 5 Y), then |-g_ (Vvq...(Vv^)
(□9 = Of).
This rule suffices for the substitutivity of provable
material equivalents in all contexts. ''.n; is, oi course,
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not a rule which any old non-logical theory can help itself 
to - but its adoption here might be defended on the grounds 
that 6^ is not any old theory. It aims to produce equiva­
lences which are semantical in nature; it would not avail 
itself of the kind of ’merely factual’ equivalences obvi­
ously inimical to the use RE). Nevertheless, a more dis­
criminating approach might be thought preferable, one which 
explicitly strengthened the semantical axioms of the theory, 
and this is what Wallace proposes: make it deliver strict 
equivalences, by prefixing its recursive clauses with a □. 
And this leads to the fundamental problem, in making 
derivable such theorems as '
(14) □(T(Lizzy is playful,E^) s Lizzy is playful).
For, supposing □  to represent logical truth, "it simply is 
not logically true that Lizzy is playful is true-in-[E^-] 
English if and only if (materially) Lizzy is playful, unless 
"true-in-[E^-J English", "Lizzy", "playful", "Lizzy is 
playful", etc. are all logical constants" ([106],p.225).
This is not the most telling formulation of the point. They 
don’t all, have to be logical constants, else not even "If 
Lizzy is playful then Lizzy is playful" would count. The 
general problem Wallace is pointing to, the "falsehood 
objection", does not depend on this particular reading of O  
anyway, it concerns the embedding of truth-theoretic appa­
ratus within the scope of the intensional operator. And 
this will afflict your truth theory no matter what charac­
terisation of consequence you adopt in the r-j.., as long as it 
includes some version of the homophonie axiom 15). there Q  
represents some prepositional attituc.e construction such as 
Maggie believes that, we would have
(1 5 )  T „  ^  ( cx- be li eve s that Ç), s, ) s (cx, s, E-0' believes
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' that ?sc(9'S,FL).
Most probably Maggie knows nothing about satisfaction (or 
even truth, for that matter).
It is worthwhile reflecting briefly on the gener­
ality of the problem. 13) is no better when □  is read as 
It is possible that. Suppose that in place of(p we have 
something of the form QPand notcp. The LHS of 13) will be 
false. But the RHS will be true, given the thought which 
the Wallace argument is sometimes stated as deploying, that 
words could have had different meanings. And might have 
meant what £r does. So the whole biconditional 13) will be 
false. Similar considerations apply to binary sentential 
connectives such as the subjunctive conditional □ —>. "If it 
were both the case that snow is white and not the case that 
snow is white, the law of non-contradiction would be invalid" 
is, if intelligible, true; but the correlative sentence of
the form Tg,^(Cpand notCp,s,?^) C M  ^sc(^’®*^3' 
argument, intelligible and false. The modal thought has a 
temporal analogue: the expressions of a language change in 
meaning over time. Reading □  as a past or future tense 
operator will therefore also lead to falsehood. (However, 
it should be borne in mind that relativising the truth pred­
icate to a time - one of the parameters temporarily sup­
pressed - -is not readily reconcilable with the use of tense 
operators in the ML). Finally, we might also mention all 
those operators which more or less blatantly involve quota­
tion of the embedded sentence, eg. It .is. written in^ preen . 
ink that.
Since the problem is thus quite general, it might be 
thought that any solution to it must match it in generality. 
One policy would be to try to find a way to disov.n any such
38
dog’s dinner as "Maggie believes that T„^(Schmidt ist bose ,^ 
s,German)" that might be served up. For although this could 
occur as part of a consequence of a truth theory for German, 
it would not be a testable consequence, the argument could 
run. The only testable consequences of such a theory for a 
natural language are the target T-sentences, and these either 
mention an 01 sentence in its entirety, on the 1RS, or else 
fully translate it, on the RHS. All the rest, it may be 
said, is just instrumental machinery for the generation of 
these biconditionals.
Something faintly reminiscent of these ideas can be 
found in the writings of Davidson and McDowell (eg.' in [24] 
and [68] ). They would agree that the evidence for an inter­
pretative truth theory does not come at the subsentential 
level; although in the postulates such as G>ja and G^b 
relations of reference and satisfaction are asserted to hold 
between words and world, neither the axioms nor anything 
intermediate between them and the final T-sentences are con­
firmed directly. They are tested through the ability of the 
T-sentences they generate to serve the general project of' 
making sense of the speakers of the 01. But there is hardly 
a kind of instrumentalism here to come to the defense of 13). 
The concern of Davidson and McDowell is with the direction 
of confirmation in a truth theory in the context of the 
radical interpretation of some tribe, from theorems to pos­
tulates, not with the truth status of the latter. It is 
central to their conception of such a theory that its axioms 
be intelligible and true statements - eg. of an "eminently 
learnable and forgettable relation between an English word 
and a set of men" '( [40] ,p.xi). It is simply that they do 
not receive independent confirmation.
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Without some strong and implausible instrumentalist 
principle to effect a split between the directly and indi­
rectly confirmed sentences, in regard to their content- 
bearing status, one would have to give up the idea that even 
the finished theorems state anything, if pursuing this line 
of approach. And if one is giving up the. ambition of 
stating the truth conditions of 01 sentences, one might as 
well have adopted the translational format from the outset. 
For compare 1.1.11, which is immune to the Wallace argu­
ment. For the genuine truth theorist, there appear to be 
only two options. Either he finds an acceptable way of 
rendering the .construction within an essentially extensional 
Ml, or he finds a way of making the (apparent) intensional- 
ity acceptable in the Ml (perhaps leading to a more pro­
found understanding of extensionality anyway - cp. [80], 
pp.474-5).
3 : THE FARATACTTC THEORY
It-is natural to think that one way a Davidsonian 
theory of meaning would accomodate modal locutions would be 
by suitable adaptation of Davidson’s own paratactic account 
of the logical form of indirect discourse sentences. (The 
possibility has been suggested in the literature though not, 
to my knowledge, explicitly by Davidson himself.) According^ 
to the C.E.D., parataxis is "the placing of propositions or 
clauses one after another, without indicating by connecting 
words the relation (of co-ordination or subordination) 
between them". By such a definition, even an operator treat­
ment of a sentence such as
(1) Galileo said that the earth moves
in terms of the application of the operator Galij eo said that 
to the content sentence
(2) The earth moves
will count as what we might call "the minimal paratactic 
theory". But what has become known to philosophers as the 
paratactic theory - Davidson’s account of 1), offered as a 
prototype for the "whole unholy array of attitude-attrib- 
uting locutions" incorporates a more substantial body of 
doctrine concerning their form and content. I shall concen­
trate on the prototype, with just a few words on a paratactic 
theory for modality, for the difficulties which seem to me 
to arise concerr more the basic proposal than its extension 
to other cases. It. will be useful to list the most distinc- 
ive components of Davidson’s theory as clearly as possible 
in that, should they prove not.to be jointly satisfiable, we 
may ask whether a modification of the theory can be made 
which does not lapse into the minimal theory.
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a) A -proposal about the logical form of propositional 
attitude sentences, like any other logical form proposal, 
must be capable of incorporation into a semantical theory, 
such as Tarskian truth theory adapted for natural language 
([15],p.144).
b) Both the components discerned as paratactically com­
bined are complete sentences. Correspondingly, an utterance 
of a propositional attitude sentence, such as 1), really 
consists of two distinct utterances, of the two sentences.
In addition to the content sentence we have what for want of
p
better terminology i shall term the "mood setter" , ie. for 
1) it is
(3) Galileo said that.
3) is a sentence made up from a two-place predicate and two 
singular terms. Mood setter and content sentence are 
punctuated by an ordinary full-stop.
c) The singular term that in the mood setter is a demon­
strative. The true demonstrative nature of the that in a 
construction such as 1) is hidden to us both by the 
proximity of its reference (this would be better), and by 
its anaphoric nature - unlike the more familiar that, it 
requires no supplementation with an act of demonstration.
In any context in which 1) is uttered, the reference of its 
that is fixed. Points b) and c) are corroborated by the use 
of an expression such as Whistler said that as a complete 
sentence, with the that referring demonstratively to some­
thing, eg. a previous utterance ([15],p.143).
d) The notion which the predicate said expresses is the 
ordinary notion of saying the same which v,-e employ when 
reporting the words of another. The inference from 1 ; to
(4 ; Galileo. said something
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has been shown to be valid - basically a case of existential 
generalisation. After all, 1) is true iff Galileo said 
something - not necessarily 2), for our concern is with 
indirect quotation, and there may be changes in tense, word 
order and so on. More importantly, Galileo didn’t have to 
speak my language in order for me to utter 1) truly. What 
is required is that the utterance he made have the same 
content - according to our ordinary, shifting standards of 
samesaying - as an ordinary English utterance of the content
sentence 2,. Let us introduce said’ for this oratio oblioua
notion, to be distinguished from the gaid’’ of oratio recta, 
where the particular words spoken are at issue. Thus we 
can say:
(5) Galileo said’ that the earth moves iff Qv)(Galileo 
said’’(v) and v matches in purport the following:
The earth moves).
This is by way of elucidation, not analysis (cp.[22],p.39). 
The notion of synonymy which samesaying involves is not to 
be analysed by the.semantic theory. (The main reason for 
this stems from the distiction between matters of (logical) 
form and matters of analysis - recall constraint 0) from 
§1.1, and cp.[13],pp.316-17).-
e) The reference of that is an utterance - not a sen­
tence or a proposition, for example. Consequently
f )■ The connection between the tv/o components of a prop­
ositional attitude sentence is not logical or semantical, 
but pragmatic^. Or rather their utterances are so related; 
the utterance of 5) containing a reference, on any occasion 
of utterance of the whole, 1), to the utterance of the 
content sentence, 2) ([15],pp.150-51j.
g) All the words function in the way they normally do.
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In particular, the words in the content sentence do not 
refer to their senses ([15],pp.151-52), ie. the theory 
vindicates Davidson’s "objection to meanings in the theory 
of meaning ... not that they are abstract or that their 
identity conditions are obscure, but that they have no 
demonstrated use ""I". With a), this means that
h) All the words in a propositional attitude sentence 
will get the treatment they standardly receive from the 
truth theorist. Standard treatment by the formal theory is 
the criterion of normal function (g). The theorist recovers 
his pre-Eregean innocence (cp.§2.l).
i) When 1) is asserted,.only the mood-setter is as­
serted. There is no need for anyone to concur with Galileo 
in reporting him - though if one added and I aaree to 1), 
and asserted the whole, one would effect an assertion of the 
content sentence. That the content sentence is uttered 
unasserted is as unsurprising as its unasserted utterance 
when eg. disjoined with another sentence. If 1) is to be 
used in an argument, the term the earth does not, strictly 
speaking, occur in it as part of a premise, but only in' 
something referred to by the premise, which is 3) ([26],
p.10). It is not available for substitution.on the basis of 
a true identity - substituting for the earth will change the
referent of the that ([15],p.151),
The extension of the account to modality is fairly 
straightforward. Eor something of the form It is necessary
thatcp it is obvious. When we have an utterance of some­
thing. like
(6) The earth cannot move
understood as expressing a conclusion about the dicrum that 
the earth moves - that it is imnossiole - we can construe it
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as the joint and simultaneous utterance of 2) and
(7) That cannot be.^
Suppose that at t^ Jones utters I am brave, Later, 
at tp, Smith reports this with an utterance which we 
paratactically punctuate as follows;
(8) Jones said’ that. He was brave.
The tense of the content sentence conveys the temporal 
content of Jones’s utterance well enough for ordinary pur­
poses (supposing enough of a gap between t^ and t^), for 
Jones said that he is brave at t^, and t^ < tp. He in 
Smith’s mouth at tp refers to Jones, just as 1 does, in 
Jone's’s mouth,- at t>j. Smith’s use of 8) would normally have 
been acceptable if Jones had used Jones instead of I, 
wliether it would still be acceptable if Jones had used a 
descriptive phrase uniquely true of himself - ie. whether 
ordinary speakers would count that as the same thought as 
expressed by the content sentence of 8) - would depend in 
part on Jones’s purpose in clothing his thought in that way, 
and on Smith’s in baring it. This suggests that when we 
come to consider quantifying in along the lines Quine 
suggested
(9) Something is such that Galileo said’ of it that. It 
moves
our ordinary standards of indirect reportage will tolerate 
the shift to It.
How does the paratactic proposal work as part of the 
truth theory for English? Let us start from the initially 
plausible assumption, consistent I think with what has been 
said so far, that, as: one would expect of any theory about 
the semantical composition of intensional sentences, it will 
eventuallv lead to their interpretation as complex wholes.
That is, -v/e shall expect to find some condition to match
(10) T^^(Galileo said’ that. The earth moves,u.t,??) , 
one which will enable us to say what it v/as that u said’ 
that Galileo said’. The main question then is; what treat­
ment should be provided for the demonstrative that? It is 
natural to assume that the standard clause 1.2.3 would be 
preferred; indeed Davidson hints at this in "Truth and 
Meaning" (p.320). The indexing of occurrences of the demon­
strative is obviously essential if the theory is to accom­
modate the embedding of one propositional attitude construc­
tion within another. Ignoring the possibility that Galileo 
said what he did at midnight, in the bathroom,... and the 
problems for logical form which attend this, we might expect 
to find as the ML condition matching 10);
(11) Galileo said’ ivDem(v,1,u,t). The earth moves 
Clearly this is no good. No connection between the mood 
setter and content sentence has been effected in the ML.
And so, for example, if the theorist accepted that an
utterance of 1) was true, relative to some u and t, he would
'
be forced,, by detachment from the 10)-11) biconditional, to 
assert both that Galileo said the first thing demonstrated 
by u at t, and that the earth moves. This is simply a 
consequence of the fact that the theorist must be prepared 
to assert his biconditionals, and that there is no demon­
strative reference in the ML to ’’The earth moves’’ and 
consequent attribution of the saying’ of it to Galileo. 11) 
is inadequate whether we arrive at it through attempting a 
semantical treatment of the punctuation mark
(12) T g c ( q % Y ' " ' t , A )  =  T s j , ( q , u , t , F j ) . q ^ ( W . u . ' U q )  
or whether we derive M e truth conditions of d) and 3 
separately and then fuse them as deep structure constituents
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of à single surface form.
It may seem that I have laboured a rather obvious 
point - but let us consider the nature of the inference from 
1 ) to 4). According to the paratactic theory, it has the 
schematic form
cjc<a,b).^  h 3v(p(a,v)
Obviously the first step in this inference is not existential 
generalisation, for then the problem of the assertion of the 
content sentence would arise again. For example, from S) we 
would get;
(13) Jones said’ something. He was brave 
Although Jones spoke a language, his bravery has been a 
matter of some controversy amongst scholars. Rather we must 
assume, that there is a rule which allows us to drop ip* the 
content sentence, ie. that we can go from 1) to 3). If that 
v/as treated as a constant, anaphorically referring forward 
to whatever follows it, the inference would be invalid. We 
have to see the that as demonstratively referring back to 
the previous utterance of the content sentence, rather as in 
Wilde’s famous remark. The only alternative is to see the 
inference as proceeding directly from 1) to 4), but this 
hardly favours Davidson’s paratactic punctuation. It 
supports the rival theory which sees the whole that-clause 
as a name, the something which Galileo said,an intensional 
entity.
Suppose we forget about the inference from 1) to 4) 
(and the explicitly demonstrative cases such as Wilde’s 
remark) - what are the prospects for an alternative treat­
ment of that? As already noted, the central occurrences of 
that which are succeeded- by a content sentence have a cer- 
tain contextual rigidity, so we could aim to treat them as
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constants-. According to Davidson, "No logical errors result 
if we simply treat demonstratives as constants; neither do 
any problems arise for giving a semantic truth definition" 
([13],p.319). Distinguishing this that’ and the other, the 
axiom which suggests itself is;
(14) (that’,u,t,E?) = that'.
• After all, if it is a demonstrative which holds together 
complete prepositional attitude constructions, it is only 
natural to expect tha.t if they are to be interpreted as 
wholes, it will be used in the Ml in stating their truth 
conditions. In his comment on [15], Quine seems to take the 
paratactic theory this- way. But what is stated in this 
axiom 14)? Presumably that' must mean something which can 
be elucidated in such terms as these: the utterance which 
follows immediately. If this is so, then the statement of 
14) will be false, in general - depending on what the 
theorist follows it with. At best, it will be truth-value­
less, if he manages to observe a suitable period of silence. 
To put it another way, if the theorist is really using that' 
in the ML, rather than mentioning (using autonymously) it,' 
the object he demonstrates enters into the truth conditions 
of every statement involving that' (cp.ël.1).
In the absence of any suitable homophonie axiom for 
the that-clause that', it would seem that the paratactic 
theorist is forced back to treating said' that as a single 
unit - as a sort of intransitive verb, if the paratactic 
punctuation mark is retained. A distictive feature of 
Davidson’s version is thereby removed: the claim to have 
discerned a singular term following said’. And now we are 
back to 1.2.13 in essence, and the Wallace argument is rein­
stated. There is a general .dilemma facing the truth
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theoretic incorporation of parataxis: either the content 
sentence is not suitably linked to its predecessor in the 
KL, or it is, and the theory has the means to link sentences 
in a manner found problematic by the Wallace argument^. As­
suming there to be a rule permitting substitution of proved 
equivalents between full stops, we could derive on the RHS:
(15) Galileo said' that. T^^(The earth moves,u,t,H^).
It would seem, therefore, that the paratactic theo­
rist has no alternative but to accept the first horn of 
our dilemma - that we should drop the assumption we have 
been proceeding under that it makes sense to talk about 
the meaning or truth conditions of such sentences as 1), 
in toto. He may query the assumption that the period is 
in some sense a semantic (or pragmatic - cp.fn.3) constit­
uent. After all, the ordinary full stop is simply a device 
of punctuation, -(Moreover, the loss of an axiom like 12) - 
which anyhow would have to be accompanied by a character­
isation of this connective in the KL - would only foil the 
accomodation of quantifying in etc., as in 9), if we have to 
construe such cases of anaphoric reference accross a full 
stop along the lines of quantifier and variable. That is by 
no means certain.) The paratactic theorist may reason that 
there is no way of directly stating the truth conditions of 
fragments of discourse longer, than one sentence, and that 1) 
is just such a fragment. All one. can do is state the truth 
conditions for individual sentences; for example 
f16  ^ T (Galileo said' that,u,t,E?) s Galileo said’' so   I. .... «I* ^
ivDem(v,1,u ,t).
and similarly for the content sentence. (Alternatively, he 
could link 10), on the LHS, with the RHS of 16), which by 
his lights would be true, but by no one's lights would be
/,G
interpretative.) The intuitive unpalatability of a view 
which denies that we can ascribe truth or meaning to whole 
prepositional attitude sentences should have been allayed by 
the informal statement of the theory in a)-i) above, from 
the informal statement of the theory, one might think it 
implicitly a quotational theory, since the reference to the 
content sentence (the sentence being one component of the 
utterance - cp. [693 , section V ) is exploited in accounting 
for failures of substitutivity. Prom the formal version of 
the theory, one can neither say that it is nor that it isn't 
a quotational treatment of propositional attitude sentences 
- it is a dissolution of them. ■ There is no way one can 
recover an interpretation of the complete sentence, on this 
theory. Perhaps afficionados of the position regard all 
this as a statement of the obvious, yet I think it worth 
emphasising if only because it requires a major revision (or 
U-turn, in popular parlance) in Davidsonian policy. It 
means reneging on the promise to state the truth conditions 
of sentences as they occur in the CL. (This is not just a 
quibble about one small point being omitted from the OL - ‘as 
the variety of intensional constructions to be considered in 
chapter 2 should make apparent, it will involve quite a 
carve-up.)
Before passing final judgement on the paratactic , 
theory, we should consider a theory which McDowell has pro­
moted as an explicitly quotational variant of it ([69]). 
Davidson comes to his paratactic theory by way of a re- 
jection .of a quotational theory of indirect discourse due to 
Cuine ([15],Pp.148-49). ■■'cDowell rescues the quotational 
account from the two distinct but overlapping objections 
which Davidson raises, only .to atrac.K i u wivh soi 'O oo jec ..ion..-
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of his own. Davidson’s first objection; any theory which 
construes the indirect reporter of a speech as not having 
uttered the sentence he is reporting fails to make him a 
samesayer with his subject, and thereby fails. McDowell 
replies that as long as he specifies the sentence somehow 
(eg. by quoting it), that will suffice. Samesaying holds 
between potential utterances ([69], section V). Davidson’s 
second: to quote a sentence is not -to utter it. Given a 
spelling account of quotation, the objection is fair enough; 
but as we have seen, that is not the only account, nor the 
best. By backing the autonymous theory of quotation, 
McDowell dispatches the second objection. A line of thought 
he then pursues can be put in the form of a question: since 
we can utter juotations, and utter them unasserted, and 
since the content sentence of an oratio oblioua sentence, 
rendered paratactically ala Davidson, is uttered unasserted, 
what is to stop us thinking of it as quotational? If 
quotations are uttered, we can use said’ in a quotational 
analysis of the indirect report 1):
(17) Galileo said’ ’The earth moves’.
And now, contrary to McDowell’s final intentions, if we 
assume the autonymous theory - which enables us to dispose 
with the quotation marks - and combine it with paratactic 
representation of logical form, this converts into the 
familiar shape of
(18) Galileo said’ that. The earth moves.
McDowell’s answer to the question just posed in his 
name is that if there is such a thing as a successful 
paratactic quotational theory, it cannot differ in essence 
from Davidson’s original theory. Kis reason for maintaining 
this stems from consideration of the behaviour of indexical
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expressions within quotes. To return to a previous example, 
suppose that Smith had used, in place of 8):
(19) Jones-said’’ ’I am brave’.
1 here refers to the word 1, though 19) conveys the infor­
mation that a particular token of I was used by Jones to 
refer to himself.^ If instead Smith says:
(20) Jones said’ that I am brave
the 1 .refers directly to Smith. If an indexical is embedded 
within the quotation marks of an oratio recta sentence such 
as 19), its reference no longer relates back to the context 
of utterance of the whole sentence, rather it relates 
indirectly to the context introduced as that in which the 
quoted material is or was produced. This ’’sealing off” 
effect of quotation marks might appear at first sight to 
vitiate any quotational construal of an indirect discourse 
construction containing indexical words, such as 20). But 
of course it would not be 19) that is proffered as an 
analysis of 20), but something involving said’:
(21) Jones said’ that. I am brave
When, on 'the paratactic account. Smith utters 21), he 
describes Jones as saying something matching the content of 
Smith’s utterance of the second sentence, the quotational 
I am brave. This is very different to 19). Since the 
context of this utterance has Smith as its speaker, we can 
if nothing else stipulate that this (notion of saying’) 
requires of Jones that he said something matching Smith is 
brave, ie. I am brave as it would be uttered by Smith, the 
result desired for (Smith’s utterance of) 20). At this 
point it is natural to want to press the query: but in what 
sense is this really a quotational analysis - a sense which 
makes it a contender to Davidson’s own proposal (cp.[69],
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pp.228,229). 'The answer is that it roust show up in the 
axiom for said’. In the ML the theorist will need to employ 
a predicate ”said*” which will relate the quotation of the 
content sentence he follows it with on the RKS to the use
which his subject u would make of it:
(22) T^^(cxsaid.’ that Cp.u. t. ) s (x ,u, t,F^)
said* that( , u,t).
Smith’s utterance of 20) at t, for -example, should be true 
iff Jones said* that(I am brave,Smith,t), ie. iff Jones said 
something matching the content of a normal utterance of 
I am brave by Smith at t, had he made it (rather than the 
autonymous use which, according to the theory, he then made 
of that sentence.)
■ 22) is a quotational treatment, in involving refer­
ence to a sentence. It also amounts to an implementation of
Davidson’s idea of reference to an utterance in that, in 
order to cope with the occurrence of indexicals within,the 
content sentence, we have to keep track of the other two 
components of an utterance of it, the utterer and time. In 
designing a theory for Lnglish in English, we have employed 
the identity mapping for the content sentence Cp, but as 
Church would be happy to remind us, 22) would not be an 
interpretative style of axiom for a foreign OL. However, it 
should be evident from §1.1 that I would not consider this a 
decisive objection (Eurge develops the case for translatable 
quotation in [8J, which I drew on in that section, with 
special reference to quotational treatments of oblique con­
texts.) We might therefore get round the problem by supple­
menting 22) with a rule which allows that when TL(Cp,L) = ^
(L is the CL and ^ i s  a complete translation of (p from it to 
the ML, ie. contains no occurrences of TR), we can substitute
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7 . . .
(p for (p , So if in interpreting Schmidt the counterpart of 
22) for German served up on the RHS: Jones said* that(Ich 
bin tapferrSchmidt.t). we could substitute "I am brave" for 
”Ich bin tapfer”.
If a quotation is a structured singular term made up 
by words and concatenation, the full-stop in 18) and 21) 
would, ungrammatically, be connecting a sentence and a sin­
gular term. But McDowell,has a complaint against the 
treatment of quotations as terms. It is ([69],p.222) that 
in so doing the theory will not be able to handle such 
. sentences as:
(23) Geach says that .they ’logically attach to the subject’. 
Obviously, if c< is a singular term and they occurs non- 
autonymously, theyoc will be ungrammatical. But what this 
shows is that appearing as quoted material cannot be the 
main function of the words between the inverted commas. It 
is clear that these words are being used twice over in 23), 
a feature reminiscent of the Giorgionne example (1.1.20): 
once, in the way words are normally used in the content
/
sentence of an oratio oblioua construction, and secondly, as 
tokens of the very same words that Geach is alleged to have 
used. The appearance of grammatical impropriety only arises 
if one fails to distinguish the oblique and the direct 
aspects of the sentence., 23) might be represented as:
(24) Geach says that. They ’logically attach to the subject’ 
where someone says (unprimed) a demonstrated sentence iff he 
says’ it and he does so in part or in whole by using any of 
the indicated words which occur between inverted commas, if 
such there be. he thus let saying coincide with saying’ 
when the"content sentence contains no inverted commas. The 
inverted commas are merely special markers for the oratio
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récta component of saying - they are not quotation marks in 
the sense that Geach would be described, in 23), as uttering 
a sentence itself containing quoted material. On the para­
tactic quotation account, the real quotation marks occur, 
invisibly, enclosing the whole of the content sentence.
In conclusion, I think we can say that Davidson's 
informal paratactic theory leads to at least three different 
proposals. Firstly, consideration of indirect discourse 
serves to remind us that the object of the propositional 
attitude must match, by some standard of accuracy, the gist 
of the content sentence used by the reporter of the attitude. 
This suggests that we may distinguish a liberal notion of 
saying, believing, etc. for which the likes of 15) are 
acceptable. By the lights of the theorist, who after all is 
the one who would utter 15}, Galileo did say something 
tantamount■to : The earth moves is true relative to u, t and 
since that, on a good theory, is tantamount to this: The 
earth moves. But if that is one kind of propoitional 
attitude, there must be other stricter notions which cannot 
be treated in that manner. For these the paratactic theory 
offers us a choice: either split them in two (never the 
twain to meet), or treat them as disguised quotational 
contexts.
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4 :  OPERATORS IN  THE ML
The kind of theory to be studied, in this section is 
typified by an appeal to special features of certain modi­
fiers, such as the alethic modalities, as exempting them 
from the general unacceptability of 1.2.15. After all, 
there should be some notion of ’semantic necessity’ for 
which necessitation of the axioms and theorems of a semantic 
theory is an acceptable rule, as much as there is eg. 
physical necessity, as necessity relative to the laws of 
physics. Whether this notion of semantic necessity should 
be identified with analyticity is another matter, though 
(think of the general case wher.e ML and OL are two different 
natural languages). But at the very least, we should be 
able to give a theory of truth for the special case where 
this theorist’s notion of necessity is imported into the
c l ’' .
If special pleading for the homophonie treatment of 
certain, traditionally intensional operators is to be per- 
sausive, 'it must ultimately be accompanied by an alternative 
strategy for those more blatantly intensional locutions for 
which 1.2.15 is conceded to be unsatisfactory. It would 
still be preferable to treat the exceptions according to 
1.2.13 rather than the more general alternative, for homo­
phony is to be preferred wherever possible. The idea that 
metaphysical necessity might also qualify as such an excep­
tional case should not surprise us too much, for we have 
become familiar with the idea of its exceptional status with 
regard to the substitutivity of coreferential proper names 
within its scope. The difficulty alleged, which concerned 
the possible falsity of Hesperus is nss^erus, xo^  insvancc,
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hinged not on tne possibility of the nonlinguistic facts 
changing for the worse, but of the meanings involved so 
doing. A natural defense of the use of metaphysical neces­
sity to interpret itself, using 1.2.13, would therefore 
consist in a justification for ruling this hypothesised 
fluctuation in meaning illegitimate.
An example of this response is provided by Gupta’s 
appeal to two different notions of truth ([48], especially 
p.'453) . There is room enough for this manoeuvre, because 
the truth theory to which 1,2.13 is added as an axiom will 
only have served to define the extension of the concept of 
truth, not its intension. The first truth predicate, T^, is 
such that OT^(C/?,L) holds just in case for every possible 
world w the proposition p which Cf expresses in w is true in 
' w . For T^, DTp (cp, h) holds iff the p which factually 
expresses is true in all worlds w. The basic idea is that 
the required constancy of meaning can be attained by giving 
a theory of Tg truth. Gupta does not supply us with a 
reading of T^  and Tg which eliminates mention of worlds, so 
it might be wondered whether this is a genuinely homophonie 
approach. We have to understand the necessity operator in 
the KL as binding the world variables in a third truth 
predicate, T-(C^,w^ ,W2, b) , where w^ is for facts, and Wg is 
for meanings. □  T>, (Cp,L) is {\/vj)Ty {Cp,w ,w ,i ), and OTg(CjP,n; is 
ft/w)T^(Cp,w,©,L). But the idea is clear enough: if the truth 
theorist is to utilise 1.2.13 as his axiom for necessity, he 
should understand the truth predicate it involves in the 
following, 1‘Gstricxed sense: trutn with respecL l-o anuuai 
meaning. He can of couj'se be préparée oo construe e 
nred.ics.te' thus in aivance oi knowing whe.u uij'cse p^±u^cu±^± 
actual meanings shornc- tui-n out to oe. lije Sorie icec ccu.J.c<.
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"be used for temporal modifiers: we can concentrate on cur­
rent English, for we are to construe the truth predicate as 
truth with respect to present meanings.
In the presence of a challenge that can’t work, 
because the property of sentences cp it requires to be 
instantiated - of its being a necessary fact that cp is true 
- can never be exemplified, Gupta’s answer is, crudely, that 
G- can work because we can understand truth in such a way 
that the property does have the required instances. Some 
have sought to provide a deeper motivation for the accep­
tance of such theories, as G^, by arguing for the necessity 
of the likes of I(Hesnerus is Hesperus,Eg) on conceptual' 
grounds. The argument is that those words could not mean 
anything different in (F^) English, for the very identity of 
that language (or fragment) depends on the meanings of the 
words which belong to it (cp.C5J,p.SD,[80J ,pp.477-78). The 
defense would also apply to a species of necessity weaker 
than, but not exclusive of, metaphysical necessity, such as
”it is at least causally necessary that” (cp.[81],fn.1P).
'
Since what we have here is an essentialist claim about thé 
identities of languages, it will be convenient to pause to 
introduce the final fragment F^, containing the lambda 
notation often thought suited to the expression of such 
claims, and make a detour through some truth theories for it.
Lambda abstracts are usually understood to be 
singular terms, denoting either sets or properties. So 
whereas man(Caesar) expresses the thoughu thaL Caesar ±alls 
under the concept man, in (Ay  ^)man(v^/CCaesarJ the square 
brackets exnress a different metaphysical relation, t]iat of 
havin? of participating in, nolning between uhe uv/o entities 
denoted by Caesar and (A y % /man ( v ^ » de can envisage c.
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theory which accomodates A-ahstracts by employing the new 
mode of semantic combination in the ML:
(1) Tg^((Av.)cp[o<J,E,F^) £
s.q)J.
Multiple abstracts can be defined in the usual way:
(2) (Av^ )... CAv^)(p|b(j, .  ,0^] (Av., )(...( (Av^)cp[ixJ)
• • • )0^ '|D •
So these can be interpreted by repeated applications of 1). 
If, as in 6 ,^ we let D  attach to both open and closed 
sentences, the logical form of
(3) Caesar necessarily is a man
understood as an attribution da la, can be revealed as either
(4 ) (Avp )Q(3 v.j ) (man(v.| ) & v., = v^)!Caesar], or
(5) (Av., X3nian(v.| )HCaesar],
depending on how much deference you pay to the words fs, a ir 
3) (see below). Choosing the latter for simplicity, we know 
by 1) that for any sequence s 5) is true-in-?^, relative 
to s, iff
( 6 ) (Avp (dnian[vp, s ( 1 /v^ ), )[Bgg (Qaesar, s, )].
We also know, by 1.2.13, that
(7) T_^O m a n ( ? p ,s(1/T,),F,) 5 (ganÇvp , s( 1/vp ,F, )■■
3y application of (the list for predicates), and 1.2.8 ,
we know that the following are enuivalent (for all v.):
( 8 ) Tgg (m a n ( Y p , s ( 1 /v man ( Fg f  ^, s ( 1 /v p., F^ ) )■ : man (?i)
Using RE) and predicate logic, we may infer
(9 ) T__ (Dman(y., 1, s( 1 / v>| ), 7/ ) =)Oman(v^;.
In order to utilise tnis equivalence, v/e nea^ ex - uie cxkin to 
one proposed by Grandy:
(FA; If _ (Vv^ )... (yVjj) (cp s HÎ . end if  (A-. ' ... (A?^ T --
then infer:  ( A " Y  '
We can then substitute RI:5 for IRS, of 9;, m  G/, whrcn wiv.i
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ohe a.>xioin ior Oa.es8.r, gives the correct truth conditions of 
5). boue uhat it is the presence of such a rule as RA), in 
a theory which does not take as axiomatic any contingent, 
non-semantical facts - in contrast to a theory which adopts 
eg. a rule similar to RA) but without the condition that the 
material equivalences should be provable within the theory - 
v/hich principally signals that the denotations of the A- 
abstracts are being treated as intensional entities.
If the d_e die to/de re distinction is to be main­
tained, the classical principle of abstraction, (Av^ )(p[cxj = 
(where (j6//o<) is the result of uniformly replacing 
all free occurrences of 5  in (p, by cK), must be replaced by 
some more restrictive principle (cp.[96j). We can then 
distinguish between
(10) OT(Hesperus is Hesperus,English),
(11) (A<pyjT{CffEnglish)f Eesner.us is Hesperus 1, and
(12) (Av)0T(Hesperus is Hesnerus,v )[English].
Prima, facie, things stand as follows. 10) is the kind of
thing which might crop up on fhe RHS of some consequence of
' / 
G .. 11) expresses a claim concerning the sentence Hesperus.
is Hesperus, that necessarily it is true in English. If
this is an essentialist claim, it is a rather dubious one.
An essential property is traditionally understood as one on
which the very existence of its possessors depends; eg.
manhood’s being essential to Caesar, as the impossioility of
any attempt to conceptually sever the property oj. being
human from Caesar on pain of obliterating hiiii. A pxopCj. oy s
being essential to .an individual can be elucidated, in j^ os-
sible worlds vocabulary, in terms o± the individual s having
the property in any worlo in wnxcn it exists, jiiis me^ns
that, according to 11), in any world in which 'lesnerns .i;.s
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exists, there English must exist for that sentence 
to express a truth in. On the view of word identity granted 
the most plausibility in section 1.1, this is false: the 
existence of an expression transcends that of any particular 
language it happens to occur in. The sentence could have 
existed as a meaningful string in another language, even if 
English had not come into existence. (A fortiori its having 
the True as its extension in English is not essential to 
it.) Finally, 12} would appear to represent the kind of 
conceptual truth involved in the proposed deeper defence of 
the use of 1.2.15 - e^œn though the inferential route from 
it back to 10) cannot be considered to be generally valid 
(just because it moves the singular term within the scope of 
the modal operator).
Before attempting to - evaluate this situation, it 
will help to clarify the nature of essentialism if we con­
trast 9^ with a rival theory, 9^, promoted by David Wiggins 
(see especially [109]). Wiggins does not hold that a unitary 
account of ^  dieto and da re necessity is guaranteed from 
the outset; not wishing to-prejudge the issue in favour of 
unification by adopting one exprssion for both, he adopts □  
for the former and Fee for the latter. The purpose of Fee 
is to modify Arabstracts, which it could do in two ways. If 
A-S-bstracts are terms, Neç can oe taken eiuher i) as ci 
1—place operation constant, forming new berms from old, or 
ii) as an expression which turns them into predicates. 
Representative of i) is:
( 1 3 )  F e c ( A v . j ) m & n ( v . j ) [ C a e s a r ]
and of ii) is Fec(Avp)rnan(v.,)(Caes,ari. A futher option iii) 
would be the introduction of another abstraction operator,
Fee (Av..2 *  not as a rival to lamoda, out as an inuension^i
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cousin 01 it. Option i) obviously allows Fee, to be iterated 
directly, ie. NecFec will be a permissible combination, and 
it is this'(in Peacocke’s generalised theory for Wiggin's 
Fee, [79],p.314) which signals most clearly that this is the 
option favoured.
According to the title of one of his papers on the 
topic, Wiggins is more concerned with the logical form of 
essentialist’s claims - with the correct formulation of a 
philosophical thesis, than with the analysis of occurrences 
of dn re modality in ordinary English. Nevertheless,
Wiggins appeals to the existence of ordinary d_e re locutions 
- rather than to possible worlds - to justify the intelligi­
bility of essentialist claims and, crucially, the bona fide 
nature of the modified predicate (Av., ) (Fec (Av.. ) (Av  ^) (y =v^ ) 
[Hesperus,v ]^ in his ^  re version of the Barcan derivation 
of the necessity of identity of Hesperus with Phosphorus 
(cp. [110] ,Longer Note 4.11). To properly demonstrate this 
appealing move, it should be shown how the traditionally 
metaphysical distinction between d_e dicto and ^  re surfaces 
in the vernacular. Traditionally, if a proposition is 
deemed necessary, this is ^  dicto necessity. It relates to 
the mode of truth. Be _re modality relates to the mode in 
which an object possesses a property: necessarily or essen­
tially, actually, possibly,.... But there is an alternative 
construal. Compare the following, as candidate elucidations 
of 3) ;
(14) Caesar necessarily-has the property of being a man,
(15) Caesar has the property of being necessarily a man.
It may not be clear at first if there is any distinction 
here - what, eg., should we make of the property ascribed in 
15) if not the necessa-y-having of the property of manhood,
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àla 14)? \viggins 'writes of "treating necessarily as a 
modifier of predicates or the copula'' ([110],p.107), and 
nowhere appears to credit the existence of a distinction in 
this, a distinction which could be described as that between 
property and. copula modification. Sometimes he takes the 
line I called the traditional one, describing the role of 
Fee in 13) (his version of 3)) thus: "necessarily as in 
effect qualifying the copula and signifying the mode of 
inherence ... 13) says that Caesar necessarily has
(Avu )man(v.)" ( [11 2j ,p.37). 14) accords with this account,
ascribing the property of necessity to the relation of 
possession or instantiation, as holding between the individ­
ual Caesar and the property of-manhood. By contrast, in 15) 
we have a modal property categorically predicated of an 
individual. Compare now the elucidation of necessary iden­
tity, "Fec(Av) (Av2) (y = Vg), or that relation which any r
9
and any s have iff they are necessarily identical."^
Is the distinction between property and copula modi­
fication metaphysically excessive enough for a homophonie 
theory of ordinary English to pass over without acknowledge­
ment? Consider the following three grades of modal in­
volvement (not Quine’s) in this sentence:
(I6a) It is possible that the man with the hat is a candidate 
for the presidency.
b) The man with the hat is possibly a candidate for the 
presidency.
c) The man with the hat is a possible candidate for the 
presidency.
(The three- grades are also available for an action sentence 
such as: The president has stopped a nuclear war.) Each of 
these exrresses something different. Tnus I6c; says,
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concerning the man with the hat, that he is something: a 
possible candidate for the presidency, whereas 16b), though 
still about that man, does not assert that he definitely is 
something. The distinction is not simply adjective against 
adverb: to say that x has destroyed a possibly fatal tumour 
is not the same as to say that x has possibly destroyed a 
fatal tumour. Moreover, since both of these occurrences of 
possibly are, intuitively;-, epistemic, it is not clear that a 
charge of equivocation over the kind of modality involved 
would have much relevance here,
I do not pretend that with one operator Toss the 
differences between 16b) and 16c) could not be properly 
expressed, provided that proper heed is taken of its inter­
action with the words is a. F o r example:
(16b’) Toss (Av ^ ) ( Gvg ) ( CT ( v^ ) & Vg = v^)) [the Mn J .
(16c’) Qvg ) ( the MK = Vp & Toss (Av ^ )CT(v^)[ Vg] ).
But 'this only serves to emphasise that, construed under 
option i), these predicate modifiers basically fulfil the 
'function of property modification. Copula modification is 
is achieved derivatively, by forming as a predicate in 16b’} 
be a candidate for the presidency. This means that one can 
no longer afford to disregard the difference in surface 
structure between Caesar is necessarily a man and Caesar is . 
a large man. To construe 5) according to 15) is, as we 
might say, to make the necessity fall within the scope of 
the having. This becomes apparent if we reformulate 13} in 
a more traditional manner: Have(Caesar, Fee(Av)man(v))
(where ’’Have" makes explicit the metaphysical relation 
expressed above by the square brackets.) This is all right 
for the adjective large, but the idea that appeal to natural 
language nromotes the use of Fee hardly makes it relevant to
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the issue of essentialism, since the English word which 
occupies this position, necessary, expresses a low grade 
species of'necessity - something like "required for" (cp. 
"Have you got the necessary equipment?"). Moreover, iter­
ation of Nec produces a term, FecNec(Ay)man(y , which with
some charity and imagination can he interpreted, hut is
■3
hardly something an essentialist would have a use for .
If w;e leave on one side property modification for 
the moment, the possibility arises of a new and potentially 
simpler representation of essentialist claims. Instead of 
■ the modality attaching to arbitrarily long abstracts
(Av., ).. . (Av^)cp to form modified relations, the mode of each 
individual’s participation in a relation must be assessed 
and expressed seperately. Using FEC for this form, we might 
have something like :
(17) NEC (Av., )FEC (Avp)(v. = Vp )[Hesperus,Ehosphorus] .
It will be helpful to make a comparison at this stage. We 
must think twice about allowing willingly to modify a rela­
tion, as in this version of Lakoff’s example
(18) Willingly (Av., ) (Avg ) (v., sacrifices Vp)[the tribe, Harry]. 
Harry may.be willing, the tribe may be, or if they’re in 
luck, both will be, but 18) doesn’t clearly express any of
these. If both parties are willing, for example, we need
tv/o occurrences of willingly, as in
(19) Willingly (Av., )willingly(Av2) (v.^  sacrifices Vg)Lthe 
tribe,Harry]
(where one occurrence of a v/illingly to the right of tne
other here does not affect its contribution - its not that,
roughly, the tribe is only willing to sacrifice a willing 
Harry.1 As Davidson almost said, intenuionali uy is oied u0 
a rerson or a tribe. In "intentional a.ctions are nor a
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class 01 actions"(cp. L H ] ,pp.244,245), we have an intimation 
of something remarkably similar to the distinction proposed 
above. It is: mode of doing an action, versus type of 
action done. The difference is marked by an asymmetry, v/e 
can say that Jones deliberately buttered the toast slowly, 
meaning that he took pains to do it slowly. But "Jones 
slowly buttered the toast deliberately" can only mean that 
he did it slowly and he did it deliberately. A deliberate 
buttering is not a type of action, something which is open 
to qualification according to speed, in the way that a slow 
buttering is open to qualification with regard to intention.
One cannot straightforwardly read off 19) in ordi­
nary English and, by the same token, it may be complained 
against 1?) that necessarily does not occur twice in 
Hesnerus is necessarily Phoshhorus. But given the special 
prominence of the grammatical subject, it may be that that 
sentence is best represented, by (Av)(v is Phosphorus) 
[Hesperus]. This is not to deny that there are more bla­
tantly symmetrical, cases, eg. Sesnenms and lh.osnhorus are 
necessarily identical - which, it may be argued, involve a 
genuine relation of necessary identity. iMt I wonfLd stall 
maintain that 17) expresses ar essemtialist themght: that 
both Hesperus and Phosphorus mecess@rily—partake of identity 
with one another, leither ©f ij ii)) is well—suited, to 
NEC, the essentialist's cepdia modifier, s® w;e cemid take 
option iii), treating it as terms fr-en 1-place
predicates. Semantically, the mmtimml treatment would be 
just like that of 1) for plsim A, ie. with ’"(lElA». j "’ 
replacing "(Av_- ) ", and - U j i r e
abstracts, a.s i?i 17), can obviously oe treateoi pararje_i-
to 2).
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We may envisage a class of term-forming predicate 
modifiers, of which plain A  is'the unadorned limiting case. 
(For rotational continuity I have included A  in (FEC/v.), 
though really it is neither syntactically nor semantically a 
component.) Whether treatment along the lines of 1) is 
ultimately successful depends, as the Wallace argument 
serves to remind us, on whether the modification of the 
satisfaction predicate which results in the processing of a 
sentence containing the modifier mirrors the modification 
that occurs in that sentence. It would thus fa.il for the 
blatantly intensional willingly. What does it take to 
willingly satisfy assassinate Maggie? How can you noisily 
satisfy eat an..apple? I imagine that satisfaction, being an 
abstract relation, is a rather quiet affair. Whereas modi­
fication of I by modalities and tenses can be agreed to be sc ^
intelligible, with this adverb it is not so clear^. But we
have still to face the Question of whether NSC and Fee
modification of T , on the RHS, matches what occurs onsc
the BHS.
The following suggests itself by analog^r with axiom 
Sat 3 of Wiggins’ minature theory for Nec ([109],p.305):
(20) For all s (T_ _ (Nec (Av^ )Man(v^)[Caesar], s, F,j ) = Nec(Avp) 
'^ sc 8 (2/vg ), F^)[Rg^ (Caesar, s, F^)J ).
What the RHS of 20) says - or better, its NEC counterpart - 
is that the referent of Caesar, whatever that is (it matters 
not how it is described), necessarily has the property of 
being the second member of a sequence satisfying in F^ 
Man(vg) ; It is not claimed that ’’the English expression Man 
nrefixed to the variable is sucn that it n.ust oe satis­
fied by any seoucnce with Caesar as its secono member ... 
[The kind of claim made] is-that certain individuals (via
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sequences) necessarily-satisfy certain expressions; not that 
these expressions are necessarily-satisfied-hy those indi­
viduals” ( Ll09],p.311). But does this really help? The 
idea is that, simplifying out the sequences, we don’t have 
this d_e ^  attribution :
(21) (NECAv)(v is true-in-7^ of Gaesar)[Man(y)] 
but rather this :
(22) (FECAv) (Man(v) is true-in-7^ of v)[)Caesar] .
It follows from what has been observed in connection with 
11) that an existential asymmetry arises between a term cK 
and any term in a formula (p in an essentialist claim of the 
form' eg. (NECAv) ( Cp(v) )[fxl|. Its reformulation in terms of 
the d_e dicto (oC exists —> cp(o<) ) brings out clearly the 
existential caveat on o<(cp.[79],p.322, and,[109],pp.310- 
311). So in 22) we have a claim which entails that Caesar 
would not exist in any situation in which either the expres­
sion or the 'language failed to exist. Moreover, when we 
come to consider the proper version in full we shall not 
only find mention of a sequence of objects but also the long 
suppressed parameters of utterer and time. Similar problems 
beset the embedding of truth theoretic apparatus within □, 
for any fragment containing demonstratives and quantifiers. 
7or □  we could avoid these problems by restricting the con­
cern of truth theory to weak necessity, a stratagem which by 
definition fails to,help with strong necessity, Fee and NEC.
One might appeal at this point to the abstract 
nature of some of the entities involved - language fragment, 
expression, sequence and time. The alleged difficulties 
with the dependence of Caesar on tham effectively disappear 
if these are entities which cannot fail to exist. But being 
an abstract object is not in itself a passport to every
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possiol.e -world, as Wiggins’ discussion of the set (Crystal 
Palace,The Eiffel Tower} testifies ([110], section 4.4).
Since a set is defined in terms of its members, its exis­
tence depends on theirs (though not conversely). A set such 
as this one whose members are contingent beings itself 
exists contingently; if one or other of its members had not 
existed, it would not have. Nevertheless it might be argued 
that the abstract entities we are concerned with need not be 
regarded as contingent existants. This suggests that one 
maj^  go some way to fend off the problems which arise through 
the embedding of truth theoretic apparatus within modal 
operators if one is prepared to pay a certain price. A 
similar conclusion is suggested by the response to the
Wallace argument which was shelved earlier. Consider first
the argument as it applied to the use of the past tense 
operator in the ML. The argument was that eg. something of 
the form PT(Cp,English ) could be true even though T(PCp, 
English) is not, because some term in Cp had changed its 
meaning. But when the prédominant meaning of a word does 
change - gay being an example which readily springs to mind 
- its not as if the old meaning is totally erased from the 
language. Such a case should therefore be treated as a 
normal case of ambiguity (section 1.1), and once disambig­
uated, the argument does not go through. But if there is a 
word for which,.if you go back far enough, you can find a 
meaning which has no currency at all today (as with villain, 
perhaps), then you may legitimately decide to discount that 
as a part of the English language investigated as the CL of 
vour truth theory. That is a plausible oelimitation of whau 
actually'counts as the language or fragment unaer suudy cche
main cost of which being to regard the line oetween
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ambiguity and antiquity as sharply drawn). But it therefore 
fails to relate to the question of what could or must count 
as English. To say that we identify English as the language
in which, inter alia, is is the copula^, is not yet to say
that it could not be, in this language, eg. a primitive sign 
for distinctness rather than identity. So the price of the 
response to the Wallace argument is higher in the modal case 
than it is with temporal operators.- Is it worth paying?
Ultimately, the worth of the kind of theory we have been
considering in this section depends on its incorporability 
into a theory for the whole of English. And there is a 
special problem which arises for any theory coping with a 
fragment containing both modal and indexical locutions, as 
the following application of 1.2.13 illustrates:
(23) Tg^ (Oman(that),s ,u ,t, )  = OT^^(man(that),s,u ,t,?^).
The LE3 of 23), we may assume, is true - if u demonstrated a 
man at t. The lES, however, says that it is necessary that 
man(that) is true, relative to the given parameters - 
something arguably,false, given that u might have pointed to 
a frog. The falsity is underlined by taking a further step 
using the Davidsonian axiom 1.2.3, to Oman(ivDem(v,1,u,t)). 
Demonstratives are both essential to a natural language and 
such that their reference, on any given occasion of use, is 
a contingent affair. But perhaps all this point proves is 
that all such statements must be construed as judgements ^  
re. There is no problematic correlate of 23) ii the claim 
is formulated as AvDman(v)[that], for example. (This is 
not to say that there could not be de aie uo necessities 
involving indexicals. In this sense, perhaps, it j.s neces­
sary that I am where I am, you were ocrn wnere you were 
Lorn, he is who he is, and so on - hut such cases cannot he
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problematic in the way 23) is.)
71
5 : MODALITY AS QUANTIFICATION
In this section I want to consider a few of the many 
issues that are raised hy the interpretation of modal 
locutions using quantification over such things as possible 
worlds. A good place to start is with the argument of 
Davidson and Wallace to show that this style of interpre­
tation should be homophonie, ie. should read the world 
variables into the expressions of the OL. In Davidson's 
version, we start with a thesis proposed by Tarski, that 
natural languages are in essence intertranslatable. Any 
natural language should be able to express, whether by means 
of a simple or a complex expression, what is expressed by 
any word from any other such language (cp.[19j,p.52).
Wallace puts forward a more precise principle: "if 
are sentences of L^ [eg. the ML] that translate some sen­
tences of L^ [eg. the OL] and if is a sentence of L^
built from vocabulary that occurs in then
translates some sentence of L^” ([106],p.225). We can see 
these principles at work by considering the modal case. 
Suppose we interpret sentences of the form Qcp from L^ using 
those of the form (Vw)Cp’(w) in Lp. Then from the vocabulary 
of the latter we can construct sentences about the existence 
of exactly n worlds such that ..., and so on (assuming L^ 
has identity), which are inexpressible In the terms of the 
sentences with simple operators. Wallace's principle 
counsels against such an account of form and scheme of 
interpretation built upon it. Dut suppose has uhe aojec- 
five possible and the means uo express wh^u a. ijmlosopher 
intends by the world, ie. 'everything thau is uhe case — a^ 
we would exnect of a natural language - rhen .nere vVilr oe
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nothing untoward in the relation described between and 
L n . Both principles are agreed that the interpreting Ml 
should be translatable back into the CL. And so, Davidson’s 
line of argument runs, since the theory of L^ in Lg teaches 
us that the use of operators is really possible worlds talk 
(for that’s how they’re interpreted in the ML), and since 
this is the expressively more fundamental idiom (and intel­
ligible to the OL speakers anyway), we should take it that 
really (at a level beyond the surface) the CL sentences 
involve the possible worlds idiom also .
Lerhaps the simplest homophonie approach just 
requires the interpretation, in a theory like 6p, of three 
special predicates: PV/(v), LRT(v^,Vg) (for Vp’s being pos­
sible relative to v^), Tn(v.,Vp) (for v^’s being in Vg - a 
world-relative existence predicate, in effect - to cover the 
interaction of modality and quantification), and the special 
constant @. A second kind of homophonie theory might use 
the world-relativised truth predicate typically employed
by a hétérophonie theory such as 6^. A crucial axiom for 9> 
is this : '
( 1 )  Lg^, /pcp,s,w.,  , F „ )  £  (Vw2 ) (PH T (w . ,  , w „ )  s , w ,  , P j )  ) 
(once again u and t are suppressed). But the significance 
of 1) cannot be judged on its own. It must be taken in 
conjunction with clauses for the basic predicates
(2) . ( cx is brave, s, w , ) = ^sw ^3) ^s brave-in w
a clause for the quantifier, eg.
(3) I_.,(3YjCP, 8,\v-, 7^) = (3y_^)ln(y^,w) & Tg^ (^Cp, s(i/y^ ) ,w, 7^) 
a clause for actuality:
(4) T^^,/^,s,w,7^) 5 T^,/(p,s,@,7^)
and one to remove the relativity to worlas i.rom Lj.uth.
(5) 1(^,7?) 5. Closed(cp) & <Vs)Tg^]Cp,s,7^)'.
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Ne could have relativised the notion of reference to pos- 
siole worlds, and indeed one would do so if one thought that 
the reference of some genuine referring expressions was 
sensitive to that parameter, Evans counsels against such a 
measure ([39],p. 169). He also reminds us that (cp, s ,v/, E)
is to he understood as satisfaction with respect to the 
world w - it is a world of evaluation, not utterance (cp. 
Gupta’s proposal, §1.3).
At least one major disadvantage of a homophonie 
theory, unlike a theory such as 6 ,^ is that it requires all 
the predicates of the OL to he relativised to a. world vari­
able - even when modality is not the theme. But against 
this charge of blatant violation of OL syntax, Davidson and 
Wallace would presumably counter that the heterphonic 6  ^
anyway interprets apparently n-place predicates as n+1- 
place, in the ML - as 2) makes apparent. The basic problem, 
it seems to me, affects both kinds of theory, and is this; 
most of the time possible worlds do not intrude into our 
everyday talk, and .even when they do (eg. with "We could 
have had a situation in which ..."), it is implausible to 
say that we are dealing with a primitively world-relativised 
predicate. These considerations suggest that we might con- 
sider the possibility of introducing what might be termed an 
’indexing operator’ £, an expression which operates on open 
or closed sentences to produce something of uhe same ilk, 
but with one more argument place. £(w)cp shourd De under­
stood as: cp with respect to w . Let us try to construct i.rom 
Gg a theory G^ for £ along the following lines. Gr^  is to 
emnloy odd—indexed vanaDies v^ to range ovei ordin^iv ^pos­
sible) individuals, even—ino.exed Vj^  to langc ove^ wo.-. Ids 
(ie. we assume that these are restricued oy tiie ^neoic^ue P-,.
/ 4-
sjid ccoH also "be written Quantification is interpreted
C.S bexore (axiom 1.2.10;, The basic idea for £ is to use it 
in the KL to modify the truth predicate when needed:
(S) 5 g(Rsc03,8,?.))?22(y,s.?_).
Acuuality will now be treated with a reference clause:
and- we shall need the familiar-looking rule:
(R£) If f-g^  (Vv^ )... (Vv^)(cp = Y) and -- £(/3)cp----,
infer ---£(/3)Y---•
?or example, if we take the sentence
(8 ) There could have been things other than those which 
actually do exist,
representing it thus:
(9) (3w^)£(w^) ( (3 vy)£(©) ( (b/xylv.^  ^ v_))
we find that
(10) T g P  S),s,P,) S 0 w„)£(RgPw2 ,s(2/w2),F3) T„X(3y.p£Cg) 
((Vv^)vi 4 Vg).. s( 2/wg)
A repeated application of 1.2.10 and 6 ), the equations
(wp, s (2/v/^  ), I7) = Wp and 7), some more of and a couple 
of applications of R£) will see us through to the desired' 
truth condition. It is perhaps worth pointing out that G^ 
can be extended to cover other intensional constructions in 
the folio wing way:
(11) T^^(0Cbelieves that(p,8,P%) = (Vwp) (Relief (R^^ ((X, s,R^ ),
Wp) —  ^ £(^2)122(^2,8,?^);.
Since we are reading £ as 'Vith respect to”, we avoid rne 
problematic ascription to r-.aggie et. al. of Lrutn-theoreuic 
beliefs,, desires and so on. In resolving propositional 
attitudes thus the theory buys o_j. one seo o .l unwan^eo. 
inferences but is still left with another set, slightly more 
palatable "^ 'eich.ans, out stall luioesi.Oc^ ole (sec; oc-lo-.,, .
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As an alternative to - if, for example, we do not 
care foi the use of ”with respect to” to modify predicates 
in the OL — v;e might attempt to make a theory Gg for ”in'', 
symbolisée Since we ought not to allow truth-theoretic 
material to occur within the scope of 0, we should aim to 
design Gg around the primitively world-relative truth predi­
cate of Gg. The simplest way would be, keeping $ out of
the CL, with a theory like Gg except with regard to the
basic predicates:
(12) T^,„(braYeo<,s,w,p) e 0 (w) brave Rg^(a,s,?_).
It is only here that $ is really vital, since "PRT" and ''In" 
will cover the other interactions between a modality and an 
expression. Adopting a rule to allow <p to be inferred from 
0 (@)(p will allow us drop reference to worlds (ie. the actual 
one) when modality does not enter into the conversation.
But to get 0 into the 01 we need an axiom like this
(13) 2s„(^(P)Ps,w,pp, = 8, ?_),?,).
P  here will either be @ - in which case see 7) - or a world
variable w^ - in which case it is basically treated along
the lines of 1.2.8 (by alternating the indices of ordinary 
and world variables, there will be no conflict between 
individuals and worlds for the places of a sequence.) 
Complementing 13) is the axiom for world quantification:
(14) Tg^pgw^(p.s,w,p) 5 (3w^)Tg^p9,s(i/w^),w,F3).
In assessing the relative strength of the £ against 
the 0, it is worth considering the expressive resources 
deployed in a sentence like 8). 8) cannot be represented in
a language containing only the operators 13 and The
problem for the simple operator language v/hicu. unis sentence 
rresents is that initially we neeo uhe combination -j )
assert the nossible existence of someuhing, cat then uc
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follow it with (Vv^), within the scope of the quantifier but 
not within the scope of the possibility operator (op.[50], 
p.54- ). One needs to introduce a ’backwards-looking 
operator’ A (cp. 4) above) which, as now always does with 
the present moment of time in temporal contexts, refers us 
back to the actual world, no matter what modal operators it 
occurs within the scope of. Actually, as it is actually 
used in Inglish, is a device of contrast and emphasis - as 
for example when we say that theoretically such and such, 
but actually so and so. It does not seem to have the seman­
tically significant function performed by A, which is rather 
carried out by the mood of the verb. According to Lewis, 
actually is ambiguous: in its primary sense, it refers us
back to the actual world (what is for him a world of utter­
ance), whereas in its secondary sense it refers us to some 
other world which has been introduced for consideration.
The phenomenon he is aiming to account for is manifested by 
the following pair of conditionals:
(15) If Max ate less, he would be thinner than he actually is
(16) If Max ate less, he would actually be thinner than he is
But the alleged ambiguity would be better explained by a 
redundancy theory of actually, according to which it adds 
nothing (but emphasis) to what is achieved oy the mood of 
the verb. If actually adds nothing to the cognitive content 
of the conditionals, we should be able to remove it wiuhouo 
affeeting their sense. This is indeed so:
(17) If Max ate less, he would be thinner than he is. 
SimiLarly, I have been unable to fine a way of formuiauin^
8 ) in which actually .clearly plays an essential role, ie. 
which prevents it from lapsing into contradiction. is
words like do (and even exist on its own; ana in, in c) ano
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15), which achieve the effect of referring us back to the 
actual world and which therefore demand the presence of A in 
their representation, (The adjective actual is more active, 
however - cp.2.4.5.)
If we give the necessity and possibility operators 
indices: , and <C^ , we .can introduce a family of these back­
ward looking operators any of which will refer us back 
outside the scope of an intervening modality to the prior 
occurrence of a modal operator with the same subscript (cp. 
[80]). In Cly....A^ we have a notational variant of eg.
(VWj^) 0(w^), in so far as the cross-referential effect
of both systems is the same. Each of the A^, 0(w.) and 
£(w^) notations have the effect, when added to a language, 
of converting it into a first order language whose predi­
cates have an argument place for world variables and @.
But there is a difference. There is an obvious difference 
between the actuality operator A and the term @ (or between 
no\v as operator and as indexical constant), in that the
latter can stand a§ the subject of predication, identity
*
and so on. In a sense, this is a theoretically dissoluble 
distinction. Quine’s "Variables Explained Away" shows how 
an operator language can be a .notational variant of a first 
order language. Suppose we have the operators O, O  and A, 
and V  and 3  for the standard quantifiers. We adopt the 
convention that an operator binds the last available argu­
ment place of a predicate. To express all possible predi­
cate-logical formulae we need other operators Lo juggle tne 
orde^ of argument places of a predicate, j^ or example, ij. 
loves is the familiar predicate whose secono p__o.ce .lo 
reserved for the object of the verb, 3 (loves) is the predi­
cate, in quantifier/variable notation, •X & *
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if IRv is the operation v/hich, for a two-place relation 
produces its converse, ie, switches the order of the argu­
ments, then binding the second place of the modified rela- 
9-(Ipy6s ]_j, is the same as binding the first place 
on the old. predicate : Ax(3y)(x is loved by v) ( =• XyQxjfx 
loves v)). Other operators will be needed to handle nredi-
\ 'y ^
caues of higher^ahicity, So with the actuality operator,
4 (loves; would express the property of loving the actual 
world Axpx l o v e s a peculiarly Panglossian sentiment. We 
could of course introduce another operator 0 such that 
4(0-(.loves ; ) expresses XxAy(x loves y in @). This shows up 
hov/ Quine’s important -insight into how an operator'language 
can be extended to a quantificational one (cp. van Renthem’s 
detailed survey in connection with temporal discourse,
[104]) remains a theoretical one as far as we are concerned. 
Ror clearly our ordinary modal operators do not follow the 
convention çf binding the last or any other argument place 
of a predicate - witness the fact that we do not require the 
insertion of 0 to make intelligible the ordinary use of 
It ,is nossible that. And it brings me back to the differ^ 
ence between the notational systems we have been dealing 
with, which concerns the argument places which # and w.^ are
allowed to occupy. If we are to say that the ....
system, when added to a first order language, produces jusu 
a notational variant of a two-sortea language, iu is one in 
which the two sorts of variable are kept clearly segregated. 
The second sort of variable must be regaroed as inferior in 
that their role is restricted to indexing assertions aDour 
the first sort of entity over which uhe ordinary variables 
range - it allows for no judgements solely about worlds.
In concluding this brief section I would like to say
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uhau perhaps uoo nucr is made of the lack of explicit ref­
erence to worlos in average English modal discourse. For we 
have seen that there are various ways of extending our 
ordinary operator language (of O, O  and A, say) into a 
quantificamional one, not the least of which involves mixing 
in an "in” operator 0 and the relevant variables. It seems 
to me that if ordinary speakers had an interest in express­
ing modal distinctions more finely they would resort to the 
extensional idiom. The moral here is drav/n from the 
temporal case: we do have a need to go beyond what leach 
calls ’grass-roots' temporal discourse, involving only the 
operators I and ? - which on their own merely act as point-^ 
ers, pointing either forwards or backwards in time - to 
express distinctions which require the explicit mention of 
moments or intervals of time. In this respect it is 
significant both that the possible worlds idiom is not hard 
for an ordinary speaker to understand and that philosophers 
- who by tradition have more interest than most in getting 
modal issues straight - will resort to the idiom when 
convenient, even if they prefer not to countenance worlds 
as genuine members of their ontology.
CHARTRB TWO: MOHTAGUE AND MOEEL I.'HICORY
1 : STRUCTURAL 3EMANTTCS AND MODEL'THEORY
In this section. I shall attempt to elucidate the 
nature of the semantic programme largely inspired by the 
writings of Richard Montague. I start with the distinction 
between lexical and structural semantics. The distinction 
is natural, and easy to state in general terms', lexical 
semantics is concerned with the specific meanings of the 
various words which occur in some language. Oti'uctural 
semantics is concerned with the way.these meanings can com­
bine to form the infinity of different meanings expressed by 
the infinity of different sentences of the language. 
Strucural semantics deals with the forms of contribution to 
truth conditions (or whatever the central semantic property 
is taken to be), lexical semantics deals with particular 
contributions. Content and form, base and^recursion - what 
could be simpler?
To make the distinction is not by itself to make a 
commitment to the view that they are separable enterprises. 
Lexical semantics, if it is to systematically comply with 
Frege’s admonition only to_ ask for the meaning of a word in 
the context of a proposition, must presuppose tne general 
insights of structural semantics in order to give the proper 
forms to its meaning specifying clauses. On une Davidsonian 
conception of a theory of meaning, the main function of 
structural semantics is to provide answers to the question: 
vrnat is the form of clause foe this kind of word (or con­
struction)? On that conception, the two components of
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semantic theory are inseparable parts of a single empirical 
enterprise, in tnat they would not be tested independently 
but uhrough "uhe products of their interaction, the T- 
senuences. nevertheless, the structural component must have 
a degree of independence from the lexical. Gne can pose the 
question: what is the mode of contribution of this type of 
v/ora? v/ithout inquiring too far into the particular speci- 
m.ens v/liich iunction in that way. This becomes cO.earor from 
consideration Oj. Montague's chosen method for the semantic 
invesuiga,cion of a. language, model theory, where the 
particular meanings of most expressions are left schematic.
In extensional model theory., EMT, it is customary to 
take a model .7^  for a language E to be a pair <A,E). A is a 
set of entities - as before (81.2), the domain of indi- 
viduaO.s talked about in L. F is a function, an assignment 
of appropriate extensions to the constants of I,. In 
particular,
(1) For any name (X & h, F((X) 6 A
- names denote entities. To a 1-place predicate (p it 
assigns a set, which can be regarded as a function from 
entities to truth values, the characteristic function of the 
set. Two members of A may be conventionally chosen as the 
truth, values truth and falsity, eg. the numbers 1 and 0 
respectively. So
(2) For any 1-place predicate cp, F(cp)6{l,q}^.
The semantic classification ox expressions .is effected 
through the types of their possiole denotations. .the oaslc 
types are e , that of entities, i.e. members of A, and u, tnat 
of the two trutli values. The set of typos is defined as the 
smallest set Y such that i) e,te x and i.i) i.i o.,oé; i 
6 Y. <a,b) is the type of functions from things of type a
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to things of type b. Thus the type of a name o< is e , and of 
a 1 "place predicate y  is <e,t)>,
F enables the model theorist to by-pass the truth 
theorist's lexical-semantical lists of clauses for the non­
logic al constants (cp. 1.2.2). It allows him to charac­
terise the extensions of these expressions in general, 
semantical terras. The reference of names cX is characterised, 
relative to a m o d e l = <A, F^ and a value assignment g of 
values (in A) to variables, by the one clause
( 3 )  \ g ( o < , g A )  = f W
(relativity to a language is implicit in a model for L, 
whose syntax should really be given.) For variables/3
(4)
Satisfaction in a model, T^^, for 1-place predicates Ç? gets 
the clause
(5) , s A )  = g V )  6 F(y).
The clauses for and and not are generalised for in the 
obvious way, and if p> is a variable of type e,
(^) = (3v^6A)T^g(y,g','^),
where g' is like g except, if at all, in assigning v to y3 
- is the Quantifier clause. Truth in a model, T (y,')^ ), is 
defined parallel to 1.2.11, ie. in terms of satisfaction by 
all valuations. Truth in a domain, T . (y,A ), is truth, no 
matter how the constants are assigned extensions (in A), 
ie. (VP)Tj.^ (Cp,<A, F^) . Removing this final relativity brings 
truth in every (non-empty) domain, T-, ((p), which is 
(VA ) ( V F ) ( y , <A, F>), :ie. ' logical truth,
In order to get at what the model theorist accom­
plishes with this truth, definition, it is helpful to compare 
it with the correspondence theory. The theories share, tv/o 
fundamental characteristics. i) "It makes t.cut.b a relation".
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This - usually uttered accusingly - needs to be qualiCled.
As far as the correspondence principle is concerned - a true 
sentence/statement is one v/hich corresponds to the facts - 
it is correspondence which is the relation, the obtaining of 
wliich is concurrent with the holding of the unary property 
of truth. Secondly, even a Tarskian 'absolute’ theory makes 
sequences a crucial relatum of truth. Indeed, Davidson has 
argued that this kind of theory deserves to be deemed a 
correspondence theory, precisely because it explains truth 
in terms of a relation between words and world, satisfaction 
( [16],p.758). It is tempting to think that the Tarskian 
theory in fact explains truth in terms.of two relations, not 
one: satisfaction and reference (roughly, the descriptive 
and demonstrative relations with which Austin sought to • 
account for correspondence.) But if we believe that the 
sentence/statement is the basic unit of currency in lin­
guistic transactions, this must be the wrong way of ex­
plaining things - it puts the small change'first, rather . 
than the basic property, truth. There is a circle here - as 
Dummett puts it: "in the order of explanation the sense of a 
sentence is primary, but in the order of recognitnon the 
sense of a word is primary" ([29]jp.4). (For this reason, 
one can accept that truth is basic without thinking that 
evidence for a semantic theory cannot accrue at the sub- 
sentential level.) Or, in terms of the correspondence 
theory, since there is no independent account of what a fact 
is, there is no explaining the ordinary, unrelativised 
concept, of truth by means of the relativised concept of 
corn e spqnd enc e ,
ii) Both theories are, in. an important sense, 
schematic. Understood as a straightforward piece of English
8 4
the correspondence principle conveys two truisms: that 
factual, ie. capable-of-heing-true, discourse :1s factual, 
ie. concerning-itself-with-facts, discourse ; and that that 
v/hich is true is that which does correspond to the facts.
If v/e do not consider a statement to be of a kind which 
states facts, we do not consider it a fit subject for as­
sessment as to truth or falsityThe principle is thus a 
proto semantic theory of the nature of truth: a true state­
ment is one which has this crudely articulated semantic 
function: it corresponds to the facts. The principle itself 
says nothing about which sectors of discourse are to count
C'
as factual, ie. what would count as a fact, and what would, 
not. (Thus with the additional assumption which Austin made, 
that it is "simply not the business of such utterances 
[as eg. of arithmetical formulae] to 'correspond to the 
facts'", he drew the -conclusion that it would be wrong to 
evaluate them as true or false ([2],pp.151-52). Similarly, 
the definition of truth provided by EMT doesn't by itself 
rule on what kind of sentence is to count as true or false. 
Consider for example subjectivity, a potential blemish of 
certain natural language predicates. If beauty really is 
in the eye of the beholder, it cannot faithfully represent 
the nature 'of the predicate beautiful to say that there is 
a set of all and only the beautiful things, uniquely deter­
mined as its extension - as 5) in effect does. If two 
people disagree over whether something is beatiful, it is 
not simply that they have different beliefs; if beauty 
genuinely is a subjective matter, there is no 'in principle' 
correct answer to whether something falls within the ex­
tension of beryfciful - even if there is agreement amongst 
speakers on the intension. The question is not whether
8 5
EMT rules out heanti fu]., but whether there is no way of 
extending it to provide a definition of something like 
truth 'for subjective predicates.) .
The correspondence principle is sometimes put in 
terms of the ’situation formula’ : a statement is true if 
the situation or state of affairs stated to obtain does 
obtain. We can reformulate the latter for the simplest 
case of a statement of subject-predicate form as: if the 
thing named as the subject has the property expressed by 
the predicate, or less richly: if it is one of the things 
the predicate applies to (cp.[46jp.126). In spelling out 
the idea of correspondence in a little more detail, by thus 
giving one part of what would have to be a recursive defi- 
nition for the different sentential forms of the language , 
we have something recognizably an informal counterpart to 
the RHS of the model theorist’s clause 5). 'If the parallel 
is correct the LHS of 5), the truth of (p(o<.) in a model is 
the formal correlate of <p(b<)'s corresponding to the facts.
One may conceive of changing the assignment E in two 
ways, one linguistic, the other factual. The fact that 
there will be E.| , Eg such that (<x) e ((p) and E^ («^ ) f Ep (<p) 
may be conceived of as a variation in the meanings of the 
expressions^ and therefore of what they have as extensions, 
the facts remaining the same, or as a variation in the facts 
of the matter, ie. what falls within what set, the meanings 
held constant. On the former conception logical truth, T^, 
truth no matter what assignment E and domain are chosen, 
comes out as truth, no matter what the non-logical constants 
mean or, if you will, no matter what language - of this 
structure - you chose. On the other, Ipgical truth is the 
familiar idea of truth in all possible worlds. The
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important -thing is that is truth solely in virtue of 
composition (in the right v/ay) out of the logical constants. 
Actually, there is a slight problem with - the second con­
ception. There is nothing to stop there being an assignment 
F which includes the denotation of Oa.egar amongst the things 
which fall under frpg, or v/hich assigns circular and sruiare 
overlapping extensions. This is the familiar point, pressed 
eg. by Quine against Carnap ([88],p.25), that logical truth, 
in the wide sense, is wider than metaphysical.truth in the 
not so wide sense. And not only are models dubious surro­
gates for possible states of affairs i.n allowing in more 
than is genuinely possible, we would also expect there to be 
differences between states of affairs which models cannot 
match, since the latter are relative to the expressive 
resources of a particular language (cp.[75],pp.155-54). 
Because the parallel between models and possible facts is 
therefore not exact, it would be best to say that the 
relative notion of truth in a model explicates the idea of 
correspondence with the facts. In so doing, the model 
theorist shows that the wrong things were expected, of the 
schematic idea of correspondence - its use is not in the 
explanation of ordinary, unrelativised truth but, by 
blotting out the particular meanings of the non-logical 
constants, to enable a definition of T^.
If the model theorist is to bear out a claim to be 
providing structural semantics, he must explain v/hy this 
discipline should be so interested in the meanings of one 
group of words, the logical constants - or, to put it 
another way, why a theory of semantic structure should pro- 
vide a theory of logical form. Log!cad fcurn is a. notion 
v/hich tends to get overworked, but its basis must surely be
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the idea of the form a sentence has which is relevant to its 
role in logical arguments. So a theory of logical form, for 
the sentences of some language, will presuppose an account 
of logical argument - a characterisation (whether syntactic 
or semantic) of consequence, A set of logical expressions 
will be distinguished from the nonlogical, and it will be 
their interpretation which counts, as far as the logical 
form of a sentence goes, the rest being irrelevant. Thus on 
the normal reading of 
(7) Something loves everything,
of the various obvious candidates a) (3at-^ ) (Vv^ , )loves (v.., , v^ , ), 
b) (3v^)(Vv2)Y(v.j,V2), and c) (Q^v^)(QgV2)Y(v.],V2 ), it is 
representation b) which optimally reveals its logical form. 
The logical form of a sentence presupposes an interpretation 
of the logical constants, as Grandy has emphasised ([45], 
p.157); and strictly speaking, no more. As the example also 
shows, a theory of logical form for a natural language will 
also require a mapping, specifiable in principle, from its 
sentences onto their forms. This mapping will enable us to 
produce qua,si-English sentences such as a), which reveals 
the logical form of 7) in virtue of being a paraphrase of it 
in accordance with some theory of logical form.
The natural way to understand semantic structure is 
as semantically relevant form. If structural semantics is 
concerned with the ways in which the words of a language can 
contribute to the meanings of sentences in which they occur, 
it must produce groupings of words according to their shared, 
semantic function. Since the semantic structure of a 
sentence will not concern any particular contribution to its 
truth conditions, it would best be displayed by shov/i.ng the 
sentence as a collection of members of such and such
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semantic categories in such and such a combination. 7) is 
made up by a combination of tv/o quantifiers -and a two-place 
relation; c) is therefore the representation which optimally 
displays its semantic structure, a) and b) (in conjunction 
with an assignment of the v/oi'ds to their semantic cate­
gories) also reveal the semantic structure of 7), but they 
do more besides. So why equate semantic structure (c)) with 
logical form (b))?
Structural semantics, on the conception outlined so 
far, will be based upon very general categories of words - 
giving the common semantic function of nouns, of adjectives, 
and so on. The pressure for extending this basis to provide 
more detail seems to stern from a desire to account for 
certain inferences as valid in virtue of the semantic com­
position of the sentences involved. The more general the 
semantic categories, the sparser the collection of struc­
turally valid inferences. If we lump all and only the 
binary truth-functional connectives into one semantic 
category C, an inference concerning and will count as 
structurally valid just in case it depends on the truth- 
functionality, not the particular truth function, of the 
word, ie., if it is an instance of substitution of material 
equivalents. But C does not correspond to the natural 
syntactic category of binary connective, since there are 
plenty of non-truth-functional connectives. The more 
inclusive category would produce an even weaker character­
isation of structurally valid inference. Similarly, a 
general characterisation of adjectives will discount an 
inference (X j s a P6 to (X j s. a 6 as structurally valid, in 
view of such adjectives as rossible ([75],p.21l). So 
instead one might approach the not j on fi'ODi a. dilferent
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direction,- an Davidson does. Ho holds that the inference
from "Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom" to "Jones 
buttered the toast" is a structural, one,in view of his 
intuition that "it has something to do v/ibh the fact that 
'buttered' turns up in both sentences"([18],p.143). This 
imparts a "common conceptual element" to the two sentences. 
The entailment is structural because "it depends on the fact 
that the word 'buttered' is playing a certain common role in 
both sentences" ([IS],p.144), ie, the way it contributes to 
the truth conditions of the whole is the same in both cases.
The notion of shared function in conclusion and 
premise cannot be enough by itself to make a criterion of 
the structural inference. A13_ the words in a sentence Cp 
contribute to its conditions of truth in the same way that 
they do in hopcp (as on Davidson's paratactic theory, they 
should also do in Jones be I.i eves that (p , etc.) - yet fot Cp 
does not entail(p on any conception of inference. The 
obvious extra ingredient is that in addition the conclusion 
must be a logical consequence of the premise. An interesting 
demarcation of structurally valid inference will require a 
theory of semantic structure to take account of the partic­
ular meanings of the logical constants. A second point to 
note is that the fact that "buttered" plays a common role in 
"Jopes buttered the toast in his bathroom" and "Jones 
buttered the toast" depends primarily on the way "In his 
bathroom" modifies the latter. To adapt an example of 
Montague's, the inference fails If we take "Jones buttered 
the toast in his dream" as the premise ([73],p.213). If 
Ilavj.d.son's inference is structurally valid., .it must oe 
because the basic category of adverbial phrase has some 
si.vnif leant subcatcp'ot*ies . .i.f tne gene.ral struc tu.ral
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semantic characterisation of tha.t category is adequate, it 
will he capable of spelling out the common function of words 
in thèse subcategories as special cases, and thus explain­
ing their special behaviour.- This is in practice what will 
happen on a sufficiently rich model theoretic account. For 
example, given the simple theory of adjectives as applying 
to the intensions of common nouns, the properties they 
express, adjectives which permit the inference from 
c< is a y66 to ex. is a 6 are those which produce, a subproperty 
of the property expressed by the common noun 6([53],pp.124- 
125).
Cn the present conception, structurally valid infer­
ence is not to contrast with logically valid, which it must 
include, but with what might be termed lexically valid infer­
ence - that which depends on the particular contributions of 
certain elements. The inference from Jones l-rnows tlial: Cp to 
Cp will count as structurally valid if either kpow is a 
logical constant, or if a suitable subcategory is identified, 
of factive sentential adverbial phrases, otherwise it will 
count as lexically valid. This strongly suggests that this 
conception has an obligation to provide us with some demar­
cation of the logical constants, since it deliberately 
permits the' specific lexical contributions of the logical 
constants to figure in structurally valid inference.
Davidson has offered a criterion of logical constancy: 
treatment by a recursive clause in the definition of truth. 
The criterion is, however, notoriously partisan. It picks 
out the standard logical constants from a standard first 
order language - excepting identity - but it is possible to 
treat blatantly non-logical words with a recursive clause: 
at least the extensional adjectives such as four-lcggqd,
9.!
treated as predicate modifiers within bhe context of a 
Tarskian 'absolute' truth definition (as Evans in effect 
pointed out in [37],p.203).
The recursive clause idea can.be made into a working 
criterion if it is formulated within the context of a xcdol 
theoretic definition of truth, An expression is trea.ted as 
a logical constant by a Mrs ory if it is singled out for 
attention by having its meaning specifically stated. The 
non-logical words are those whose meaning is given schemat­
ically, ie. through a basis clause involving P or g. The 
working model.theorist, after all, is not confined by some 
philosophical criterion of logical constancy, but is con­
cerned with the syntactic and semantic characterisation of 
some expression or construction. The description of the 
semantic function of non-logical words in general terms goes 
hand in hand with the characterisation of other expressions 
in detail. A truth definition which captures the indefinite 
contribution to truth conditions of vague predicates will 
provide the means for a definition of an operator "It is 
definite that"; a description of the intensions of words, 
understood as functions from possible worlds to extensions, 
will enable one to define □  and O, and so on,
EMT' characterises the truth and falsity of sentences 
purely in terms of extensional features of their parts.
Frege would have said that it characterises the extensions 
of sentences in terms of the extensions of their parts. In 
compliance with his view we could have written .= 1
instead of Rs would have added that it was-
therefore inadequate to deal with certain constructions.
"It.is a priori that Hesperus is Hesperus" is brue, bub that 
cannot be a function of the exteno.i.ons of the parts, lor rho
9 2
parts of "It is a priori,that Hesperus is ihosphorus" share
those extensions, hut it is false. Frege put this hy saying
that in such contexts as "It is a priori that" ,a sentence
refers to its sense - translating out of his ternlnology, we
may say that the chsuacterisation of the bruth and. falsity
of sentences will in general require us to consider the
senses or intensions of their components. Montague's .in-
tensional model theory of ?TQ, IMT, achieves just that.
An intensional model, or interpretabon for the
language of tensed intensional logic can he considered
a pair r nov/ assigns to constants their
intensions, ie, functions from points of reference <Cv/, b)> é
c
MX I to their extensions at those points'". Thus if c< is a 
constant, its intension w .r .t . %  and g, S(0(,g,9)%), is given 
by:
( s )  s K - . ^ n )  = i’ (c<).
A point of refe^nce encodes the relevant aspects of a con­
text of utterance - in Montague's theory these are, as far 
as this language is concerned, a world w and time t. The 
notion which is recursively defined is stil.l the extension 
of a sentence (but now relative to a point of reference):
Thus I shall also write, where is a 
sentence, T,.,j.(Yj g M - S fo''-' S(y, g,'7%)(<[w , t)>) = 1. A model in 
the old sense, ie. an assignment of extensions to expres- 
sions, is thus a pair consisting of an interpretationand
a point of reference <(w,t^.
The set of types is given an additional clause for
intensions: iii) when a6Y, <s,a>6Y. s is the type of 
points' of reference. In L.v. there are variables of every 
type, so if (X is a variable of type a, g(o<) will be a 
member of the set of appropriate extensions of type a, and
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(9) = g(o().
For functional application, of a function of typo <a,b)>
to an argument 6 of type a, v/e have:
(10) s(^(6),g,^)«w,t» = u(/6,g,'%)«w,t»(s(6,g,';%)«w,t»).
As well as the natural clauses for the various connectives
v/e have a clause for □:
(11) If y  is of type t (then so is ÜCp, and)
T.v.(OY,S,^ '/,k,%) = (Vw'6W)(Vt'6T) T^(y,g,w\t','%)
(boxes are forever). The language also has an intension 
forming operator ^ which forms an expression ^cK of type
<^ s,a)>, from an expression cK of type a. '^ CK denotes the
intension of (X- thus if <X is a sentence, ^cK could be read 
as tlnpt (X. So
(12) S(''cx,g,'»l)(<w,t» = S{o<,g,n).
If c< denotes an intension, ie, is of type <s,a.)>, the result • 
of applying the extension forming operator ^ to it denotes 
the corresponding extension, ie. '^(X, is of type a, and
(13) S('?X,g,'^)«v/,?» = (S(<X,g.U«w,t»)«w,t>).
There are a number of different ways one could 
characterise the syncategorematic expressions of using 
IMT. In order of increasing strength: K is syncategorematic 
if i) the expression is not explicitly assigned an entity or 
function, its sense; ii) there is no clause which (even) 
assigns an extension (showing its sense - assigning it an 
intension implicitly) ; iii) there is no clause which shows hov/ 
the presence of # affects the extension of a complex expres­
sion in which it occurs. Derivatively, these criteria 
apply to expressions 6 of a natural language I which is 
interpreted by translation into - ie, 6 3.s syncabegore- 
matic if its translation Tf(6) is. (There is another, 
syntactic criterion for L: i v ) 6 is not a member of any seb
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of basic expressions of category A,: ie. if it is only
introduced recursively in one of the syntactic rul.es for L;) 
Necessity, □, is categorernatic by iii), but not by i) and .
ii). This is not essential - v/e can, eg. move D u n  a grade 
by using the clause for functional application 10) and the 
clause
(14) 8 (D, g,*^ ) (Ov/, t)>) = that function h such that for any
proposition p, h(p« w , t » )  = 1 iff (Vw')CVt')pOCw*,th>) 
= 1.
But clearly this is just a longv/inded way of saying what 11) 
says. The point is the rather obvious one that if v/e are 
interested in stating the sense of an expression like D, itfs 
no good simply assigning it some function as its sense, 
unless one also characterises that function in some other 
terms - and then talk, of the function becomes a superfluous 
intermediary. Being syncategorematic ala i) or ii) there­
fore says less about the sense of a logical constant than 
the v/ay it is being treated within the theory, viz., as a 
logical constant.
Central to Montague’s conception of semantic theory 
is the claim anounced in the title and first sentence of 
"English as a Formal language"; "I reject the contention 
that an important theoretical difference exists between 
formal and natural languages" ([73],p.188), The optimism in 
this claim is very similar to Davidson's faith in the 
capacity of Tarskian 'absolute' truth theory to be extended 
from formal to natural languages. Montague acknowledges 
this, but also that his claim is made from bhe perspective 
of a model theorist. If we take the paradigm of a formal 
language to be o.ne whose semantics can be given in terms of 
EMT, we can be clear about the kind of difference between
formal and natural languages which Montague denied, his 
optimism, like Davidson's, heralds a programme : to demon­
strate in detail that the techniques which enable the 
concept of trutji to be defined for a. formal language can be 
adapted to cope with the intensionality, indexicality, 
ambiguity, elipsis, vagueness, subjectivity etc. which 
infect natural languages.
Equally, if not more important than these specific 
differences between the two kinds of language is the simple 
fact that a formal language is defined into existence in 
front of our very eyes. In contrast to this, the workings 
of a natural language are not handed to us on a plate.
This raises the question: what kind of evidence is a model 
theoretic treatment of a natural language accountable to?
A lower bound on the acceptability of a structural semantic ' 
theory is its ability to cope finitely with all the differ­
ent constructions in the language. Beyond that, the prin­
ciple means of assessing model theoretic semantics is the 
theorist's reflective insight into the workings of his own 
language. One may use the word "intuition" here if that 
does not give the misleading impression that the process is 
not subjected to rational criticism. We have intuitions 
about scope distinctions, about the preferred scope of a 
word or phrase relative to another kind of phrase. These 
can count towards a systematic account of the kind of thing 
the former expression applies to, for example. I/e have 
intuitions about entailment relations, ie. about the rela- 
tionship between the truth conditions of different pairs of 
sentences. Sometimes these intui Lions are j.aulcy, or people 
mistake their import. V/e shall see examples of tnis in 
section 2.3. V/e can discover mistakes because there are
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principles, such as Grice’s conversational principles, for 
the critical scrutiny of these intuitions - principles 
which enable us to skim off aspects of the significance of 
an assertion not strictly relevant to its conditions of 
truth. And of course, with certain qualifications, conjec­
tures about intensions are subject to conformity with actual 
extensions. Some intuitions about meaning are (as) unas­
sailable (as anything can be). . All English speakers will 
agree that the word ^  refers, in a context, to the one who 
produces the sentence containing it in that context. 
Precisely how this simple insight is to be incorporated into 
a systematic formal theory is another matter. This will 
depend to a large extent on the best overall account of the 
ways contexts can regulate sense. The choice of such 
theories is subject to philosophical appraisal. As Dummett ■ 
put it in his Shearman lectures, a semantic theory must 
serve as the basis for a theory of meaning - a model theory 
which does not present an acceptable picture of the workings 
of certain expressions has only technical significance. 
Possible worlds, for instance, provide a reasonable means 
of representing objective conditions of truth. But there 
are questions of detail to consider, as Pripke’s work on 
rigid designation exemplifies (this leads back to intuitions 
about scope, of names in relation to modal operators - cp. 
@2.4). There are also questions of application - is this 
objectified notion really adequate for all the tasks we 
want sense to perform (which leads back eg. to the question 
of whether certain truth values assigned to propositional 
attitude sentences are acceptaole)? Altnough iion bague dis­
dained psychological considerations, a.t lease in so far as 
they translate into the precise requlreinenb bhab
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propositional attitude sentences be properly accounted for, 
they are a powerful constraint.
After semantic data regulated by philosophical 
inquiry, a second constraint on model theoretic structural 
semantics is syntactic data regulated by linguistic theory. 
Syntax and semantics exist in a certain degree of tension 
with one another. Syntax is a 'theory of meaningfulness' 
for a language - it should characterise all and only the 
expressions capable of bearing a meaning in the language. 
Traditionally, the logician demands of the syntax of a 
formal language that it a) defines the set of well-formed 
expressions and b) provides a basis for the semantic inter­
pretation. Logical perfection in a language - as defined 
by Kaplan ([56],p.214) - requires that for each syntactic 
formation rule there is a corresponding semantic evaluation 
•rule. An artificial language will be logically perfect 
unless there is some good reason not to design it so. But 
with a natural language syntax cannot simply be manipulated 
to serve the ends of semantics. First and foremost it is 
answerable to empirically given"facts about well-formedness 
supplied by eg. native speakers' intuitions about grammat­
ical! ty. Syntactic well-formedness and intelligibility or 
meaningfulness even seem to come apart at various places. 
Bearerless proper names and failed definite descriptions 
constitute one kind of example, where some philosophers 
have suspected that akwell-formed sentence may fail to ex- 
press a proposition. Another kind comes from the violation 
of conceptual possibility already alluded to above, and 
illustrated by J ones ^ i s a j ■roof t r e e. But charac ter.ls Lie 
of such potential nonsense is its .abilJ.ty to pr'oduce sense 
when taken in an. anpropriave con ue.xt — og« In moLachorical
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use, or embedded in a propositional attitude construction:
(15) Jones dreamt that he v/as a proof tree
(cp.[95],p.72 ). This contrasts with genuine syntactic 
rubbish, which is not capable of making sense - eg, in
(16)*Jones dreamt that he and not
I suggested earlier that structural semantics start from a 
basis in the major syntactic categories. It may then 
deviate from the syntactic classification either by singling 
out logical constants from their category or by subdividing 
these categories under pressure to account for certain 
inferences (there may be other pressures - cp. pp.109-110). 
The correspondence may also break down in the other direc­
tion, in that different syntactic categories are assigned 
the same semantic type (cp. p.99).
99
2 ; ' MODALITY A m  MONTAGUE GRAMMAR
Montague * s approach to English in PTQ was to inter­
pret it indirectly, through a four stage process, i) The 
syntactic characterisation of a formal language (and a 
system of logic within it), ii) The interpretation of L* by 
a model theoretic truth definition, iii) The syntactic 
characterisation of a fragment of English and iv) The defi­
nition of a system of translation of sentences of that 
fragment to L*, according to their syntactic composition.
In this section I wish to concentrate on stages iii) and 
iv) of this process, with particular reference to the actual 
treatment of modality which Montague gave, and some exten­
sions of it which allow other modal locutions to be treated. 
By supplying these extra stages, Montague demonstrated by 
example one way of making model theory applicable in the 
study of natural language.
The lexicon is divided into sets of different basic 
expressions, B^, of basic terms, B^y, of basic transitive 
verbs, and so on. T and TV are syntactic categories. The 
basic expressions of a category A form a subset of the 
phrases of that category; (There are no basic (ie.
unstructured) sentences - B^ is empty.) There is a rule f 
which correlates every syntactic category with a semantic 
type, defined thus : f(e) = e, f(t) = t and f(A/B) =
<<s,f(B)>,f(A)>. Two syntactic categories may be correlated 
with the same type, as CN and IV, the categories of common 
noun and intransitive verb, are with <<s,e>,t>. Naturally, 
the categories CN/CN and IV/IV, of adjectives and verb- 
modifying adverbs, are also mapped to the same type, 
«s,«s,e>,t»,«s,e>,t». A category A/B (and A//B) is
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one of expressions which combine with an expression of 
category B to form one of category A# Thus necessarily, the
only modal locution Montague deals with and sole occupant of
the set of sentence-modifying adverbs, is correlated
with the type <%s,t)>,t)>. This means that it is to be
translated into an expression of 1* of this type - something 
which forms a sentence from a proposition-denoting expres­
sion* . Where p is a prepositional variable of L*, type <(s,t)> 
(T1c) TR(ne ces sarily) = Ap(O^p).
To be told that an expression is of category t/t is
not yet to be told how it forms sentences out of sentences 
- we need a syntactic rule. Not surprisingly, it is this: 
(S9) If 6  ^^ t/t* 6 where
= Sji,
Pg is the 6-th structural operation, a function from expres­
sions to expressions - in this case, concatenation. S9) 
has its corresponding translation rule 
(T9) If ^6  P^ and TR(<S) = 6*, TR(^) = j5\ then
TR(Fg(8,/3)) = 6'L"/6’J •
(To avoid unnecessary repetition, I shall adopt the conven­
tion here that Cp' is to symbolise the translation intb. L* of 
(p, and ' is to abbreviate "the result of replacing the 
main verb in <p by its first person singular present".)
Every sentence of the fragment will have as many 
analysis trees, which display its syntactic construction, as 
there ways of constructing it via the syntactic rules.
Since there are non—trivial variants, this is to say that 
the fragment contains structurally ambiguous sentences. As 
an illustration, let us consider the de dicto and de r^
readings permitted of
(1) Necessarily, every man is a man.
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To the right of each non-basic expression displayed in the 
tree, I will list the structural operation and syntactic 
rule of PTQ by means of which it is produced from the 
expressions immediately below it. We have:
(la) necessarily every man is a man ; S9
every man is a man ; 84necessarily
every man 82 be a man P^; 85
man be a man Pg: 82
man
(1b) necessarily every man is a myi P^q  ^; 814
every man Pq ; 82 necessarily he^ is a man P^ ; 89
man necessarily he  ^ is a man P^; 84
be a man P^; 85
be a man Pg: 82
man
Translation proceeds according to construction, 
starting with the simplest and working up. It is at this 
point that one can appreciate the power and generality which 
the glut of variahles in 1* (ie. from every type) imparts to 
the method of semantic representation through translation 
into 1*. The initial translations of non-basic English 
expressions generally involve a greater complexity than is
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needed in their final representation, and are designed to be 
simplified by the application of a number of rules and 
meaning postulates. Thus if (p is a sentence of English,
TR (necessarily Cp) = (Ap) (□^p)|^Cp*J , 
which by lambda conversion equals n^^Cp\ which in turn is 
equivalent to . One may end up with a simple first order 
representation of a sentence - having arrived via this 
system of semantic, rather than syntactic, manipulation.
Let us consider the translation of 1) which results 
by proceeding according to the analysis tree la) version of 
its construction, v^ are individual variables, type e; 
are individual concept variables, type <s,e>; are vari­
ables of type <(s,<<(8,e^,t%>, of properties of individual 
concepts; andcP a variable over properties of these prop­
erties, type <s,«s,<Ks,e>,t»>,t».
(i) TR(man) = man*.
(ii) TR(a man) = AQ^x., (man* (x., ) & ). T2, where
if y is of type <s,<a,t>> and OC of type a, is
("/%)[*].
(iii) TR(W) =AJPAxq^{x2('^ Xq = ^Xg)J where is
(iv) By T5, TR(be a man) =
X J ^ \ x ç p [ x ^ C ^ Q  = '^X2)jL"AQo3x.,{m^*(x.,) & QqIx^] )]
= Axp^AQo3x.|(man*(x.,) & '
(v) TR(every man) = AQ'|Vx^(m^* (x^) —»
(vi) By T4, TR (every man is a man) « AQ^Vx^(man* (x^) —> 
Q-,{x3})rAxo'V^Qo3x^(aaS’(xi) & Qol^l? = ""^2^3]
= \/x, (man* (x^) —> "^Axq^AQo^^i (S-S* ^ 1^ ^ ^ Oo{^i3 )
[x2("'xq = "'X2)3 W ) '  =
Vx, (man* (x^ ) AQq3x.j (man* (x^  ) & ^3” ^2^3 ^
= Vx^(man* (x%) —> 3 x.j (man* (x.| ) & ( x^ = x.j))).
(vii) So TR(necessarily every.man is,a .man) =
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DVx^(man* (x^) 3x.j (man* (x.j ) & ('^ x^  = x^.| ) ) ). 
man* is of type <3Cs,e)>,t)>, and man** expresses the corre­
sponding set of individuals, ie. is of type <e,t); man * * = 
Avman* (^y). Since man is not an *intensional* common noun, 
ie. it doesn*t give rise to the Partee problem (cp.[73], 
p.248), this translation reduces, by Montague’s second 
meaning postulate, to
□Vv^(man**(v^) 3v^ (man**(v^ ) & (v^ = v^))), ie.
( 2 ) DVv^(man*^(v^) —» man**(v^)),
a translation displaying the simple quantified modal logical 
form of 1), according to which it conveys the claim that the 
dictum that all men are men is necessary. Similarly, a 
translation of 1) in accordance with the analysis tree 1b) 
will simplify to
(3) Vv^(man**(v^) -» Dman**(v^) ).
Here is a generalised essentialist claim that something 
which is a man is so necessarily.
I want now to consider how to extend the Montague 
fragment in relat^ion to the variety of forms of modal locu­
tion that occur in English. The question of how much
natural modality can be interpreted in terms of the □  which 
Montague defines at 2.1.11 above will be postponed until 
the next section. I will firstly consider three hypotheses 
for the treatment of the modal auxiliary verbs, i) As 
forming new intransitive verb phrases from old:
(820) If 6 ePjy, then F^qCS), ^
= must & . Pg^ (6) = can & and » cannot 6 •
Alternatively, one could expand the category =
^wish to,try toj and treat them as normal IV-taking verb 
phrases. One way of securing the intended interpretation 
would be by laying down special meaning postulates, which
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impose a restriction on those models considered admissible;
(4) □(must*^^(x) 5 06(x)), where 5 translates any member 
of Pj^.
(5) r~l(caji'^A(x) = %(x)), 6 as in 4), etc.
This style of meaning postulate could also be employed in 
interpreting the adjective possible, ie.
(6) □  (possible * ( X ) = <%(x) ), where 6 translates any
member of Pqjj.
However, this is an unnecessarily roundabout way of achieving 
the same effect that would be secured by adopting special 
translations such as
(7) TR(can) = TR(possible) = AQAxOq{x J.
ii) A treatment which parallels the one Montague gives for 
tense and negation:
(S21) If otePg,, then Pg^Coc.S),
£ P^, where Pg_(i/,6) = ocgugtS, («., 6) = (xçan &
and = fxcannot S ,
with the translation rule:
(T21) If ocfePj, 6 e P ^ ,  then TR(Pg^(<x,5)) = □ tx T S ') ,
TR(Pg^(«,&)) = OcxTS*) and TR(Pgg(o(,S) = O-'X' (' ).
iii) As a variant of the second approach, we have eg.: 
(S22/T22) If then = the
result of replacing the first verb 6 in Cp by must S , 
and TR(?2 (^cp)) = DCjp*.
As will be apparent from 1b), adverbs classed as 
sentence-modifying are not precluded from taking scope 
narrower than that of a quantifier phrase. In PTQ distinc­
tions of scope are held to be the respqeibility of terms, 
eg. quantifier phrases, through the different ways they com­
bine with expressions, rather than the responsibility of the 
operators with which they interact. This delegation of
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responsibility is borne out by the following pair of 
sentences:
(8) Any one of us may be killed
(9) Every one of us may be killed.
Spoken before the troops are about to go over the top, 8) is
naturally understood to assert of each of them that it is 
epistemically possible that he will be killed, whereas 9) 
makes the stronger claim that the following is possible: all 
of them are killed. Clearly, the different scope prefer­
ences cannot be a matter of the position of the modal term
in 8) and 9)» since it remains the same, but must arise
through the ways the two quantifier phrases interact with 
it. Montague mentioned the fact that different quantifier 
words, provide a means for reducing scope ambiguity in every­
day language (L73],P"215), and suggested that rules might be 
given for restricting the number of possible syntactic 
analyses. Sometimes, of course, both scope readings may be 
possible.
(10) Someone must be unhappy
o
could be undersood as a comment on the total misery in the 
world, with the epistemic necessity taking wide scope; 
alternatively, as a comment upon the screaming coming from 
the next room, with the existential quantifier out front.
These considerations must lead us to reject hypoth­
esis i) concerning the modal auxiliaries. Treating an 
adverb as verb—modifying will not enable it to take scope 
wider than that of a quantifier phrase lying in subject 
position. Whereas it is acceptable to have uossible modi­
fying things of type «s,e>,t>, as f) and 10) testify, the 
corresponding restriction of must, can, may and co. would be 
incorrect. What of the converse policy of allowing
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necessarily narrow scope? It may be thought, for example, 
that 1b) is an implausible reading of 1), given that every 
is a universal quantifier with a predilection for narrow 
scope. However, as the syntax of PTQ only allows a sentence 
modifying adverb 6 to occur at the front of a sentence Cjp, we 
must allow for some means of syntactically transforming 6cp 
to insert S into the middle of Cp, We should reserve a de re 
reading for eg. "Every second is possibly your last" - for 
this reason as least, 1b) and its ilk should stay. (Note 
that since Montague adopts a once and for all domain of 
individuals A, the forms VxO and OVx are equivalent. Scope 
distinctions are significant because all the quantifier 
phrases in the PTQ fragment are restricted quantifiers. But 
because proper names are treated as rigid designators - 
through the meaning postulate 3uC3(u *= j), where j is the 
name in L* for John - different syntactic analyses of such 
sentences as John must win have no semantic significance.)
Needless to say, we have sufficient means in PTQ to 
handle the distinctions of scope we saw arising in 16a) - 
16c) of 81.4, as the following sample of (not fully exe­
cuted) syntactic breakdowns displays:
(a) Pg(possibly, P^(P.|(man with the hat), P^(be,
Eg(candidate for presidency)))).
(b) P.JQ g(Pi (man with the hat), (possibly, P^(heQ, P^(^, 
Pg(candidate for presidency))))).
(c) P^(Pi(man with the hat), P^(]^, Pn(Pg(possible, 
candidate for presidency)))).
In deciding between the two remaining proposals for 
the modal auxiliaries, it may help to bring in a few more 
constructions involving modality. There is a family of 
locutions which, like it is possibly true thatcy, are based
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on a dummy s u b je c t Here is  a s e le c t io n :
fpQ S S ib le  1 C th a t + in d ic a t iv e
( 1 1 )  It is V  impossible I  < i £  + infinitive
/ necessary J / for + infinitive
Ç may be A f that
(12) ^  J might be L / true' that
I must be J I the case that 
It is desirable that the relation is exhibited between these 
and other sentence-modifying adverbial phrases, such as 
John believes that. And there is another bunch of expres­
sions, connected with the substantive possibility; for 
example
C ') (genuine) (that + indicative
( 1 3 )  There/  is >a< real Vpossibility J of + gerund
(will be ] /slight j (££■*■ noun phrase
This apparently frank ontological commitment to possibil­
ities is accompanied by a preparedness to count them: "one 
possibility is to ...", "there are three possibilities ...", 
etc.
Montague treated the verb phrases believe that. 
try to as unstructured - basic expressions of the categories 
and respectively. Their grammatical role is
given by functional application, eg. for the former 
(S7/T7) If and then Fg(5,ip) = and
TR(Fg(6 ,<jf)) = 6 ' r y  ) .
An alternative would be to treat the that and ^  as syncate- 
gorematic, ie. with believe and try the members of 
and BjYyyjy, and
(S7'/T7') If S e Fjy/^-and <p4 l>^ , then = 6 that(p
£ and IR(Fg^(6 ,9 )) = 6' C f  ).
The it S thatcp construction of 11) and 12) can be produced
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directly, via Bennett's rule (from C 7]»p.H5)
(S23) If 6 € By 6 , then ?2g(6,(p) = it &* * that Cp e. P^,
where in B^y^ go such verbs as be possible.
(This forces adoption of the . syntactically more superficial 
hypothesis iii) for the modal auxiliaries.) Montague's 
proposal has the disadvantage that it cannot handle
(14) John believes everything Mary believes.
This cannot be derived from the ^  dicto "John believes that 
everything Mary believes is true", for 14) could be true 
even though John knows nothing of Mary, and the latter could 
be true even if unwittingly, John disbelieves something 
believed by Mary. Nor is the other proposal any better just 
because it does not weld that to believe, for it still 
characterises believe as IV/t (type « s , t>,<J(s,e^,t)>/^), yet 
everything Mary believes is not a sentence. On this ap­
proach, one would have to postulate a second believe, member 
of Bjy, yet distinct from a third believe, as it occurs in 
John believes .Mary (cp. for know). Moreover, in order to 
handle constructions such as 13), Montague would have to 
introduce' a new category CN/t - for possibility that, belief 
that - ignoring the common role that plays in this and the 
previous construction (cp. ^  in be able to /3 and ability 
^15» Likewise, Bennett's rule passes over intuitively 
significant structure in be possible.) Consider, for 
example,
(15) There is a possibility that John will win.
With a rule for CN/t parallel to S7), we may expect
TR(possibility that John will win) = possibility that' 
(^Prwin'(^j)).
With a rule for the there of existential assertions 
(S24/T24) If ^X.^Pjy and c< is of the form , then
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é where = there oc* * and TRfPggO*)) = AQ3xQ{x} C^ «f)
and Montsigue's relation notation 8(15) (oc) = <S(o^ ,^ ),
TR(15) = 3x possibility that*(x. win' (^  j) ).
We could introduce a special meaning postulate to reduce 
this to
(16) OP win'C~n).
but this would be ^  hoc, and it would leave unexplained 
the relation between other occurrences of the noun phrase, 
as in
(17) The possibility that John will win amuses Bill 
and the concept of possibility, ie O.
It seems to me that in the respects we have just 
been discussing, the syntax of PTQ should be regarded as a 
simplification of the proper theory, one which exploits more 
fully the rich semantic resources available. The full 
theory treats as term phrases both that 0  and everything 
Mary believes, but terms at a new level of ontology, the 
prepositional level. The general idea, suggested by the 
work of E.B. Delacrus (L28j), is to make more use in the 
syntax of the multiplicity of semantic types by introducing 
a new level of grammar wherever terms are discerned which 
denote things of an appropriate type. In PTQ, everything is 
geared to the individual concept level, in that term phrases 
and common nouns respectively denote individual concepts and 
sets thereof. Delacrus adds to this the prepositional level, 
which contains terms such as that John will win and common 
nouns such as proposition itself. Generalising from this, 
we may think of the syntactic rules of PTQ as, on the whole, 
formulating general modes of syntactic combination of eg.
T's with IV»s, no matter what the level of the expressions 
involved. Each syntactic category A is potentially
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subdivisible into many - let be the individual concept 
level terms, Tg be prepositional level terms, and be 
property level terms (eg. the capacity to win). The syn­
tactic category of entity divides into e.j, Sg, e^,..., and 
we modify the definition of the function correlating syn­
tactic categories and semantic types as follows: 
f(e.j) = e; f^Sg) = t; f(e^) = <<s,e>,t>;...
Just.considering the first two levels, we see that the 
category of TV now splits four ways: Bjy , the old set
Bjy/t > ^ f entaiJL^; ^lv.j/T * f » believe,
ignore,...]; and Bjy ^amuse, surprise....}. as in 17).
The translation of most expressions will depend on 
their precise level. This is.particularly evident in the 
case of those key words and constructions whose particular 
meaning is given by translation into the logical vocabulary 
of 1* and which may recur at different levels. For example, 
we might represent the translation of the existential there 
as follows:
(T24') TR(F2g(«),1) = AQ3xQ(x* C'oC ),
TR(F2g(«),2) =AJ3pJ{p}(''o<.'),
IR(Fgg(o(),3) = ),
where J is a variable over properties of propositions, type 
<s,«s,tX't/^/^- Note that since this restricts there to 
combination with the verb to recover such phrases as 
there may be, hypothesis iii) concerning the modal auxil­
iaries is forced upon us. Consider the way apposition 
functions at different levels. As well as Montague's treat­
ment, at the individual concept level (S3/T3), we have 
(S25/T25) I f a n d  I’cHg* ^29^/®’*'®^ “
jBthaty  and TRCFggCp.cp)) •= Ap(p'(p) & P =''<?')
If /3êPqjj^ and6 £Fiy, ^30^ ’ ^ ^ CNj* ^30^^’^^  "
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and TR(Pj q (^,6)) = AQQS'(Q) & Q = ''6')- 
Examples of are belief, proposition, possibility and
truth; examples of B^^ , ability, tendency.
With the addition of a few natural special trans­
lations we are able to reduce a variety of English modal
sentences to the same underlying form. For example, the
2following is a plausible rendering of the substantive 
(T1f) TR(possibility) = Ap(0^p)
T just the translation one would expect that Montague would 
have given for possibly. But how one assembles an assertion 
with these two words differs. Using T25), T1f) and the 
prepositional level translation for the indefinite article 
TR(a.possibility that John will win) =
AJ3p(O^P & V = ^ F(win«rj)) & Jfp().
Using T24 * ) and the propositlonal level translation of be 
(cp.[28],p.188)
(18) TR(15) = 3p(0'^P & P ^ ^ E Cwin'C^j))) 
which reduces to 16), or OF (win'*(j) ) - something which 
could have been said in a less long-winded manner by 
possibly John will.win.
For it is possible that <p and its variants we have 
to appreciate the workings of adjectives in predicative 
position. To classify adjectives as CK/CK is to take their 
attributive use, c<ls a <$jS, funda­
mental. This must be reconciled with the fact that they are 
used predicatively, o<^s <S, since the semantic type(s) 
correlated with CN/CN deems them incapable of applying di­
rectly to the relevant kind of individual. What makes the 
attributive construal plausible as a more general account 
than taking the predicative use as basic is the fact that 
certain adjectives, eg. former, only seem to make sense used
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attributively. One may then take cxjnS as derivative from 
oC is a S3* with/3 a dummy noun appropriate to the level: 
entity, proposition, etc. We can secure the intended inter­
pretation of the predicative possible throu^ a meaning 
postulate :
(19) □(possible' (^proposition* )(p) sO'^p).
(This cannot be generalised to a l l t r a n s l a t i n g  some mem­
ber of, : a possible belief is a possible-to-be-enter- 
tained belief, rather than a possibly-true belief.) One way 
to put this into action is to use a deletion rule:
(S26/T26) If/SePcN^/ON,' ^31 J£2E2SiîÎ2S) >)^
= , and TR(F^^((p)) = TR(<f?).
Using Delacrus's rules for that-clauses,
(S27/T27) If then P^2(y) = thatg? e , and
TR(F^ 2((p)) « AJ ,
we can construct that John will win is possible using S4). 
This too will simplify to the RHS of 18), and so to OF (win'* 
(j)). Finally, it is plausible to take the it 6 that Cp 
construction as derived from this form of sentence by 
reversing the order of subject and verb and slapping a dummy 
subject on the front
(S28/T28) If and «  = F^ g((p) for some and h e
, then F^^(F^(o(,6)) = itg'cK eP^, and for any 
TR(F^^(/3)) = TR(f3).
(This construal of the dummy subject ^  does not force a 
choice between hypotheses ii) and iii) above.)
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3; MODALITY; MEANING
I now turn to what, from the reflective native's 
point of view, some of the various modal expressions mean.
We can then evaluate the claim of systems other than the S3 
of Montague's intensional logic to represent them. One 
motivation for e mploying S5 is for the benefit of theory: 
it is needed for the meaning postulates to be stated with 
full rigour. It is a separate issue whether we should 
translate ordinary modal locutions into the operators of 
that system. Translation in terms of S3 has some plausi­
bility in the case of the particular word which Montague 
treated. One might argue that because we have few intu­
itions about modal reduction principles such as necessarily cp 
necessarily necessarily (p. we need a system much weaker 
than S3^. But this way of thinking ignores what would be 
the more basic fact, the failure of intuition arising 
throu^ its lack of a grip on the combinations such as 
necessarily necessarily Cp which the reduction laws employ.
If we ordinarily find no point in such iterations, having no 
use for them, our everyday necessarily should be represented 
by a system which collapses this kind of modal distinction,
through reduction laws like those of S3, rather than one
2
which lets them multiply .
It may nevertheless be that a more complex account 
of necessarily will be required than the one Montague gives. 
After all, in everyday life we have little use for the 
logical/metaphysical/conceptual notion of necessity. It is 
often used to express a strictness of conditionality of a 
broadly causal nature, as for example in "Reflation will not 
necessarily lead to inflation". However, I would prefer us
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to turn our attention to the meaning of the modal auxil­
iaries can and must. as these provide, in a clear way, a 
rather rich variation on the theme of modality, and raise 
interesting questions about the variation of meaning from 
context to context. They have recently been studied in this 
connection by Angelika Kratzer. She poses the question: how 
many different senses of must and can should we recognise? 
One might first distinguish a small number of major cate­
gories - the ones I shall shortly discuss are A) Epistemic, 
B) Existential/Universal, C) Ability/Opportunity and D) 
Deontic. One might then think that each of these categories 
further subdivides. On this point appeal might be made to 
the authority of Aristotle: "the senses in which we should 
call a boy and a man and a eunuch 'incapable of begetting* 
are distinct" (from the Metaphysics, A12,1019b). Kratzer 
rejects this idea that can and must are multiply ambiguous, 
favouring the hypothesis that they are univocal but relative 
in sense. But before considering her proposal, it will be 
-helpful to review some of these major categories of their 
sense.
A)j-Epistemic. It is widely recognised that epis­
temic possibility and necessity are frequently involved in 
everyday modal discourse. Quine, for example, writes in 
Word and Object (p.195) that possibly is usually "a modestly 
impersonal rewording of ... 'I am not sure but what'." Of 
the modal auxiliaries must is an obvious representative, as 
in Kartunen's example ([57])
(1) John must have left.
By inserting must the speaker draws attention to the epis­
temic status of the proposition in question -
(2) John has left
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- that 2) follows as an inference from the information he 
possesses, ie, is not known directly. The epistemic use of 
cem is more or less restricted to the negative (cp.[75], i 
8.4), may being the favoured idiom, but it seems to me that 
an example Palmer gives as neutral can be understood as 
epistemic:
(3) Who knows? It can go either way.
Imagine it used of a close run ballot, when all the votes 
are in (so that the result is determined), yet not fully 
counted, to convey the epistemic uncertainty of its utterer.
Kartunen formulates a rule, a "constraint on the use 
of possible that we all seem to follow ...":
(4) Whatever is cannot (possibly) be otherwise.
To motivate the principle, we are presented with some 
examples, not syntactically ill-formed, but anomolous as "a 
matter of the meaning of possible"(f571,p.5). Here are two:
(5) *It isn't raining in Chicago, but it may be raining there
(6) *John is mistaken, but it is possible that he is right.
It is not entirely.clear that the second has no acceptable 
meaning - one might say "It is possible that John is right", 
as a concession, "but (in fact) he is mistaken". This is a 
quibble, since it is to find 6) a reading in terms of 
logical possibility, and this is not the concern of prin­
ciple 4). What is more serious is the unclarity of the 
status of the principle, of the level of explanation offered.
Kartunen considers the consequences of adding 4) to 
one of the standard accounts of the truth conditions of <^ cp, 
where the possibility is logical - not surprisingly, it 
leads to a collapse of modal distinctions - by way of re­
jecting such an account for majr and possible. This suggests
3
that the explanation is offered at the level of sense . Por
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other phenomena, however, he clearly gives an explanation in 
terms of conversational principles. An example of this is 
the Aristotelean distinction between one-sided and two-sided 
possibility. If O 2 represents the latter, then OgŸ s 
Por one-sided possibility, . Aristotle recog­
nised that these two notions cannot be combined, for then 
Qcp would ensue. Kartunen argues that if someone
says something of the form OCjp and is obeying the Gricean 
conversational maxim 'Make your contribution as informative 
as is required', he indicates that he doesn't know the facts 
for sure. So for all he knows, -»cp is also possible.
This seems a good explanation.to me, and it illus­
trates one of the great dangers in using intuition when 
dealing with matters of sense. The fact that we don't or 
shouldn't assert when we know Cp or even OCp, so that we 
only assert it on occasions when0^ -»Cp is also assertible (or 
at least cannot be gainsaid), does not mean that this is to 
be laid down as a principle, ala governing our concept 
of possibility. Exactly parallel considerations apply in 
the case of the principle 4). By Grice's maxims of Quality, 
'Do not say what you believe to be false', 'Do not say that 
•for which you lack reasonable evidence', a speaker should 
have good grounds for an assertion(p he makes. Even if he's 
not absolutely certain that Cp, the epistemic possibility of 
-t^must be a remote one. So being in a position to assert Cp 
makes maybe conversationally inappropriate. But this is 
not to say that ifCp is true, whether jæ know/can assert ^  
or not, • it is epistemically impossible that -i<p. As stated, 
principle 4) makes English speakers out to be either epis- 
temologically very arrogant, or extreme idealists. But 
grD^ oe Kartunen also comes to the conclusion that examples
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such as 5) and 6) are not actually inconsistent but violate 
"the rules of discourse", one cannot definitely accuse him 
of adhering to it in this spirit. It seems that he is 
unaware of the conflict between the two levels of expla­
nation offered.
Let us now consider the epistemic must. Kartunen 
seems to concur with the "intuitive feeling that [1)J is a 
weaker assertion than [2)] " (p.13). A distinction perhaps 
worth drawing here is between the factive and the committal. 
Call a sentence ^  factive with respect to Cp if the truth of 
y  requires, inter alia, the truth of Cp (there are other, 
pragmatic, definitions of factivity, but these may be 
ignored for our purposes.) Call a sentence (p committal 
w.r.t. Cp if the sincere assertion of cp commits the speaker 
to the truth of Cp. The former is a subclass of the latter, 
and Cp is committal, because factive, w.r.t.cp. It seems 
clear that 1) is at least committal w.r.t. 2) - we use the 
must form as a way of asserting the unmodalised sentence.
It is rather like paying "I conclude that John has left".
But there is a difference. Someone might truly assert the 
latter bn the basis of some erroneous and idiosyncratic 
theory of John's behaviour, but we would regard their 
assertion of 1) as false if 2) fails to follow from gener­
ally acceptable assumptions - even if their idiosyncratic 
conclusion turns out to be correct. The must idiom is not 
as subjective as personal reports of belief. But nor does 
it appear to be as strong, as objective, as knowledge. If 
someone makes a mus^ judgement on the basis of an inference 
that would be generally accepted as practically certain, but 
is unfortunate enough to hit a rare counterexample, we would 
not readily call that judgement false. The must idiom is
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not factive - it is a guarded form to be used when the 
speaker does not know for sure.
Since our information changes through time - we gain 
and lose knowledge - we should expect time to enter cru­
cially into the definition of the notion of epistemic 
necessity [H by means of which we interpret must, may, etc. 
The importance of this featue is brou^t out by Strawson's 
recent, analysis of might have statements ([98]). In one 
sense, might have would naturally be translated in terms of 
the combination <$>P, as in "It might have rained last Sunday 
(I can't remember)". But Strawson is interested in another 
sense of the phrase,.one which is compatible with our pres­
ent certainty that the event in question did not happen. A 
good example he gives of this is "You might have been 
killed" - spoken, say, to someone who has just avoided a 
fatal accident. We can approximate his analysis within the 
Montague an style as follows: TR(o< mi^t have 6 ''*) = 
oC ' (^^' ) (where 6 ^  Pjy and <S" ' is its past participle form). 
A mi^ht have statement is true in this sense if there was a 
time when it was not certain that <X wouldn't 6. But cer­
tain to whom? Strawson argues that the knowledge concerned 
would be of an ideal information gatherer, one who would 
collect facts available at the past point in time, even if 
they were not then collected, and who is equipped with our 
present knowledge of the way the world develops. <x mip;ht^  
have 9 ' ' will be true if we can imaginatively project our­
selves back, in the guise of this spy, to a point in time 
when the particular facts available at that time would not 
lead us to say, on the basis of our current knowledge of 
general truths, that the event or state in question will not 
occur. Obviously we do not import particular knowledge
119
concerning the fact of o(.'e (not) &-ing. In making these 
might.have judgements, we are not interested in the possibly 
erroneous perception of how things would develop of people 
around then, if indeed there were any at all. Perhaps no 
one was then appraised of all the relevant particular facts; 
perhaps no one then knew the laws we know about what ensues 
from what. Strawson does not consider the import of past 
facts which would have a bearing on the matter, then known 
but now lost. This perhaps reflects the fact that these 
cannot enter into our (current) appraisal of the situation.
We must assume that our spy would not be empowered to collect 
them.
We can summarise these findings by providing a 
suitable model theoretic characterisation of @  :
(7) T*(Sçp,w,t,'ni) s (Vw*)w~w' -»
Worlds are now to be considered as splayedout in time - 
they are possible world histories. w%w' is in effect the 
altemativeness relation relativised to time: w* is an epis­
temic alternative -^o w at t. Since our knowledge changes in
time, from wssw* we can infer nothing about w%w' for times 
t t'
t' earlier or later than t - there is branching backwards 
and forwards in time. We also established that neither 
Cp nor mcp Cjp is a principle which governs the
concept of necessity underlying the epistemic must. So 
is not reflexive, though it would appear to be symmetric and 
transitive. As Palmer has observed ([75],p.19), combinations 
of epistemic modalities, on those infrequent occasions when 
they naturally occur, do intuitively seem to be pleonastic.
With, for example
(8) It may possibly rain tomorrow
one feels that the extra modality is not there to mark a
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finer distinction, but is essentially redundant. Likewise, 
you would not say "It may be that John must have left" if 
youTfre not convinced that "John has left" is correctly 
inferrable from the available information; you would simply 
deny that "John must have left" is true.
B) Existential/Universal. Palmer has an example
(9) The squid of the genus Loligo can be as much as two 
feet long,
which, along with Ryle's
(10) Stones can float (because pumice-stone floats) 
suggests that in combination with a generic or a bare plural, 
can may be used as an existential quantifier. 9) "does not 
mean that a squid may vary in length from time to time, but 
that some squids are two feet long"([75],p. 153). As regards 
must as a universal quantifier, he gives
(11) All scientific results must depend on a rather special­
ised form of history,
writing that "virtually the same meaning" would result if 
either the all or the must were dropped.
It seems to me that the examples 9)-11) do not 
exemplify a distinct category of sense or usage for the 
modal auxiliaries. The phenomenon is principally connected 
with the generic and bare plural forms. Por one thing, 10) 
must also have a universal reading, since it has the same 
form as
(12) People over 18 can vote,
which is naturally understood as: All people over 18 can 
vote, in which the modality is not redundant. So although 
the bare plural form can be read either as existential or 
universal, the insertion of can does not force the former 
reading. Furthermore, we can find examples of the generic
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construction, eg* "The NASA space shuttle can re-enter the 
earth's atmosphere intact" which would have been true if the 
things had been built but never tested, even though the 
corresponding existential paraphrase (some ... do/will) 
would be false. The element of potentiality expressed here 
by the can cannot be captured in terms of 3 •  Similarly, 
although Palmer writes that a generalisation with must is 
roughly synonymous to one without, in effect he concedes 
that the former will be stronger than the latter^.
C) Ability/Opportunity. Under this category falls
Kratzer's 'dispositional* must ; If you must sneeze, at least
use your handkerchief. Its suitability for inclusion with
the can's of this category, on which I shall concentrate, is
brought out by the paraphrase she gives of it :"If you cannot
help sneezing,...". Much has been written on the can of
ability, and I shall merely aim to highlight some of its
temporal features. I think there is considerable intuitive
support for the idea that there are basically two related
can's falling within this category, those introduced by
Vendler in the following passage.
There are people who can drink a gallon of wine in one 
draught. Suppose one of them has performed that remark­
able feat a minute ago. Then it is quite unlikely that 
he can do it again now. Should we say then, at this 
moment, that he can, or rather that he cannot, drink a 
gallon of wine in one draught? He can and he cannot.
([105],p.116)
The sense in which he can, which Vendler labels oan^, seems 
to correspond to what Honoré ([52]) distinguishes as the 
general can, which relates to types of actions. The sense 
in which he cannot, can.,, is a particular can relating to a 
particular occasion. It is natural to construe this dis­
tinction in terms of tense, canp should be understood as 
the simple present, since it relates to the possession, over
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a period, of time which includes the present, of a general 
Ability or freedom from impediment to perform some kind of 
action or he in some kind of state. Exemplifying action:
"He can drink a gallon of wine in one draught", exemplifying 
state: "You can believe in disarmament without being a uni­
lateralist". can.j is naturally construed as future, since 
it relates to the ability to perform, occur, etc. on some 
particular occasion, as in Austin's example "He can sink 
this putt". An example of a state: "We can stay at home 
this evening". Note that if he fails to sink it, it doesn't 
necessarily mean that that prediction was false, since an 
ability, whether general or in relation to some specific 
action, can tolerate a failure or two (cp.[3],p.218, [52], 
p.466). The distinction can^^ /oann is not always clearly 
marked in ordinary language, since the same form of words 
can do duty for either sense. "If I work hard, I can get 
away by five" may refer to the speaker's general situation 
at work, or may be used with reference to his particular 
predicament on that day. There is a difference: if true in
' t
the gener&l sense, then true with respect to that day, 
though not conversely. As Vendler's example shows, the 
inference from cano to can^ cannot be generally valid, in 
that the performance of a feat may temporarily incapacitate 
the agent. (Honore also distinguishes a third quite partic­
ular can. one which I have difficulty in recognising. It is 
virtually equivalent to will, and predictions employing it 
are therefore supposed to stand or fall with the success or 
failure of the particular action in question - ie. it is 
intolerant of failure. It seems to me that when someone 
holds "He can do it" false when the person in question fails 
to produce the goods, they are construing the failure as
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evidence for the lack of the ability, in one of the two 
senses already distinguished.)
If this sketch is along the ri^t lines, a full 
treatment of can will only arise within the context of a 
systematic treatment of aspect. Nevertheless we can bring 
out certain salient features of the word without a proper 
theory of aspect. Por example, the importance of the tem­
poral parameter in its semantic evaluation is well illus­
trated by an argument devised by Lehrer and Taylor. They 
use this argument to cast doubt on the principle P that "If 
A is a certain means to some end and an agent can do A, it 
follows that the agent can achieve that end" ([114],p.399). 
More abstractly, a question mark against P would mean that 
the rule Of, 0(Cp —^ Y) O y  would be in jeopardy. Their 
argument concerns a person Smith who, though nothing pre­
vents him catching a plane at 3*30, chooses not to do so.
The plane is the only means of getting to a certain city by 
four o'clock. The argument runs as follows:
(13) If Smith does^not leave at 3*30, then he cannot arrive 
at 4*00 ,
(14) Smith does not leave at 3*30 , therefore:
(15) Smith cannot arrive at 4*00.
(16) If Smith leaves at 3*30, he will arrive at 4*00 ,
(17) Smith can leave at 3*30 , so by principle P:
(18) Smith can arrive at 4*00.
In 15) and 18) we appear to have reached a contradiction.
Paced with this result, we may either challenge one 
or more of the premises, query whether 15) and 18) are gen­
uine contradictories, or reject the principle P. The second 
response has its appeal - as in Vendler's example, we might 
say "There's a sense in which he can arrive, and a sense in
124
which he can*t". But this is not obviously a case of can^/ 
0 0 ^ 2  ambiguity, and simply to level the charge of a fallacy 
of equivocation is not yet to explain anything. The first 
response will provide for us a route to such an explanation, 
for we may ask whether the premises add up to a description 
of the situation consistent with any one particular temporal 
perspective on it. In fact the first thing we should ascer­
tain about an argument like this is the use of tense it 
involves. The most plausible construal is that it relies on 
that use of the simple present with which one may narrate a 
past sequence of events. Typically, the ordering of sen­
tences in the narrative will follow the temporal ordering of 
the events. In this respect th.e, second inference 16)-18) '
should come first.' It takes us back to a point before 5*30. 
The first inference moves us on past 3*30. Premise 14) is 
the most concrete of the lot, reporting Smith's non-depar­
ture at 3*30. Now, as Lehrer and Taylor recognise, what we 
are able to do changes with time - in particular, one can 
lose an ability. Up to 3*30, Smith has the ability to
/
arrive at' 4*00, since it is assumed that it is a free choice 
he makes at 3*30, ie. not determined by something occurring 
prior to that time. But he loses the ability once 3*30 is 
past and he is not on the plane. So the 'senses' in which 
the conclusions 15) and ,18) differ are basically the same as 
in Kant's example "He is young" and "He is not young" said 
of the same person at different times (Critique of Pure 
Reason. B192). Before 3*30, "Smith cannot arrive at 4-00" 
is false - we cannot then detach that as consequent of 13), 
because we cannot then assume that Smith will not leave at 
3-30, even if that turns out to be the case. But after 3-30 
it becomes true and 18) becomes false. "Smith could arrive
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at 4'00" will still be true, but that does not contradict 
it.
We can capture the temporal relativity of can which 
this example brings out in terms similar to the clause that 
would parallel 7) for But more conditions will be placed
on %  for the notion 0  of historical possibility which it 
defines^, çc is to be an equivalence relation, and if w%w* 
then for any t' earlier than t, w^w*. wi^w* represents 
coincidence of worlds w and w* t. Two such worlds may
diverge at a subsequent time, and consequently <$> >
F though not its converse, is invalid in this system.
This captures Smith's predicament accurately enough, since 
he loses an opportunity. It may be that basically suf­
fices for can^, for here the notion of ability expressed 
coincides roughly with the existence of some relative possi­
bility. If a tutor says "I can see you at six o'clock 
tomorrow", and then checks in his diary only to find he is 
engaged, he might then say "No I can't see you then. I'm 
seeing someone else", the inability is an impossibility, not 
absolute but highly relative to the fulfillment of previous 
commitments and so on. Often we use can in this way when 
the action is not really impossible but highly inconvenient 
or awkward - the implication being that there is not really 
any choice in the matter, that there is not really any other 
option ("I can't" rather than "I won't").
Intuitively, caug, when used in connection with 
actions, has far less to do with the existence of a possi­
bility, however relative, than can^. For one thing, the 
mere existence of a possibility does not seem sufficient for 
the truth of a can  ^statement. We don't hold "He can swim" 
to be true of someone at the water's edge who has not yet
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learnt to swim but is about to do so. We gain abilities in 
the sense of can ,^ not just lose them. Moreover, if someone 
actually but fortuitously executes some difficult action, or 
performs part of a complex procedure, we would be reluctant 
to say that he can do the thing in question. If someone 
manages to repair a TV by poking around in the back of it 
and knocking a loose component into place, we wouldn't say 
"He can repair TV's" or even "He can repair this TV", if he 
lacks the requisite training. What counts with kinds of 
actions is the possibility of repeatedly performing them on 
demand - with allowance for the odd failure. This is 
basically the idea of habitual performance which the simple 
present expresses and which is perhaps impossible to accu­
rately represent formally. "He repairs TV's" is true now if 
there is a reasonable period of time which includes the 
present and in which there are times at which a correspond­
ing progressive form can be truly asserted: "He is repairing 
a TV", and during which moreover some kind of conditional is 
true, roughly, that when he works he repairs TV's. The 
repairings are not totally fortuitous. "He can repair TV's" 
relates to the possibility of: he repairs TV's, ie. to the 
possibility of habitual repairings. (It is for this reason 
that an analysis of gano in terms of a subjunctive condi­
tional is so plausible - and more manageable. We shall 
consider conditionals in connection with dispositions, in 
Chapter 3.) Normally, our grounds for asserting occano 6 
are that the agent has 6-ed, but this is not essential. We 
can imagine "He can repair TV's" truly asserted of the 
apprentice technician who has so far learnt only theory and 
has not yet put his ability to use. It should be noted that 
this kind of analysis is inappropriate for stative verbs.
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Statives lack the progressive form (cp.[105],pp.102-3). The 
truth of "John loves Mary" over a period of time requires 
that it is true at any instant in that period. "John can 
love someone (if they love him)" relates not to repeatable 
occurrences but to the possibility of his being in a certain 
state.
D) Deontic. Kratzer gives as an example
(19) All Maori children must learn the names of their 
ancestors.
It seems we could also include here what she calls the 
'preferential* must :
(20)'When Kahukura-nui died, the people of Kahungunu said: 
Rakaipaka must be our chief.
It expresses in part the fact that Rakaipaka is the only 
person they will permit to be chief, just as "Rakaipaka can 
be our chief" could he used to express a permission, a 
deontic c ^ , granted in virtue of their preferences. Alter­
natively, it could be understood as a can^. It has often 
been: noted that the borderline between this can and the 
deontic is not at all clear cut - Palmer cites the reporting 
of rules and regulations as constÿuable either way ([75], p. 
149). When, for example, I say what must can express, I 
talk about a possible use within English, ie. what is per­
mitted by the rules of the language. It has been suggested, 
with some plausibility, that our conception of necessity and 
possibility stems from deontic notions of obligation and 
permission. The one major difference between this category 
and the others is that may be empowered to grant permis­
sion or lay down an obligation - the deontic can and must 
have a performative use. Assertoric use of must and can can 
intuitively seem to report obligations or permissions
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granted from a non-human authority, must may express a 
conceptual obligation, eg. in "We must therefore conclude," 
or "If you accept an intuitionist theory of meaning, you 
must reject the principle of bivalence". The deontic must 
shares a feature we decided was possessed by its epistemic 
counterpart, namely, that it doesn't necessarily follow that 
what must be is. Deontic modality, which must be tensed to
allow for change in obligation over time, is characterised
■
by the axiom DCp Deontic alternativeness is serial:
(Vt) (Vw) (3w' )w%w' (cp.[1l], chapter 6).
We can now return to the question of the overall 
sense of can and must. Kratzer musters two lines of thought 
against the view that they are ambiguous. The first depends 
on the assumption by the ambiguity view of the 'Aristotelean' 
move to distinguish different senses of the verbs within 
each major category. Since our dispositions, epistemic 
states and so on are constantly changing, the ambiguity view 
would need a never-ending list of lexical entries must^,
must2, must^,.... "But we might not have enough numbers,"
'
she reasons, "And even if we had enough numbers, it would' 
not be very sensible to use them here. In everyday conver­
sation we do not use subscripts when we use the words must 
and can. Somehow we do without them," ([58],p.340) The 
second line of thought is that in addition to this multi­
plicity ("billions") of must's, the ambiguity theorist would 
have to recognise a neutral must. to be found in such sen­
tences as
(21) In view of what their tribal duties are, the Maori 
children must learn the names of their ancestors
(22) In view of what is known, the ancestors of the Maoris 
must have arrived from .Tahiti.
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Her proposal is that when the relativity is unpacked through 
one of these in view of relative clauses, the must (or can) 
we are left with is neutral, and expresses the kernel of 
meaning which is the common element running through each 
occurrence of the verb - as, for example, in 21) and 22) 
minus the qualifying phrases (cp, 19)). The in view of 
phrase spells out explicitly what would otherwise be pro­
vided implicitly through context, giving rise to the impres­
sion of difference in sense. The phenomenon is not ambi­
guity but a relational sense of must and can, requiring 
completion in one of these ways.
It seems to me that Kratzer has failed to come to 
grips with the thought that the modal auxiliaries are ambi­
guous, and that her arguments are rather unconvincing. 
Firstly, we should dissociate the ambiguity view from the 
implausible 'Aristotelean' move. On the face of it, this 
move involves a confusion of the grounds for an assertion 
with its conditions of truth. To take an analogy, no one, 
would claim that the sentence
(23) You are overweight
meant, in a particular context, the same as
(24) In view of your excessive eating for the last month, 
you are overweight,
even if 24) spells out the speaker's reasons for asserting 
23). For 23) could be true if, say, the person had been 
injected with too much of a special fattening chemical, 
whereas 24) could not. Similarly, in a context where it is 
presupposed that a certain person is incapable of begetting 
through immaturity, "He cannot beget", construed as "In view 
of his immaturity, he cannot beget", would have to be taken 
to be false if the incapacity was caused in some other way.
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I take it that this consequence is unacceptable enough for 
us to reject this move.
The ambiguity theory should only recognise a hand­
ful Of senses of ca,n and must - our categories A, C and D, 
perhaps. Sometimes we.can tell the kind of modality being 
expressed by the tense of the verb, must have with the past 
participle is reserved for (HP, had to with infinitive 
expresses P 0 .  This should be borne in mind when consid­
ering Kratzer's second line of thought, that the "different 
occurrences of the word must ... Tin 21) and 22)1 seem to 
have the same meaning." This seems to me to be a highly 
debatable point, must have does not lose its epistemic 
sense, even when embedded the way it is in 22). If we 
rewrite 21) using must have
(25) In view of what their tribal duties used to be, the 
Maori children must have learnt the names of their 
ancestors,
we have an epistemic modality, approximately: "we conclude 
that they learnt the names",. Changing must have learnt to 
had .to learn in 25) produces past obligation, intuitively - 
not a neutral must. Kratzer has given no thought to the 
question of how her neutral must - let's use □  for it - 
would interact with tense. What could the significance of 
□  P and P Q  be (if not [H P and P.0)? As is suggested by 
our previous discussion of 23) and 24), the role of an in. 
viey „o,f phrase is to qualify the main clause, not to extract 
part of its meaning.
The ambiguity theorist need not make the absurd 
denial of there being no common element to the various kinds 
of must he discerns - clearly they are all different kinds 
Of necessity. His point is simply that there are a few
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significant differences between them. It may be felt, 
however, that the discussion of Aristotle's example does not 
show anything wrong with the relational view. Perhaps the 
wrong relativisations were chosen. If we expand it in a 
different way, "In view of the way he is constituted, he 
cannot beget", we do not get the counterintuitive conflict 
in truth values. Moreover, there are more plausible examples 
of a fluctuation in sense, in the way predicted on the 
relational view. One such is provided by David Lewis (in 
[64]), v/ho cites Kratzer's account with approval. Lewis 
envisages himself arguing with an elected official over ways 
to handle a potential embarrassment for the latter. They 
have been discussing options, such as destroying the evi­
dence, which are available within the constraint - implicit­
ly assumed - that the official does not commit political 
suicide. Lewis rudely interjects: "There is one other pos-. 
sibility - you can put the public interest first for oncel" 
That would be false, ie. the possibility in question would 
not be a genuine one, if that constraint, determining what 
is and is not to count as possible, remains fixed. But 
Lewis's point is that Èis very utterance protects itself 
against this by widening that tacit delimitation of the pos­
sible, in accordance with a rule of accomodation, A rule of 
accomodation is in effect a principle of charity: a rule for 
changing the 'conversational score' in a context, eg. the 
presuppositions of the participants. Some of the cases 
Lewis cites shift the score back to a previous point as 
easily as it was shifted away. For example, salience with 
respect to an elliptical the cat can reinstate one cat as 
the topic of conversation after some other cat had usurped 
that position. But in other cases he maintains that
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accomodation tends to work in one direction only. In this 
example, this means that once the boundary has been widened, 
it remains there and is difficult to shift back to the pre­
vious position of excluding Lewis’s possibility. If, after 
Lewis's interjection, the official protests
(26) I cannot do that 
according to Lewis he is mistaken.
It is not olear to me that Lewis is right on this 
last point. We can understand why the official would make 
that protestation. The point about these practical can 
judgements is that certain consequences follow from their 
acceptance. If 26) is accepted, the person in question is 
automatically exempted from doing the action. If "You can 
do that" is accepted, it is clear that the person has a 
choice, and is responsible for whether or not he does the 
deed. If the official did assert 26), he would be attempt­
ing to shift the boundary back to where it lay before 
Lewis's interjection. The suggestion would be that staying 
in office is to constrain the consideration of options. It 
seems as implausible in his case as it is in Lewis's to say 
that his assertion would be false. The official is a normal
\
speaker and so will have an implicit mastery of the 'kine­
matics of conversational score'. If the boundary stays 
fixed at the outer limit, after Lewis's interjection, he 
should know that. So his assertion of 26) would require him 
to have the belief that he cannot put the public interest 
first, even if he is prepared to commit political suicide. 
And this is very implausible. The dispute between the two 
is unlikely to be over this kind of fact - they can both 
agree that he cannot if he is not prepared to give up his 
office, and that he can if he is.
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According to Lewis, "the boundary between the rele­
vant possibilities and the ignored ones ... enters into the 
truth conditions of sentences with ç^n ..." If v/e represent 
Lewis's belief that the official can put the public interest 
first as Ow')PRT^(@,w') & ^(w')(p(a), then the official's 
protestation 26) will either represent the negation of this, 
or involve a more restrictive accessability relation;
-i(3v/')PRT2 (@,W ) & 0(w')(p(a). But neither of these alter­
natives is plausible. The first requires the official to 
have a false belief, and the second makes it impossible to 
see how there is a dispute between them, since both claims 
are acceptable to both of them. The negation test strongly 
suggests that the drawing of a boundary is a matter of pre­
supposition. Any ordinary judgement about whether something 
is possible presupposes that some boundary between possible 
and impossible has been fixed. But that boundary is not 
strictly a part of the sense of the statement , What may 
shift, in a context, are the background assumptions about 
the delimitation of possibility - conditions of truth, 
strictly speaking, remain the same.
We must therefore conclude that the ambiguity 
theorist has a more accurate description of the facts than 
the relatiohal theorist. Lexical ambiguity, Montague 
suggested, would be accounted for by rejection of the 
assumption that there is just one actual model, a unique 
actual dictionary. However, in view of the fact that there 
are ambiguous words of special interest whose interpreta­
tions could be fixed, it would be preferable to adopt 
Bennett's proposal and have the required number of distinct 
lexical items, each tagged by an index which the syntax 
would be designed to erase.
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4 : THE PROBLEM
In Chapter 1 I observed that it would be a defect of 
a truth-theoretic treatment of modality if it could not be 
located within, or at least in relation to, a general 
semantic account of intensional contexts. In this section I 
want to consider the difficulty as it faces model theory 
based on possible worlds. In a nutshell, the problem is 
that equivalence of extension in every possible world does 
not seem sufficient for synonymy, and so as Dummett has put 
it "cannot be meant to give a representation of the knowl­
edge that someone has when he knows some expression in a 
language" ([33],p.422).
The two versions of the problem which are most 
discussed concern sentences and proper names, I shall 
introduce it via the first version, since Montague's extant 
thoughts on it relate to that; I shall then go on to discuss 
the second in more detail, with special reference to the . 
writings of Saul Kripke. It will be convenient if we begin 
by restating, in simplified form, the relevant interpreta­
tive axiom for belieye. It is based on the idea that Maggie 
believes that ^ iff (p is true in every possible world which 
is consistent with her beliefs;
(1) T(o< believes .that C^,w) = (Vw* ) (Belief (r (o<) ,w') — > 
T(y,w')).
The ML thus employs the predicate "Belief(Maggie,w)", which 
has as its extension the set of Maggie's 'belief worlds' - 
the proposition which encapsulates the totality of her 
beliefs. Maggie believes that (p iff that proposition is 
included in the proposition expressed by (p, Then any sen­
tence logically equivalent to (p, ie. one for which the
0
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following will be true;
(2) (Vw)(T(^,w) 5 T(y/,w))
must also be believed by Maggie.
Montague contemplated two responses to this result. 
One v/as to accept it as revealing a genuine feature of any 
properly proposition-oriented notion of belief. Its accept­
ability, he claimed, is bolstered by taking seriously assent 
as a criterion of belief ([73],p.139) - basically^ what 
Kripke has termed the "disquotational principle"; "If a 
normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to 
*p*, then he believes that p" ([62],pp.248-49). There is 
something to this. If Maggie sincerely assents to both (p 
and to where y  is a logical consequence of (p, there is 
clearly a real problem for ^  about what beliefs to ascribe 
to her. Does she really believe the proposition expressed 
by <p? We have as much right to ascribe to her that belief 
as the belief that given that we have as much right to 
ascribe to her the belief that -,y/, and given that - 7 logi­
cally entails -rp. One may, then, maintain that if someone 
really believes some proposition, they do believe all its 
consequences, implicitly at least. Why, after all, should 
we be aware of all our beliefs? But even if we may distin­
guish this sense of belief, there will still be other 
prepositional attitudes - be ^ e  that, is an example 
Thomason cites - and therefore, we may assume, a different 
sense of belief, for which the above result is unacceptable. 
V/e should not forget that the case just considered was a 
rather special one - the general problem of logical falli­
bility is not that one explicitly assents to the negation of 
some consequence of a belief, but that being unaware of all 
the consequences one simply doesn't know whether to affirm
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or deny them. This suggested to Montague at one stage that 
we are dealing here with more linguistically-oriented 
notions ([73],p.139). Obviously if a context (eg. "... is 
an instance of L.E.M.") is implicitly quotational, we cannot 
expect it to permit intersubstitution of logical equivalents 
salva veritate. The treatment which Montague actually 
adopted for these notions which do not permit interchange of 
logical equivalents was to allow that even if 
( 2 ' )  T * ( p  ,g,w,t/%) 5  T*(y,g,w,t/%)
holds for all g,'^ and all designated points of reference 
<Cw,t) (= and are logically equivalent), there could be 
certain "unactualisable" points <w,t^ for which 2') fails 
(= (p and y/ are not synonymous). This proposal has the air 
of being a purely technical solution. For one thing, when 
Montague made it he still affirmed allegiance to "the best 
and most elegant approach ... viz. to permit unrestricted 
interchange on the basis of logical equivalence ..." ([73], 
p.231). More importantly, there remains the question of the 
status of these seemingly 'impossible worlds', the invoca­
tion of which might well be thought to bring the whole 
possible worlds framework into disrepute. (At non-desig- 
nated points logical constants are assigned deviant 
extensions) I Given the unclarity of these things, it "  
remains unclear what explanation has been offered either of 
synonymy or of the prepositional attitudes we are interested 
in (especially if they are supposed to be oriented towards 
linguistic entities).
To see whether there is any plausibility in this 
move, it will help if we turn to consider the second version 
of the problem. Imagine someone coming across entries [53] 
and [54J in the bibliography. He may wonder/Hans Kamp and
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J «A.W+ Kamp are two different people or not* The following 
thought might enter his mind:
(3) It may he that Hans Kamp is not J.A.W. Kamp.
Other epistemic modal operators suitable for use here would 
he maybe and Kripke*s favourite it could turn out that. On 
both the description and causal accounts of reference there 
need be no cause for complaint that the person is less than 
competent in the use of the names. For the description 
theorist, he can associate properly identificatory descrip­
tions with each name, eg, "the author of 'Two Theories About 
Adjectives'" with the latter. For the causal theorist he 
has picked the names up from a speaker standing in an 
appropriate causal relation to the bearer of the names, I 
choose the example because it is a realistic case, closer to 
home than ancient Babylon, of a question arising as to 
whether or not two names stand for the same entity. We know 
the kind of situation which the person would envisage, or at 
least, could not exclude as a possibility - his coming to 
accumulate sufficient further information that he could 
associate incompatible properties with these two Kamps. 
Perhaps he imagines meeting them side by side at a confer­
ence. The problem is this. Since Hans Kamp and J.A.W, Kamp 
are one and'the same person, that imagined situation is not 
a logical possibility - in no possible world can he be other 
than himself. So a first glance might lead one to think 
that, by turning to the subsentential level, we have found a 
vindication of Montague's tolerance towards logically 
impossible worlds, (At the sentential level, that impres­
sion might have been gleaned from an example like 2,1,15 - 
for there the truth actually ascribed to the whole preposi­
tional attitude construction should be a function of the set
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of worlds in which the content sentence is true, yet that 
sentence is not true in any logically possible world.)
Whether this is a more than superficial diagnosis 
depends in part on whether or not ordinary proper names are 
rigid designators. The two main theories - or pictures - of 
naming tend toward different descriptions of the situation, 
neither of which is very palatable. On the description 
theory, one might assume, names are not rigid designators, 
being synonymous with some associated description. Hence 
there need be no impossibility about the circumstance envis­
aged by the utterer of 3) - it will just be one with respect 
to which the two names refer to different objects. But the 
description theory would appear to face the following 
dilemma. Either the explanation is offered at the community- 
wide level, or it is a question of descriptions being 
associated with names by individual speakers. The former 
seems straightforwardly false, since for example most of 
those who are competent with these names do not attach any 
difference in sense between them. If it is the latter then, 
as Kripke has pointed out ([62],p.245), the sense which I 
attach to the names, apparently being the same for both, 
cannot be sufficient for me to render intelligible the 
epistemic state of the person concerned by anything I can 
say using the names, eg. "He believes that Hans Kamp may be 
other than J.A.W. Kamp". For I would be attributing to him 
a belief in the epistemic possibility of the denial of a 
trivial self-identity. But the causal theory would appear 
to fare no better. If names rigidly designate their bearers 
the truth of 3) should require an epistemically possible 
world with respect to which the two names rigidly designate 
a non-self-identical object. But this is nonsense. It does
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not help to render intelligible a seemingly impossible 
belief to import a contradiction into our description of 
the case.
Let us turn to the writings of Kripke and Dummett 
for some enlightenment on these matters. They are agreed 
at least in that each has, at some point, called talk of 
possible worlds "metaphorical" ([60],p.80, [29],p.127), For 
Dummett, since the rigid/non-rigid distinction is framed in 
terms of possible worlds, when we give it non-metaphorical 
content it reduces to the distinction between a term's 
taking wide or narrow scope in relation to a modal operator. 
The rigidity of proper names becomes the thesis that their 
scope is always wider than that of the relevant modal oper­
ator. A related point is made by Kamp in connection with 
temporal discourse, in likening proper names to the ngy 
operator (names "refer back to the moment of assertion; they 
point at the object they name at the time the assertion is 
made...". [55],p.187) - since npy/ always takes widest possi­
ble scope (cp. 81.5). But in his new Introduction to [59], 
Kripke explicitly rejects the relative scope interpretation, 
on the grounds that it cannot be as general as the rigidity 
doctrine, requiring as it does the presence of modal (or 
tense) operators. The question of rigidity arises with 
respect to ordinary understanding of non-modal sentences, 
since understanding these requires knowing what has to be 
the case for their truth - ie. whether or not such a sen­
tence would be true in other possible situations. In the 
context of a dispute where it is common ground that possible 
worlds are metaphorical, this may seem an odd reply - 
Dummett*s purpose was to remove talk of those things. How 
better to do this than to reintroduce modal operators?
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The whole point of introducing possible worlds was origi­
nally to account for the truth conditions of sentences 
involving operators - ordinarily one would say we have no 
need to invoke them in giving the semantics for a non- 
intensional (part of a) language. Kripke might deny that - 
he might claim that even in an extensional language, names 
and other terms require mention of modal facts concerning 
them if a full semantic characterisation is to be given.
But even if we grant him what would be for the purposes of a 
truth definition (of either of the two kinds we have 
considered) strictly superfluous, there remains the question 
of what relation these modal facts bear to the semantics of 
the modal part of the language. If we simply consider the 
reference of a terra occuring in a non-modal sentence, in 
relation to some unactualised world, we will be in danger of 
losing touch with the very linguistic phenomena we origi­
nally sought to explain. This is perhaps one reason behind 
Kripke*s continuing reluctance to admit that descriptions . 
can be used rigidly. If we set things up by asking after 
the truth value of a sentence like "The last great philoso­
pher of antiquity was fond of dogs" in relation to some 
imagined counterfactual situation, it will only be natural 
to consider who is imagined to be the last great philosopher 
of antiquity in that situation, and thence to assume that a 
desription will always function non-rigidly. While it 
undoubtedly follows from my understanding of a sentence that, 
had things turned out differently, I could ascertain its 
truth value in relation to that circumstance, we must be 
clear on the precise significance of this fact. A hypothesis 
about rigid or non-rigid designation, whatever its intuitive 
appeal (or that of the correlative metaphysical thesis), is
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only as good as the phenomena it seeks to explain. In the 
context of the present dispute, the methodology just de­
scribed is simply question-begging, since granted the 
equivalence T(09^,w) = (3w* )T(9? ,w* ), it amounts to the 
assumption that the possibility operator is always to be 
semantically evaluated prior to the description, ie. that 
descriptions always fall within the scope of the modality.
If a rigid designator is, in possible worlds terms, 
one which with respect to any possible world refers to the
same entity as it does in actuality, then the acid test for
a definite description's being rigid (or more precisely, 
being used as a rigid designator) should be its use to pick 
out the individual which it does denote even with respect to 
a world in which some other entity is the unique satisfier 
of the description. In scope terms, then, v/e should listen 
with our native's ear to a sentence like this
(4) The 37-th president of the U.S. need not have been the
37-th president of the U.S.
to hear if one or other occurrence of the description has 
wider scope than the modality. On the natural reading of 
4), the first occurrence does - the sentence might be para­
phrased as conveying that Nixon was only contingently the 
37-th president of the U.S. This has little to do with the 
description occurring prior to the modal expression in the 
sentence. The scope we assign to a description waits upon a 
comprehension of the whole sentence in which it occurs. If 
we convert the second description into an explicitly rigid 
term (of a kind which Kripke acknowledges,[59], fn. 22);
(5) The 37-th president of the U.S. need not have been the 
actual 37-th president of the U.S.
the first description intuitively has narrow scope.
142
Roughly, 5) means that we could have had a 37-th president 
of the U.S. different to Nixon. With
(6) It need not have been that the 37-th president was the 
37-th president,
we have a sentence ambiguous between a reading like 4)*s and 
the false one which gives both descriptions narrow scope - 
false in that, however things had turned out, the 37-th 
president would have been the 37-th president.
On the current understanding of the causal theory, 
therefore, proper names take scope wider than modal expres­
sions (what is distinctive about them is that, unlike 
descriptions, they always do). We might thus rewrite 3) as:
(7) (Av^)(Avg)Maybe(v^ 4 V2 )[Hans Kamp,J.A.W.Kamp], 
showing clearly that there should be no difference between 
3) and a similar sentence using either of the two names 
twice over. The same difficulty is brought out on Kaplan's 
'direct reference* formulation of the theory, according to 
which when a proper name occurs in a sentence, the object 
itself which is the bearer of the name is the relevant 
constituent of the proposition expressed. That would there­
fore make the content of 3) quite mysterious, the same 
object being involved in it twice over.
One- approach to the problem posed by 3) and its ilk 
would be to try to qualify the theory in some way. The idea 
would be that although 'direct' or 'simple' reference must 
correctly characterise names in essence, there could be 
certain peripheral cases where names are used non-rigidly. 
The difficulty facing any such modification is evident from 
the old description theory: what other object, and in virtue 
of its possessing what property, could a name refer to with 
respect to another world if not its actual referent? There
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is a much-maligned though to my mind plausible candidate - 
v/ith a name such as Jjauhb.n it would be; the thing called 
Lauben. To appreciate its plausibility we might start with 
the way we typically become familiar with previously unen­
countered proper names. A normal speaker of English who 
has, inter alia, mastered the business of referring to 
things by name, has the ability to add endless new names to 
his lexicon. He can generally recognise an expression as a 
name on the basis of typography; he can then form the belief 
that it has a referent - an inference from previous cases.
If someone tells him "Dr. Lauben has been wounded", when he 
has never heard the name Lauben before, then the natural 
view, which I think is correct, is that he will at least 
have understood that someone called Lauben was asserted to 
have been wounded. He can use a name correctly, having only 
heard or read it once, by intending to refer to the thing 
which, according to the usage on the occasion of his en­
countering it, it is normally taken to refer to. Perhaps he 
comes across the name on an otherwise blank piece of paper, 
but if he has identified it as a name, he can still say "Who 
is G. Lauben?" (or perhaps "Who or what ...?"). "What does 
'Lauben' mean?" is an inappropriate question for a name, the 
asking of which suggests that the inquirer has not iden­
tified it as a name and which might therefore prompt a reply 
prefaced by the remark "Well, its a name ...". It is tnus 
implicit in this bit of ordinary usage that a name has no 
meaning — we assume that it simply stands for a particular 
object, on encountering it, and what we want to know is 
which object (or at least some partially identificatory
information about it).
No one could pretend that this can be the whole
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story about reference, since it blatantly depends on the 
assumption that the name will already have its reference 
established. This does not preclude it from being an 
important chapter in that story, however. The fact that 
language use is generally accomplished unreflectively, even 
when mastering new names, should not be allowed to obscure 
the fact that, implicitly or explicitly, we form beliefs 
which are semantical in nature. Language is part of the 
world we experience. There is thus one definite description 
which a competent speaker at least implicitly believes to 
denote (relative to the context) the bearer of a name - "the 
object called 'Lauben'", in the case of Lauben. (Such a 
description, like "the postman", will be contextually 
variable because elliptical - but is still likely to be 
definite when used in a context.) Normally speakers only 
use names on the presumption that they have bearers (obvi­
ously this is subject to qualification concerning the use of 
names from fiction ^  they had referents.) So Kripke is 
wrong to say that, on the description theory, people who 
know of Feynman and Gell-Mann only that they are leading 
contemporary theoretical physicists must attach the same 
sense to the names. The property of being someone called 
Feynman is not the same property as that of being someone 
called Gell-Mann. But Kripke would be right to say that if 
that's all there is to the description theory, it can't be 
enough. He brings out the incompleteness of such an account 
in his discussion of Glpnk. One cannot determine the ref­
erence of that name by saying "I shall use the term 'Glunk' 
to refer to the man I call 'Glunk'". The circularity gets one 
nowhere. "One had better have some independent détermina 
tion of the referent of 'Glunk'" ([59],p.286). This does
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not tell against our assuming a comparable attitude when we
cfquire (as distinct from: try to introduce) a new name: "I
shall use 'Glunk * to refer to the man who is called 'Glunk*".
One passes the buck, not to the man from whom one first
picked up the name (cp.[59],pp.297-99), but to the community-
wide determination of its reference, which presumably will
trace back to some initial act of baptism.
At this point Kripke might muster an argument which 
2
is at least implicit in his line of reasoning, against any
association of a name with a description. It comes as part
of another dilemma posed to the description theory:' either
it is providing an account of the sense of a name, in which
case it is false, or it is providing an account of how its
%
reference gets fixed, in which case it will be inadequate . 
The part we are concerned with is the first, which proceeds 
by drawing out unacceptable metaphysical consequences 
(certain properties being essential to an individual, eg. 
Nixon) from correlative semantical claims (the sense of 
Nixon). It might be thought that oc need not have been Q 
(or might not) is a general recipie which, when truly in­
stantiated, shows that i) the referent of o< possesses the 
property expressed by bein^/3 only contingently and that 
ii) the sehse of /3 cannot be part of the sense of the term 
(X. Whereas i) almost uneontroversially follows from the 
meaning of "contingent", ii) is far more dubious. Its 
weakness should be apparent from our discussion of 4) above. 
The fact that the 37-th president was only contingently the 
37-th president could hardly show that "the 37-th president" 
differs in sense from "the 37—th president". All normal 
definite descriptions express a property which is only 
contingently possessed by the object which, if ctny, they
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denote. So the fact that a description only expresses a 
contingent property of an object does not by itself show 
that It must differ in sense from some codesignative 
name.
Perhaps the point Kripke was most concerned to 
make in this connection was as follows; that if it comes 
to a showdown between a name and a description, over which 
should refer to the thing which they both actually designate, 
with respect to some other possible world, it is the name 
which will always win out. That is to say, if we consider 
a sentence like
(8) G. Lauben need not have been the person called 
* G . Lauben',
it is the description which is forced to let go of Lauben 
himself, rather than the name. Now while 8) undoubtedly 
has a contradictory reading which gives the description 
wider scope, we can also take it this way - what is more 
naturally expressed by (but with which 8) is not to be 
confused) a sentence without a definite description.;
(9) G. Lauben need not have been called *G. Lauben*.
But for this to be significantjin the present context it 
would have to be the case that, faced with an assertion of
(10) G. Lauben need not have been G. Lauben
we would not construe that too along the lines of 9). As it 
happens, that is the way native speakers tend to read it.
Kripke is apparently prepared for this kind of 
thought: "Sloppy, colloquial speech, which often confuses 
use and mention, may, of course, express the fact that 
someone might ... not have been called 'Aristotle* by saying 
that he might ... not have been Aristotle. ... Colloquial­
isms like these seem to me to create as little problem for
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my theses as the success of the 'Impossible Missions Force' 
creates for the modal law that the impossible does not 
happen" ([59],fn.25). But is it so simple? The acceptance 
of 10) (or 3)) as true by ordinary speakers is not a chal­
lenge to the modal principle that any objects x and y which 
are identical are necessarily identical. We can agree that 
the planet Hesperus cannot be other than Phosphorus, which 
is to say that in one sense of "necessary" - the philoso­
pher's logical/metaphysical necessity - "it is necessary 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus" is true. The question is (as 
Kripke points out in his new Introduction) whether an 
ordinary proper name like Phosphorus (if it is one) refers 
to the thing we actually call Phosphorus with respect to 
every world. Consider Kripke*s discussion of
(11) Hesperus might have turned out not to be Phosphorus. 
According to him this way of speaking is "loose and inac­
curate" ([59],p.353). It should be clear from the account 
of 3) that he is mistaken about this - 11) is a past tense 
version of a sentence which, like 3), may be a natural, 
almost unavoidable form of words for those concerned. 
Moreover, the circumstance which Kripke describes ([59], pp. 
306ff.) in which another planet such as Mars occupies the 
morning .position of Venus and gets named PhQsjphqrus, al­
though it wouldn't be a situation in which Hesperus wasn't 
Phosphorus, ie. wasn't itself, would nevertheless be the 
kind of circumstance one would ordinarily cite in defense 
of 11).
It seems to me that the Kripkean arguments we have 
considered do not provide us with any convincing reason why 
the sense of a name c< cannot be equated with that of a 
description the thing calledc< though, to repeat, he has
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shown that there is more to he said than this. It is 
significant that in his discussion of names in belief 
contexts Kripke stresses both that this is an area where 
our normal apparatus for attributing belief, based mainly 
on the disquotational principle, appears to break down, and 
also that there is no problem for our description of the 
puzzling cases as long as we remain within the essentially 
linguistic terminology of the thing called oc, rather than 
using the name o< itself. In the case of the itinerant 
Pierre ([62],section II), we can say that he believes that 
the thing called ^pp^rqq is pretty, and that the thing
called London is not - but can we answer the question: does 
he, or does he not, .believe that London is pretty? ([62], 
p.259). There seem to be two ways of approaching this. . One 
is to decline the terms of the question, ie. to refuse to 
8.pply the disquotational principle to Pierre's sincere 
assent to "Londres est jolie" and "London is not pretty".
The specification of the content of Pierre's beliefs remains 
in the explicitly metalinguistic form already recorded. We 
thus retain the link between London and Londres at the 
expense of that between London and the thing called . ',London' 
etc. The other response is to reverse the connections, 
treating Londres and the thing called 'Londres* as inter- 
substitutable, and replying that Pierre believes that 
Londres is pretty but that London is not. This is a natural 
way of describing the situation and one which keeps the 
linguistic element of Pierre's beliefs implicit. Since 
the thing: called 'tondon' and the thing .called Jhondresl are 
not intersubstitutablej we are entitled to say, on this 
response, that Pierre does not believe Londres is London 
without fear of contradiction, just as we would want to say
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a similar thing in the two ïlamps case. This approach there­
fore coheres best with our need to say things like 3).
We should conclude, it seems, that Montague was 
wrong to suggest that we have a choice in whether to con­
strue belief as proposition- rather than language-oriented, 
and thus whether or not we accept that logical equivalents 
are intersubstitutable in all intensional contexts. The 
traditional notion of a proposition is that of objectively 
communicable and graspable content, lying behind the 
linguistic apparel of the sentences used to express it (the 
sartorial imagery goes back at least to "Der Gedanke"). In 
the totality of genuinely possible worlds, of objective 
conditions of truth, we reach the limits of this notion, 
realistically construed. What is needed in order to handle 
belief contexts in general is not a dabbling in impossible 
worlds, or a subjectivisation of the notion of sense - for 
that way lies incoherence or incommunicability - but a 
recognition that, for certain cases at least, the linguistic 
garb is an ineliminable part of what is expressed, ie, 
cannot be removed, as the disquotational principle enjoins 
us, in the move from sentence to proposition expressed. It 
may be that model theory, with such techniques as the 
discourse representation structures of Kamp, has now the 
means to produce an adequate treatment of the problem.
CHAPTER THREE: .DUMMETT AND ANTI-REALIST THEORY
1 : INTRODUCTION
There are many facets of Michael Dummett*s writings 
on semantics. I shall concentrate on two central themes, 
which relate to his critique of unthinking acceptance of 
realism: the argument for some kind of verificationist
theory of meaning, and the thesis that metaphysics is sub­
servient in some sense to the more fundamental discipline of 
semantics. The arguments will be developed as much as pos­
sible with reference to modal locutions. As Russell pointed 
out ([93],p.259), the verificationist has a particular 
theoretical interest in elucidating modality, since we need 
to know eg. what notion of possibility is involved when 
something is said to verifiable, ie. such that it can be
verified. According to Dummett, consideration of vagueness
shows that the idea that verification be possible in 
practice leads to incoherence - from which it follows that 
if the demand for verifiability is a worthy one, it must be 
shown not to lead to the strong demand of practical 
verifiability.
For Dummett, the emphasis on a theory of meaning is 
that it is a theory of understanding. To understand an 
expression, ie. to grasp its meaning, is to know how to use 
it, to know what its role in the language is. As yet this
is to say very little; it serves to remind us that any
account of meaning must square with the principle "Meaning 
is use". Various interpretations of this Wittgensteinian 
dictum are possible (cp.[29],pp.359ff.). Taken to extremes
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- ”Don*t ask for the meaning,..." - it embodies the rejec­
tion of the idea of a central core of sense which can be 
extracted from the motley of our linguistic interactions, 
and therefore of a systematic theory of meaning which aims 
to isolate it. Less radically, it tolerates the notion of 
sense as merely a convenient shorthand for summing up 
facts about usage. This interpretation seems the one 
which harmonises best with Wittgenstein's own account of 
understanding. We are not to conceive of sense as if 
grasping the sense of an expression is something that can 
be achieved independently of, and therefore having the 
potential to conflict with, a.mastery of its use. For 
example, as Kripke and others have persuasively argued, to 
be able to use a proper name correctly does not require 
one to be in possession of a nontrivial criterion for 
identifying its bearer - so requiring that the sense of 
a name supplies such a criterion would violate this version 
of the principle. Construed thus, meaning is not some­
thing which could be made out‘ by a theory in a way that 
would show up as mistaken certain linguistic practices, 
such as the use of L.E.M.
As Dummett understands it, the dictum breaks into 
two halves: "meaning determines use", and "use determines 
meaning" (cp.[33],p.216). On the one hand, the meaning of 
a sentence doesn't simply consist in the different uses 
to which it can be put, but on the other, we cannot afford 
to sever the connection between the two. This ambidextrous 
interpretation embodies the Fregean distinction of sense 
and force - in terms of a theory of meaning, its division 
into two subtheories, a theory of sense, associating a 
specific sense with each sentence in virtue of its semantic
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constitution, and a theory of force, containing general 
principles which link the sense of sentences with their 
uses (cp.[36],pp.12-13).
The problem a realist truth-conditional meaning 
theory faces concerns its ability to connect up sense and 
usage in this way. The meaning which resides in our lan­
guage is brought into being by humans engaging in linguis­
tic activity, it cannot therefore be made out to be some­
thing humanly incommunicable. It must be capable of being 
manifested in the use we put sentences to, and of being 
acquired from such use. A meaning cooked up by a theory 
which a person was incapable of making manifest would also 
be something no one else would be capable of squiring from 
them. Thus conceived, the principle is aimed primarily at 
those who would make meaning ineffably private, making it 
something more than might ever come out in use (cp.[4l],pp. 
35-36,[85],p.8). But in the hands of the anti-realist, it 
is aimed specifically at theories which indulge in epi- 
stemlcally transcendent conceptions of meaning. The 
theorist must look to the conditions under which speakers 
are taught to accept and assert sentences as true or false. 
"What we learn to do," writes Dummett, "is to accept 
the occurrence of certain conditions which we have been 
trained to recognise, as conclusively justifying the 
assertion of a given statement .. ., and ... the occurrence 
of certain other conditions, as conclusively justifying its
denial" ([33],p.362).
The import of this consideration is itself open to 
interpretation. It might be taken to suggest that we learn 
a language by associating particul^ circumstances with 
particular sentences - those we are explicitly taught as
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being conditions of its truth, or falsity. The problem 
would then be how we could understand previously unencoun­
tered sentences, and even those we have met, as true or 
false in circumstances we did not encounter in training, 
and therefore weren’t taught whether to assimilate to the 
conditions of truth, or of falsity. We could not assume a 
notion of truth going beyond what has already been deter­
mined as such. Although an anti-realist may want to say 
that of course we go beyond the limited experience of our 
linguistic training (but not as far as the realist would 
have it), we shall see that he is sometimes dogged by this 
strong interpretation of "use determines meaning". But he 
would rather put his case as follows. For both decidable 
and undecidable sentences there will be possible situations 
in which we would recognise them as true, and others in 
which we would recognise them as false - if they occurred 
and we encountered them. With a sentence of either kind, 
our current epistemic situation may be neither verifying 
nor falsifying. The point about decidability is that with 
such a sentence we are entitled to conceive ourselves as ' 
understanding it bivalently, because it is ensured that we 
can gain access to the situation in which its truth value 
is recognisable. The realist, of course, wants to say that 
if our conceptions thus extend beyond what we actually 
experience, in the decidable case, then why not also for 
undecidable statements? To him it looks like the same 
confusion of meaning with evidence in both cases - the 
anti-realist who concedes decidable sentences to him is 
making the same mistake, with regard to undecidable sen­
tences, as the anti—realist who doesn’t.
At this point the dialectic can be illuminated by
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consideration of the anti-realist's principle that truth 
entails knowability/verifiability/provability:
(1) Y  OKCp.
One reason why this principle may provoke hostility is a 
misunderstanding of it as reviving the old verificationist 
spirit of 'the method is the message'. If we had to pos­
sess a method of verification - one guaranteed to result 
in the determination of the truth value - in order for a 
statement to be meaningful, undecidable ones would be 
meaningless. And surely, for example, the jungle linguist 
could traverse the Amazon and lose his front door key in 
its midst, so. that any search we might make for it would 
have no guarantee of success? Quite so, the anti-realist 
would agree, but what would it be for the key to be there 
and also that it be impossible for it to turn up, even by 
chance? That would be a model transcendent truth condition, 
transcending all possible evidence - something not in 
question in this case, since it must be possible for us to 
hap upon it, just because its there.
Even so, it is likely that the realist will regard 
1) as either vacuous or false. In the sense in which he 
finds it acceptable, 'knowability' is such a weak notion 
that it need bear little resemblance to our ' own powers of 
aquiring knowledge. The anti-realist has just granted that a 
situation is knowable just because it exists, and what 
exists, the realist stresses, does not depend on our epi­
stemic predicament. Alternatively, if the notion of veri­
fiability is made more concrete and related to our powers,
1) is false. This dilemma he sees the anti-realist facing 
is sharpened by a proof, recently resurrected by Hart and 
McGinn ([49]), which shows that 1) entails the stronger
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principle 
(2) y  -» Ky.
2) is proved by reductio, ie. by first assuming its nega-
tion - equivalently y  & -»KCp - and deriving by means of 1)
and some uncontentious principles, the conclusion 0(K<p &
which, unacceptably, asserts the possibility of a
contradiction. This highlights the vacuity of the vacuous
interpretation. If all facts are knowable simply because
they exist, as part of reality, then already the idea of a
knowing subject plays no essential role in the notion of 
-1
knowability . At most one need assume a hypothetical 
omniscient being, one who would know the facts, if he 
existed. So we might as well assume that all facts are 
'known* by it, ie. would be known, if he existed, simply 
because they make up reality. It also rubs in the falsity 
of 1) when knowledge is given a more mundane interpretation. 
Clearly, we can't know both that something is the case and 
that we don't know it. So, since we can't know it, by 1 ) 
it can't be true. So either the upholder of 1) is forced 
into the,more radical anti-realism which disallows a notion 
of truth beyond what is known, or he must temper the 
generality of 1). A moderate anti-realist would say that
1) needs restricting, to cope with knowledge of knowledge.
At the heart of the realist's antipathy to 1) is 
the thought that a state of affairs can exist, yet there 
be all kinds of obstacles to prevent us discovering it so - 
even by chance. He thus allows for the metaphysical pos­
sibility of there being states which exist in total isola­
tion, epistemically, from us. For the anti—realist, 
however; when evaluating 1) we must bear in mind that truth 
is a relation between two terms: the world, and language -
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our language. The realist begs the question in the crucial 
cases by assuming that the world already is determinate.
It is as if he could see beyond the obstacles, mentally 
moving them aside, then replacing them at will. Take the 
oft used example of infinite quantification. We gain our 
understanding of the quantifiers with finite samples. In 
certain cases, we observe something of the form (Vv)(cp(v)
—  ^ ^ (v)) to be true in the most direct manner possible, 
collectively. We can observe all the Cp*s and see whether 
they are all Y  * perhaps with "All your fingernails are 
red", with the hands held close together. More frequently 
we have to adopt a less direct approach, checking through 
each (p to see whether or not it is finally ensuring
that we have checked them all (unless already encountering 
a falsifying instance). By thus running through the 
instances we can ascertain whether "All the rooms in this 
house have fireplaces" is true. In both these cases we 
can imagine getting indirect evidence - eg. for the last 
one, from the architect's plan. But there are also cases 
where indirect evidence may not exist or at best be incon­
clusive. Thurber once introduced the category of the 
"fascinating but undemonstrable" generalisation, into 
which he put "People who break into houses don't drink 
wine". The 'undemonstrability* in this case relates to 
the enormous effort that would be required in practice to 
check through every contemporary american housebreaker 
(assuming this to be the intended domain), coupled with the 
inconclusiveness of any indirect evidence. It is not, if 
present tensed, in principle undecidability. The obstacles 
to verifying it are ones of degree « Since the original 
domain was assumed finite, by restricting it - eg. "The
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housebreakers in this town . -  we could make the task 
more manageable without changing its essential nature. 
Thurber*B generalisation is *in principle* verifiable, like 
the key in the jungle example - the difficulty is quanti­
tative rather than qualitative. Not so in the infinite 
case, for here the obstacles are not ones we can surmount, 
or remove without changing things radically. If someone 
understands a sentence involving such quantification, he 
should be able to acknowledge a demonstration of it if 
presented with one - but we cannot take seriously the idea 
that we are guaranteed such a demonstration, or failing 
that, a refutation. We would only have this guarantee if 
we could check through an infinity of objects, whereas 
all we can do is check a finite subset of any such set - 
not the same thing at all. It is here that the realist 
abuses the license gained in the finite case and pictures 
the condition for the truth of a quantified sentence as 
obtaining independently of what we, in conferring meaning 
upon it, can take as establishing its truth. A non- 
(effectively-) decidable sentence is one for which we have 
no effective method for determining the truth value. In 
the undecidable case, to say that a sentence is bivalent 
is to invoke a notion of truth which cannot be reconciled 
with our ability to use it - to recognise it as true if 
true, or false if false.
We can summarise the situation so far by considering 
how Dummett and Quine would juggle with the following 
theses about meaning and truth^. &) The ultimate ground 
of the meanings of sentences - the source of our acquaint­
ance with them - are the circumstances in which their 
assertion would be justified (where "circumstances" must
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be understood liberally - op.[34]p.132). b) If and only 
if truth conditions are completely determined, meanings 
are^. c) Truth is not an epistemic notion - it may 
transcend our ability to recognise it. d) Meaning is 
complete, ie. determinate. Quine and Dummett can be said 
to agree more or less on a) and b) (hence the comparisons). 
But then we must acknowledge the existence of sentences 
which are not effectively decidable, ones for which, by 
definition, we have no guarantee that we shall be able to 
recognise as true or false. Quine, realist that he is, 
accepts c) and so is forced to give up the determinacy of 
sense. The anti-realist, by contrast, cannot accept such 
anti-realism about meaning itself: meaning is something 
created by us and so must be totally accessible to us. 
Matters pertaining to sense, such as synonymy, must be 
effectively decidable (cp.[29],p.632). So he resolves the 
tension by admitting d), and advocates 'epistemologising* 
the notion of truth. By rejecting c), he thus transforms 
the nature of b), ^since meaning will not be given in terms 
of classical truth conditions (see here eg.[36],p.13). We 
drop the idea that truth conditions could obtain totally 
unrecognisably. The traditional realist slinks off, 
privately cherishing b), c), and d) at the expense of a), 
in violation of the usage constraint.
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2; DISPOSITIONS
Having sketched the argument for rejecting the 
realist conception of meaning as bivalent truth conditions, 
I now turn to consider it unleashed against a particular 
instance of realism - that with respect to the meaning of 
disposition terms. These relate suitably to my general 
project, since to ascribe a disposition is "to make a 
statement about potentiality" (Goodman). Verifiability is 
one already mentioned, fragility is another. We say that 
something fragile can break easily, or can be broken 
easily. In this disjunction we see the intimation of a 
distinction between active and.passive dispositions. But 
it is little more than grammatical (cp.[65],pp.99-100); 
most dispositions can be regarded as passive if only 
because something has to happen to their possessors to 
produce their manifestation. And for this reason many more 
properties can be regarded as dispositional than just the 
familiar ible*s and able*s. Any property expressing a 
state of a thing can be regarded as at least partially 
dispositional, for any state can be regarded as disposing 
whatever is in that state to react in certain ways. As 
Popper points out ([85],p.151), not only solubility, but 
also being dissolved is. a dispositional property of a 
solute. As opposed to having reacted with a liquid, being 
dissolved requires a substance to be recoverable in a 
certain way - a disposition. But dissolving is not; it is 
not the. disposition to behave in a certain way, but the 
behaviour itself. Though even here, as Goodman indicates 
([44],fn.7,p.41), the distinction is not absolute. A 
phenomenalist might regard dissolves as a dispositional
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term for certain kinds of appearances. The important thing 
is that we spell out the dispositional nature of a property 
in terms which are, relatively speaking, non-dispositional 
- paradigmatically, these describe features of observable 
events. Hence the elucidation of dispositional predicates 
by means of conditionals linking the manifestations - what 
it disposes the thing to do - and the circumstances 
required to produce these effects. The dispositionality 
of the redness of a surface consists in the fact that it 
either does or would look red, if you do/did the appropri­
ate thing to it: if you observe it in normal light. The 
conditional may succeed in explaining the predicate in 
different terms, but as this last example shows, it may 
not. In the latter case, what elucidation is achieved comes 
through the description of the conditions in which it will 
be displayed. It is the realisation of these conditions 
which turn a can into a would (or at least a should).
Before continuing, I need to review some features of 
subjunctive conditionals. It will be helpful to discuss 
some logical principles which potentially govern them along­
side their analogues for the metric future tense operator 
Fn. Thus we have L.E.M. applied to conditionals, and its 
future tense counterpart:
(1) (Cp Q-» cp) V -i(cp 0-> cp) (T: Pay v )
What is called the law of conditional excluded middle is 2):
(2) (Cp 0 »  cp) V (<PO-> -■'P) (2': PnP v Pn-,cf)
In effect, it asserts that if a conditional is false, the 
opposite(same antecedent, contradictory consequent) is 
true. It excludes those 'middle' cases where we want to 
say that Cp might, or might not occur, given Cp. It thus 
supplies one half of the equivalence.
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(3) -i((jp 0-» (p) s (<p D-> ly) (3’: -.Pnip s Pn-<p)
the other half, from right to left, being unproblematic 
except in the vacuous case (cp.[63j,pp.79-80).
There are two different kinds of reason that might 
be given for the equation 3) of the internal and. external 
negation of a conditional, which correspond to the trans­
position into the subjunctive key of two traditional views 
about the future, the Ockhaunist and the Peircian. Accord­
ing to j;he Ockhamist, PnY is now true if Y  holds, n 
periods hence, in what fact turns out to be the actual 
future - it doesn't yet have to be determined that Y  will 
hold then. On this understanding of the future tense, all 
of 1*) to 3*) come out valid. The Ockhamist finds his 
conception reflected in our ordinary talk of the truth of 
future tensed statements (cp. eg.£9],pp.160-61), so it 
would be unsurprising if we sometimes understood "it would 
be ..., if ..." in a manner comparable to "it will be ...": 
Cp Q —» Y  as true if Y  would in fact have occurred, had y .  
But there is a crucial difference between the indicative 
and subjunctive cases, in that there can be no correlate • 
for the latter of our waiting to see whether Y  comes to 
pass, and thus of ratifying the truth of the prediction F n Y  
even when made before the issue had been settled.
Consider the following thought of Ramsey's, recently 
cited by Peacocke ([81],p.60): "If we regarded the unful­
filled conditional as a fact we should have to suppose that 
any such statement as 'If he had shuffled the cards, he 
would have dealt himself the ace' has a clear sense, true 
or false, which is absurd." Peacocke accuses Ramsey of 
mistakenly rejecting an instance of 1) on the grounds that
2) is invalid in this case, by confusedly holding on to
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the equivalence 3). But the Ockhamist reading is more 
charitable to Ramsey (and accords with what he goes on to 
say). For the Ockhamist, 3) does hold - as with 3') for 
Fn - but this time 2) fails, and so therefore does 1). 
Someone guided by this conception might protest "How can 
you say what would or would not have happened, had he 
shuffled the cards?" Since shuffling 'randomises* the 
outcome (assume, if you need, that a little free will would 
enter the performance), neither outcome is determined. But 
neither is there any waiting to see whether Y  (dealer 
getting an ace) comes to pass since, in Ramsey's phrase, 
the conditional remains "unfulfilled". So there is nothing 
in virtue of which we would regard the conditional as 
either true or false.
Just because the Ockhamist conception has this 
effect of invalidating 1), there is a point in a stronger 
interpretation of the conditional which, as Peacocke 
intends, makes Ramsey's conditional assume a definite truth 
value, falsity. This exports to the subjunctive the 
Peircian view of the future, for which if FnY is to be true 
now, it must already be determined that Y  will occur at the 
appropriate time. Whereas for the Ockhamist, we need only 
consider the one possible future development of the world 
which turns out to be the actual one, for FnY , for the 
Pgf^cian we need to consider all possible future develop­
ments, and be sure that Y  holds in them all. Likewise for 
Cp Q — > Y  * it must be that Y  holds in all the possible 
^-worlds which are most similar to the actual one. (It 
should be pointed out that these are not the only options 
available. On Stalnaker's theory, there is a unique most 
similar Y-world, giving the effect - illicitly on Ramsey's
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view — of the Ockhamist idea of a single world at which to 
evaluate Y* r^.d thus validating 2),) On the transposed 
Peircian conception, the equivalence 3) cannot hold in 
general (cp. for the future, -.PnY Pn-,Y  fails), so the 
rejection of conditional excluded middle 2) does not 
necessitate reneging on the classical 1).
This brings us around to the second kind of reason 
which, can be given in support of 3). It concerns the 
adoption of a realistic attitude towards some statement  ^
which grounds the truth of the conditional. We accept 
the equivalences
(4) X a
(5) -X s
Note that 4) and 5) alone are enough to guaramtee the 
equation of the internal and external negation of a con­
ditional. (Take negations in 4).) Being realists with 
regard to X , we also accept
(6) X V -»X
which, given 4) and 5), is sufficient for the truth of 1) 
and 2). 'This is the kind of case most favourable to the 
'connection* account of conditionals, with X indicating 
the connection between (the states of affairs described by) 
Y  and Y* In. the special case we are interested in, X 
the ascription of a disposition, and Y  Y  dascribe how 
it is manifested. According to Dummett, it is not the 
relation between disposition and manifestation, as given 
by 4) and 5), which is in dispute for the realist and 
anti-realist. (It seems that the sense of would here must 
be Peircian. For consider an attempt to introduce a 
predicate when the outcome is not determined on fulfill­
ment of the antecedent condition Cp . To exploit Ramsey's
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example: call a pack of cards "aceable" if one who shuffles 
it will deal himself an ace with it - ie, such that for an 
unshuffled pack, the truth of "It is aceable" reduces to 
that of Ramsey's conditional. The Ockhamist would have us 
believe that a never shuffled pack is neither aceable nor 
not aceable, emd that a pack in use is aceable one moment, 
not so another - mainly the latter. This seems highly 
inappropriate - when introducing a predicate, we would like 
a sense of will or would which is false in such a case.
Our natural reaction is to reject such a predicate on the 
grounds that no normal pack can be considered to be 
aceable.)
An example of 5), using a timeless ia and an explic­
it temporal coordinate (dispositions can be acquired and 
lost), is
(7) Jones is not (water) soluble at t s If Jones had been 
immersed in water at t, he would not have dissolved. 
Realism about solubility entails that if its not the case 
that had Jones beep, immersed at t, he would have dissolved, 
then the right hand side of 7) must hold good. We could 
say: either the connection - solubility - is present, or it 
isn't, so one or other of the.opposing conditionals must be 
true. Another way to put this is to say that we take a 
realist attitude to the test for solubility• Realism about 
testing amounts to holding that when we t^s^ for something, 
we test for something. Or, in Dummett's more refined 
formulation, we believe i) that if the test is applied (cp, 
in the above schematism), the state it reveals (ie, X » or 
for this is what it is a test for), would have oc­
curred anyhow, ie. independently of the performance of the 
test, and ii) that even if the test is not applied, there
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is still some state of affairs obtaining such that if the 
test were carried out, it would reveal that actual state 
([29],p.607). So whether or not Y, either X, or -, / . Both 
realist and anti-realist will agree to
(8 )  Y  V
but only the realist will go on to infer 2) from this**. A 
realist attitude to the testing of some property, seman­
tically ascended one stage, becomes a realist attitude to 
the testing of the truth, ie, verification, of the 
corresponding statement. It is a belief in objectivity: 
the independence of the truth of a statement, what is the 
case, from whether we desire or believe it, and more 
importantly in the present context, from whether we actu­
ally check for it. In mathematics, for example, it is 
intuitively plausible to regard proofs as the kind of thing 
in virtue of which its statements are true or false. 
Nevertheless we believe that mathematics is objective in 
that its statements, at least the decidable ones, are 
determinately true or false prior to our undertaking, if we 
do, to prove/refute them.
A realist attitude to the test for some property 
involves the belief that one of the relevant instances of 
Cp Q —  ^Y  end Y  -, Y  determinately true. As long as 
one is justified in maintaining bivalence for the corre­
sponding X. this will be acceptable, for one or other of 
the conditionals will be true in virtue of the presence or 
absence of the property, as recorded by X* ®^t few of us 
are likely to hold a realist conception of testing across 
the board, since few of us are wholesale realists. Renun­
ciation of realism applied to a certain kind of statement, 
as envisaged here, will amount to a refusal to accept the
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relevant instances of 6), 2) and 1). The anti-realist need 
have no quarrel with Y  Y* Y  "'Y» ^ d  hence 8), for 
it is D —  ^which introduces the crucial element of undecid- 
To see this, consider a not wildly implausible 
case of anti-realism, one by which Dummett has advertised 
the general argument: that concerning traits of character. 
Our ordinary conception of the psychological realm allows 
for a certain indeterminacy. For example, you may say to 
someone "Either you are coming with us or you aren't" in 
order to induce them to decide what they're doing. In one 
sense, as referring to future events, it is tautologous, 
but'in another, as referring to the person's intentions, it 
will probably be false - if they haven't then 'made up 
their mind'. More importantly for our present concern, 
however, is the fact that what counts, ultimately, in 
whether some psychological predicate can be truly ascribed 
to an individual, is their manifesting the appropriate 
behaviour in the appropriate circumstances. It seems 
undeniably connected with the ordinary meaning of "Jones is 
good at learning languages", for instance, that its truth 
depends on whether "If Jones were to attempt to learn 
another language, he would quickly succeed" or its opposite 
is true (cp.[31] »P»91)• But, even if we don't intuitively 
conceive of "good at learning languages" as somehow being 
as real as solubility, say, we might as well conceive it so 
uniARR we are prepsred to challenge the following general 
realist picture of the meaning of predicates. Predicates 
- so eg. "good at learning languages" - delimit particular 
classes of entities so that, ignoring vagueness, either an 
entity, such as Jones, falls within the class, or he falls 
outside it (cp.62.1). We think of the 'lines of projection'
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(the correspondence relation) as reaching out from state­
ment to state of affairs (= truth), or not, as the case may 
he. Our access to that state of affairs may be indirect; 
we can't just look at Jones and tell whether he has this 
property, as we can with "fat", say. Nevertheless God, if 
he existed, could: trivially, saying that the state of 
affairs determinately exists or does not is to say that a 
being who could see into that sector of reality would see 
which - just because its there (or isn't, as the case may 
be).
In so adhering to bivalence, the realist risks the 
charge of ignoring what "good at learning languages" really 
means - the meaning it has for us. For if according to the
ordinary meaning of the phrase the ability is, as we might
say, 'purely dispositional* - if Jones's being a good 
language learner consists in, ie. is nothing more than, the 
fact stated above by the conditional - then we will have 
no guarantee that Jones determinately either has or lacks 
the property. For we will have no guarantee that one of 
the conditionals is true. The point can be accentuated by
imagining Jones now to be dead and such that he never
encountered anything but his mother tongue. The first 
assumption means that the versions of 4) and 5) we are now 
concerned with are past tensed, eg:
(9) Jones was good at learning languages h if Jones had 
attempted to learn a language, he would have quickly 
succeeded.
The second ensures that the conditionals are contrary-to- . 
fact. This assumption does not necessarily mean that 
neither of them is true. Jones might have displayed 
qualities - a certain kind of intelligence, say - which is
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significantly correlated with the linguistic skill. But 
suppose we look for such evidence, something to support one 
or other of the conditionals, and are unable to find any.
Two different possible states of the world would account 
for this epistemic situation. One is that there is evi­
dence around somewhere, but we have been unlucky in not 
uncovering it. In such a situation Jones would have been 
a good language learner (or not, depending on the evidence), 
even though that ability was never called into play, and 
even though we never discovered it. There is a fact which 
we could know, and which we would count - via the condi­
tionals - as rendering true one disjunct of;
(10) Either Jones was good at learning languages, or he 
was not.
In the other case there is no such fact - there is nothing 
which, if we knew it, would be counted as grounds for 
asserting one or other of the conditionals. What are we 
to say about this case? It is tempting to say that this 
time 10) would not be true. Early in "Truth" Dummett 
questions the wisdom of this response of assuming that 
there is such a thing as a third truth value (for atomic 
sentences). The notions of truth and falsity are rooted 
in the more primitive ones of the correctness/incorrectness 
of assertions, of designated versus undesignated values - 
and these exhaust all the possibilities. Any putative 
counterexample that would be recognised by us would really 
count as a second kind of truth or a second kind of falsity, 
depending on the case. But this move does not apply here, 
precisely because this is not a recognisable counterexample 
for us - we can't tell which of the two stories correctly 
accounts for our current epistemic predicament. For us.
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10) may be true, and may be false (op.[33],p.149). The
realist who insists that 10) must be true must either main­
tain that the question of Jones's language learning ability 
doesn't simply reduce to the subjunctive conditional, 
contravening the meaning we have so far agreed with the 
anti-realist that it has, or, by insisting on 2), allows 
that a counter factual may be barely true. In the former 
case,.he allows for truth in virtue of something which 
apparently we don't take as relevant; in the latter, for 
truth even though there is nothing we would count as 
relevant - both accounts of truth conditions which would be
at odds with the meaning we have conferred on it.
Reverting back to the present tense case, ie. when Jones is 
still alive, rejection of this realism amounts to not 
regarding him as necessarily good at learning languages or 
not, prior to anyone's testing him for it. Fulfilling (f> 
and finding that Y  * say, holds good, does not necessarily 
mean that the conditional Y  O —  ^Y  ^^ .s true all along.
Jones may have been a good language learner, but alter­
natively' it may be that we are not discovering an ante­
cedently existing ability, rather we have created the 
opportunity for it to come into being.
This last thought is reminiscent of the conception 
Dummett suggested as a.general anti-realist picture of 
reality: "Our investigations bring into existence what was 
not there before, but what they bring into existence is 
not of our own making" ([33],p. 18). This is intended as a 
middle-ground between realism and idealism, and as such is 
puzzling: it attempts to reconcile two notions, discovery 
and invention, which we are accustomed to contrast. But 
it suggests a notion of truth as what has been verified,
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as proof, rather than what is possible to verify, as 
provability. On what Dummett takes to be the idealist 
position, truth does require the existence of proof — to be 
is to be perceived, rather than perceivable - but the 
notion of truth is not at all objective. The world is our 
creation, standing to us as we conceive the work of fiction 
as standing to its author. Not only is there no notion of 
truth or falsity independent of our deciding which, but 
such decisions are also totally unconstrained - we are 
free to choose. The anti-realist picture drops this last 
clause; proof is more like something we intuitively 
appreciate as proof, objectively constrained in some sense, 
but still the answer it provides cannot be considered as 
the discovery of some state existing antecedently to its 
execution.
According to the preceding discussion this meta­
physical view cannot be the whole anti-realist picture, 
though it is perhaps what is distinctive of it. For by the 
argument so far, if the anti-realist's account of the 
meaning of disposition ascriptions is correct, we cannot 
say that the world does spring into being wherever we 
investigate it, only that it may do. As McDowell says,
"a claim to know, in the absence of evidence, that a 
sentence is neither true nor false [cp. that Jones is 
neither good at learning languages nor not good] should be 
no less suspect than a claim to know, in the absence of 
evidence, that a sentence is either true or false" ([67], 
p.49). Of course, we have yet to be shown the precise form 
of clause a systematic verificationist theory of meaning 
would offer for a dispositional predicate such as brave - 
or, indeed, for any other kind of expression (with the
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possible, exception of the logical constants). Clauses 
which took a form roughly along the lines of 4) and 5) 
(perhaps characterising ML predicates "Verified" and 
"Falsified" on the LHS) look like promising target equiva­
lences, because a conditional Y  Y  spells out condi­
tions for the correct assertion of X -  what one would have 
to do to get in a position to verify it, and what one 
should then observe. But as Dummett has emphasised (eg. 
at [33],p.360) in general the statements which describe 
the conditions under which we would recognise a given 
problematic statement as true could be infinitely many. A 
theory of meaning could surely not employ an infinite 
disjunction of statements (the truth of any one of which 
being sufficient for the truth of the statement X 
question. ) The lack of any positive proposals concerning 
meaning specifying clauses remains an obvious lacuna in 
Dummett*s account. Nevertheless, the realist has enough in 
the thesis built around the claim that equivalences like 7) 
hold in virtue of meaning of the predicate in question to 
launch a counter-offensive.
Let me first try to scotch one form of realist 
rebuttal. The realist notices that whereas X makes no 
mention of observers, the RHS's of 4) and 5), the condi­
tionals, do. As Mellor says, "To call a piece of cardboard 
'triangular* seems clearly to say how it is in itself, not 
merely how it is disposed to behave in this or that 
situation"^ - including how it would appear to people.
Given this discrepancy, this realist says, there should be 
no question of the two sides getting anywhere near sameness 
of meaning. But this faintly Kripkean style of argument is 
risky when applied to qualities other than primary ones
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(perhaps we could take it as a test for primality). Kripke 
uses something like it to argue that yellowness is not a 
dispositional property ([59],fnn.66 and 71 - though 
"related to" one - this much is consistent with what was 
said above for redness). For Kripke, yellow refers to 
"that external physical property of the object" which 
causes in us the visual sensation of yellowness. The 
sensation we have of yellowness only serves to fix the 
reference of yellow, not to provide its meaning. But the 
assumption that there is a unique physical property of the 
objects is crucial, unargued for and in fact highly dubious, 
given that physicists make a distinction between surface 
and pigment colour. (Think also of the blueness of, say, 
blue paint as against the blueness of the sky.) Kripke 
also argues that since, if we had different neurology for 
example, yellow objects would have produced in us a dif­
ferent sensation, yellow cannot be synonymous with "our 
visual impression of yellowness". But as already argued in 
section 2.4, this form of argument is a non sequitur. The 
fact that a descriptive phrase expresses a contingent 
property of (in this case) a property does not entail that 
the description cannot be synonymous with the term for that 
property. Kripke does not show us that we can talk of 
yellow objects in a world where there are observers with 
a different neurology etc. other than, ultimately, by 
refeiMce to how those objects would look to us. This is 
not to deny that yellowness is "right out there", as he 
puts it, if this means that whether or not something's 
being yellow is an objective matter (barring vagueness).
The objectivity of colour ascriptions is consistent with 
the thought that things aren't yellow, red and so on
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independently of there existing suitably equipped observ­
ers.
The, idea that the equivalences 4) and 5) are not 
beyond dispute, as Dummett would have us believe, is 
nevertheless worth pursuing. To find a better route to a 
realist rejection of the anti-realist's account of dispo­
sitions, it is worth reviewing some of the empiricist 
tradition on the topic. Dispositions introduce a multitude 
of ?*threats and promises", in Goodman's phrase, and for 
this reason the empiricist suspects them. A dispositional 
property should be truly ascribable to an object even when 
it is not directly manifesting the relevant trait. One has 
to turn to event predicates to find the non-dispositional. 
Nevertheless, it may be said, what ultimately counts with 
solubility, for instance, is dissolvings on immersions.
That is, its meaning seems to revolve around correlations 
of observable events. But as Carnap noted, it cannot be 
given an explicit definition in extensional terms: the most 
plausible truth function (— >) of these most plausible 
candidates (v is.immersed, v dissolves) suffers from the 
obvious defect, the solubility of the non-immersed. One 
must renounce either extensionality or the aim of an 
explicit, eliminative definition, if not both. We have 
been considering the former option, whereas Carnap stayed 
extensional, and proposed his famous reduction sentences 
in place of an explicit definition. In general, these come 
in pairs, one stating a sufficient condition for the 
disposition ascription X» "khe other a necessary condition.
(11) -» /<)
(12) (p2 — » ( 1/^ 2 ■
OT particular interest in Carnap's account is his
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attempt to do justice to certain diachronic features of 
language use: the introduction of a new dispositional 
predicate into a language and a consequent evolution in its 
meaning, "in accordance with the intentions of the scien­
tist". He recognises that if we make such an introduction, 
hy establishing a pair instantiating 11 ) and 12), 6) cannot 
be guaranteed. Por "the meaning of ] is not established
completely, but only for cases in which the test condition
is fulfilled. In other cases ... neither the predicate nor 
its negation can be attributed" ([10],p.8). With reference 
to the class of immersed things ( we can apply the
predicate soluble bivalently/classically, for here
dissolved ( ) and didn! t dissolve ( ) exhaust all the
■5
possibilities^ but, it is supposed, we have as yet no way 
of applying it to things outside that class. We cannot say
of a match that has been destroyed by burning, that it was
either soluble or insoluble. It is worth pausing to 
contrast Carnap*s burnt out match with the deceased Jones. 
The reason this failure of classical principles does not 
have, for Camap, any "profound metaphysical consequences" 
is his acceptance, at least as far as these freshly 
introduced dispositional terms are concerned, of the old- 
style verificationist equation of meaning with the method 
of verification - no method, no meaning. In the region of 
indeterminateness there can be no question of evidence 
turning up, by chance perhaps, because as Carnap explicitly 
states, with regard to that region we have yet to confer a 
meaning on the predicate. With respect to all meaningful 
uses of it, of course, classical principles still apply.
One might think that Carnap could restore the 
general validity of 8) by extending the falsity conditions
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of 7< to include the intermediate region. But it would be 
an arbitrary stipulation to do so at this stage. It 
suggests as misconceived the scientist's aim to leave it 
open for us to discover more about the dispositional 
property in question. It would be to deny that there is 
any natural way to increase our understanding of ^ , a way 
of diminishing the region of indeterminateness which is 
sensitive to the way of the world. Instead, the scientist 
is free to define what he means by a term. A theory would 
be divided between those laws constituting a definition of 
what it is to be an f, or have property Q, and therefore 
analytic, and some synthetic principles concerning' where 
f's happen to show up, which things happen to possess Q, 
and other contingent features. At worst a scientist could 
only be mistaken about the latter - he could not produce a 
false account of what f's are (their constitution), only a 
coherently articulated concept to which nothing answers in 
reality (cp.[86j,pp.22ff.). In which case he must scrap 
that theory - the terms simply fail to refer - and try to 
mould a new definition. There is no continuity to this 
process, since each theory constitutes a logically distinct 
definition ([10],p.12). "Testability and Meaning" repre­
sents a step away from such a 'definition account' of 
theories. It depicts the scientist as slowly closing the 
gap in the meaning of a predicate, by discovering laws that 
convey new criteria for its application, these being laid 
down as additional reduction pairs. Thus, supposing we 
know what soluble means only for things that have been 
immersed, "we may perhaps add the law stating that two 
bodies of the same substance are either both soluble or 
both not 8olnble"([lO],p.8), Since we know that wooden
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things are normally insoluble, this addition would non- 
arbitrarily extend the falsity conditions of ^ to include 
the burnt out match.
Two brief comments are perhaps in order here. The 
first is that Carnap is not putting the 'being of the same 
kind* idea to the same use as Quine puts it to (cp.[90], 
p.224). Quine defines soluble as "being of the same 
molecular structure as something which has dissolved." But 
it is not inconceivable that there is a kind of thing whose 
members are soluble no one of which has been immersed^. 
Camap is not vulnerable to this accusation, since he 
recognises this possibility and does not assume that his 
principle would close the gap completely. Perhaps Quine's 
account suffices for something like the assertion condi­
tions of solubility ascriptions, since if we are to know 
whether the members of a kind are soluble, the crucial test 
is still the dissolving of some specimens under suitable 
conditions. But this brings us to the second point: many 
different kinds of things exhibit solubility - what counts, 
it is still admitted, is the dissolving on immersion. So 
isn't this a good case for the 'definition theorist'? In 
the end we may find that all soluble substances share a 
common kind of atomic bonding, but it is not guaranteed at 
the outset that such a physical explanation of the property 
of solubility will be forthcoming. (Moreover, for the 
definition theorist, saying that things belong to the same 
kind only looks like a solution. All it does is pass the 
buck, "for just when are two things of the same kind?" 
([44],P'44)" I am assuming that Kripke and Putnam have 
shown enough about reference to show that we do have some 
right to pass the buck in this way.)
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On the "Testability suid Meaning" picture, science 
begins to look like an activity the purpose of which we 
(being realists at heart) can sympathise with; a progres­
sive attempt to come to understand better the nature of 
f's. But the picture is not beyond criticism. The idea, 
which Carnap endorses, that the scientist, in adding these 
terms afresh with no antecedent meaning creates a new 
language from an old one itself defines "language " in a way 
which falsifies the flexibility of natural languages. More 
importantly, the model is linear, and definition is still 
considered to be the limit of the cumulative process, ie, 
when the term's application is settled for all cases (cp.
[10] ,p.13,[44],pp.47-48). We can thus regard the sets of 
reduction pairs accumulated on the way as partial defini­
tions. Difficulties in this as an account of the ordinary 
meaning of disposition terms have been brought out by 
criticisms made by J.C. D'Alessio ([12]). He points out 
that with a predicate such as soluble, although we can 
state a principle sufficient for its attribution (dis­
solving), there is nothing, corresponding to 12), suffi-' 
cient for its denial. It may always be that a lump's 
failure to dissolve is not due to its insolubility but 
rather to the absence of some relevant condition, such as 
the temperature's not being high enough. Goodman made 
basically the same point in connection with the subjunctive 
conditional account of dispositions, that we are "forced 
back to some ... fainthearted counterfactual" beginning 
"If all conditions had been propitious and ..." ([44],p.39). 
(We could get the same effect using a weaker form of 
conditional connection, eg. with should rather than ^puld.) 
D'Alessio uses the point to challenge the linearity of
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Carnap's model. We need to replace 12), not merely to 
supplement it, by a reduction sentence which demands the 
presence of the propitious circumstance if insolubility is 
to be correctly ascribed on the basis of a failure to 
dissolve. But since the possibility remains that we shall 
discover that other conditions are required for a soluble 
thing to dissolve, it is always possible that the replace­
ment will in turn need replacing. Nor is this just an 
affliction of the necessary-condition-stating reduction 
sentences. For D'Alessio goes on to point out that some­
thing may not be fragile just because it breaks. Here it 
is the correlate of 11) that is at risk - pressure, temper­
ature, and the kind of thing which the object is are all
relevant conditions. With other disposition terms, eg. 
magnetic, both kinds of reduction sentence may be subject 
to correction.
This shows that a simplistic instrumentalist account 
will not suffice for ordinary dispositional predicates. 
Solubility does not entail dissolving in any parcel of 
water, as Ryle once suggested. If a lump of what we take 
to be ordinary salt fails to dissolve in what we take to be
a normal glass of water, the natural response is not "Here
is something insoluble, and it happens to be salt", but to 
wonder whether the lump is salt, or the water is unsatu— 
rated, etc. Soluble is a flexible term whose use can be 
made more precise by explicit relativisation to a partic­
ular solvent and, if needed, a particular temperature.
What kind of solubility was D'Alessio talking about? 
Obviously there is solubility relative to the conditions at 
the test immersion, which quite trivially a thing will fail 
to possess if it fails to dissolve then and there.
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D Alessio's point must be that the test conditions may 
diverge in unsuspected ways from what is taken to be the 
norm. If that is so then he should also have pointed out 
that they can be too lenient, for instance if the temper­
ature of the water was high enough to dissolve a. substance 
insoluble at room temperature, where what was at stake 
were the latter conditions.
The important fact - pace 'definition accounts' - 
is that the evidence that something belongs to a kind whose 
members are soluble under the relevant conditions is taken 
to outweigh a particular failure to dissolve - we take it 
as evidence.that the conditions aren't right, rather than 
that the thing is insoluble. In a complex world, causal 
mechanisms may break down, or interact with one another in 
such a way that they are prevented from displaying them­
selves as they normally do. The failure of some observable 
feature to occur may be due to the obstruction rather than 
the absence of the property. Of course, Carnap's law that 
things of the same substance are alike as regards solu­
bility i^ not sacrosanct, and it might always be that we 
have hit a counterexample. Let us consider a case where a 
physical disposition is not shared by all members of one 
kind. Taking glass as our substance: some panes are 
brittle, but some are strengthened. As Hempel says: "The
report that the pane was struck by a stone explains its 
being broken only in conjunction with the additional 
information that the pane was brittle" ([51],p.458) (as­
sume the stone was not hurled with extreme vigour). It may 
be that we only know it was brittle in virtue of its so 
reacting — our easiest access to the knowledge that it is 
that type of glass coming from putting it to the test - so
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in a sense Hempel»s explanation is trivial, but it is still 
true that it was in virtue of its being brittle glass that 
it did break.
Ordinary talk of the world is suffused with the idea 
of sufficient reason. An event, such as a dissolving, is 
not something which just happens. Soluble does not simply 
gather together actual and potential observable events as 
brute facts - herein lies the failure of naive instrumen­
talism (as, to repeat, a theory of ordinary meanings).
Quine puts it thus:
men talked equally easily of solubility before 
explanations [in terms of atomic structure] were at 
'hand; but only because they already believed there 
was a hidden trait of some sort, structural or other­
wise, that inhered in the substance and accounted for 
its dissolving on immersion. ([90j,p.223)
To say that opium puts people to sleep because of its 
dormitive virtue is vacuous on two counts. The first is 
the obvious one: at the time it was put forward, it 
pretended to be what it is not: an explanation - since 
no independent characterisation of the 'virtue* was avail­
able. Secondly, v/s expected a 'virtue' all along - some 
feature which opium possesses which gives it that effect 
on people. It isn't just a happy coincidence, it is 
counter factual supporting too: if you had taken that piece, 
it would have put you out.
What this shows, against.the views of Garnap and, 
in a different way, of Dummett, is how the classical 
reasoning some group of people adopted in talking about a 
disposition could be unjustified in the sense that they did 
not then possess the means always to determine whether or 
not it was possessed by an object, but for their faith in 
its existence, realistically construed, to be bome out by
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subsequent discoveries, discoveries which would lead them 
to a fuller conception of its nature. Their insistence on 
L.E.M. even when they are not capable of proving one or 
other disjunct requires a picture of the disposition never­
theless either present or not, rendering true one or other 
disjunct - a picture which they may not then be able to 
substantiate but which may be correct, if there is only one 
way of completing the meaning of the predicate, ie. if 
there objectively is a determinate property which they so 
far only incohately conceive. There would then be no route 
in general from an account of the meaning conferred on a 
disposition predicate at some stage to the possible lack of 
determinateness of the corresponding aspect of reality.
That not all dispositions conform to the anti-realist 
metaphysical picture is a conclusion with which Dummett 
concurs ([31j,p.93). But what, finally, of psychological 
dispositions, for which the anti-realist account was 
granted to have some credibility?
Quine resolutely uphol&s the realist faith in 
connectipn with dispositions "such as intelligence, whose 
physical workings we can scarcely conjecture; the disposi­
tional characterisation is all we have to go on" - in this 
case, and oversimplified, the ability to learn quickly.
But he still means by it "some attribute of the body, 
despite our ignorance concerning it; some durable physical 
state, perhaps a highly disjunctive one" ([92],p.157). 
Intuitively, the prospects for realist faith in the exis­
tence of a base for the disposition being rewarded seem 
less in this domain than they do with a physical property 
like solubility. For one thing, the idea of being of the 
same substance/kind, so helpful in the physical case, has
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less appeal in the mental. Psychological traits exhibit a 
continuous gradation in the extent of their possession. So 
physiological factors are at work, one would expect 
there to be a combination of several or many of them — as 
Quine said, intelligence might be a "highly disjunctive" 
state • What this really means is that even though the 
physiological realist may agree with the correlation of the 
disposition with the related behaviour—specifying condi­
tionals 4) and 5), he may not want to commit himself to 6) 
(and therefore to 2), etc.), on the grounds that these 
predicates do not have cut and dried conditions of appli­
cation. If there is an element of vagueness in "intelli­
gent", one may decline to accept "Either Jones is intelli­
gent or he isn't" on the grounds Jones may be a borderline 
case. Recognising that intelligence covers a spectrum of 
cases would thus seem to defuse the dispute, as set up by 
Dummett.
I am inclined to think that neither a physiological 
realist account noj" a purely behavioural account of the 
meaning of these predicates will tell the whole truth.
Both types of account are abstractions from our linguistic 
practice - practice which exhibits tendencies in both 
directions. On the one hand, someone may think he 'really' 
possesses a certain quality - wit, say — even though he 
fails to manifest the appropriate behaviour given the op­
portunity. He fosters the idea of a trait enduring through 
its failure to be manifested. On the other hand, those who 
disagree with him may take it that in part his failure to 
produce the goods is evidence against the presence of an 
underlying disposition, but in part also just constitutes 
not being witty. Mi#it it not be that we prepared to
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"bend our conception of what a mental trait consists in 
according to our particular interests?^ The members of a 
linguistic community are not taught words uniformly - which 
words are basic, and which defined, will vary from person 
to person, as will the precise wording of the definitions, 
where given. Dummett‘s claim that a predicate like "good 
at learning languages" is "introduced" via a subjunctive 
conditional, though plausible, is of unclear status as a 
hypothesis about language. As a piece of armchair linguis­
tic psychology, it seems to me more plausible to say that 
what we are initially exposed to (with a predicate which is 
unstructured and which is not explicitly defined fbr us), 
are positive and negative exemplars. How precisely we 
extrapolate from this is an empirical matter (as indeed is 
the question of whether such training does occur) which 
should leave us with some freedom in how we understand the 
word.
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3: POSSIBLE WORLDS AND ANTI-REALIST MODALITY
In this section I want to consider how the differ­
ence that should arise between the realist and anti-realist 
in their accounts of necessity and possibility will affect 
the possible worlds interpretation of these notions. We 
have already (section 1.5) looked at one way in which 
possible worlds talk can be regarded as an extension of 
our more everyday operator language. If, being a refine­
ment of ordinary modal talk, the possible worlds rendition 
of it is to this extent unexceptionable, a suitably mod­
ified version of it should be acceptable to the anti­
realist. But first let us consider the kinds of demands 
anti-realism makes on the modal notions themselves.
In his exegesis of Frege, Dummett phrases the 
discussion of the interpretation of necessity in terms of 
the notion of analyticity. For the anti-realist, any 
notion of necessity must relate, like the notion of sense, 
to the means we have of recognising sentences as true.
So he favours epistemic analyticity - roughly, truth in 
virtue of the meanings to be found in our language, anti- 
realistically construed. By contrast, realist necessity 
will typically be non-epistemic like realist sense, re­
lating to the kind of thing in virtue of which a sentence 
will be true, whether or not we could know it ([29],p. 117). 
The realist should favour ontic analyticity - epistemic 
analyticity, we could say, relative to God's language 
(= epistemic analyticity relative to our language, realis­
tically construed.) The idea of God's language is that it 
is one which would he spoken by an omniscient being, one 
who sees things as they really are, and whose language
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therefore describes things, as they really are, it is . 
deliberately intended to enshrine several, (potential) 
myths.
According to Dummett, Frege retained the Kanti 
trichotomy ox analytic, synthetic a priori and synthetic a 
posteriori. This is somewhat misleading, since Frege 
adopted a wider notion of analyticity than Kant: a sentence 
is analytic if it can be proved from definitions and 
logical laws ([29],pp.502,632 and [41],section 3). But 
even this .Dummett regards as too restrictive, and at one 
point he suggests that a sentence is analytic if the 
procedure for determining its truth value can only yield 
one result ([29] ,pp',655,636) : our discovering it to be true, 
presumably. Of course, any true sentence, so described, is 
such that we could only discover it to have the truth value 
true. But the point is that an analytic sentence has that 
status in virtue of the sense it possesses, not the way of 
the world.
Since our recognition of the truth of an analytic 
sentence may not be immediate, such a sentence may be 
informative. The informative/trivial distinction cuts 
right across Frege's analytic/synthetic distinction, Tnere 
are analytic trivialities, "1 -• 1" oeing a good example, 
Fregean sense, according to Dummett, is transparent to 
users of the language: if two words have the same sense, 
and someone understands them, he must know that they share 
that sense. So a genuine expression of synonymy such as 
"1 = 1" must be trivial, ie. recognition of its truth will 
follow merely from a grasp on its meaning. '(This is just 
the contrapositlve of: because "Dor Mogenstern 1st der ' 
Abendstern" is informative, the two Eigennm^en, as Frege
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called rhem, are not synonyms.) By wanting to prove that
all true arithmetical equalities are analytic Frege had, in 
analytic equivalence, a notion which obviously goes beyond 
synonymy: most of these equalities are informative. Now 
consiaer "Either the sun is shining now or it isn’t". We 
could verify this by looking out of the window. That kind 
of verification would he on a par with that for, say,
"Either the sun is shining now or it is snowing" - it 
follows directly the composition of the sentence out of its 
disjuncts. Its truth would have been ascertained, but not 
its analyticity. It is unlikely that an ordinary speaker 
would consult the weather in this simple case, but it 
becomes more probable the more complex the analytic sen­
tence is that one might directly verify it without realising 
it was analytic ([29],p.635, and cp. p.120).
As Kripke has pointed out, people can learn arith­
metical truths a posteriori, by consulting a computer or a 
mathematician ([59],pp.261,765). The computer may supply 
us with answers that transcend what it is humanly possible 
to calculate - ie. truths which are in practice impossible 
for us to ascertain a priori. This example of a necessary 
truth being verified a posteriori does not impugn the idea 
that the most direct and conclusive route to its verifica­
tion is a priori — it was a priori for the computer (or 
mathematician). That idea is, rather, brought in question 
by the previous, meteorological example. Clearly, uhe 
notion of a priori requires a modality in its characterise,- 
tion (as had analyticity above): a truth is a pri o n  ix it 
can be known - whether directly or indirectly - without 
recourse' to experience of the world. (This modality can 
perhaps be eliminated in favour of a quantification over
methods o.t verification,) Even though we may be tempted to 
conceive of apriority as a species of necessity, thus 
construed it is a problematic rather than apodeictic <' 
modality. And even when we acknowledge the confusion 
Kripke mentioned, of substituting "must" for "can" in "can 
be known independently of experience", the temptation 
remains to a certain extent.
One reason for this is that it is natural to think 
that apriority is at least coextensive with a notion like 
epistemic analyticity. For how else could one derive 
knowledge independently of experience if not ultimately 
from a grasp of the meanings of the words? - and conversely, 
if a statement is epistemically analytic, it should at 
least be possible to know it independently of experience.
To be weighed against this is the well-known dissociation 
of apriority from metaphysical necessity argued for by 
Kripke. If we think of the concepts in a. series ranging 
from the most to the least epistemic: apriority - epistemic 
analyticity - ontic analyticity - metaphysical necessity, 
then if a connection fails to hold in either direction 
between the outer pair, some links must fail in between.
Let us consider some cases. Concerning Kripke's 
rejection of: if it is metaphysically necessary that 
then it is a priori that it is worth observing that one 
case which might spring to mind, "Hesperus is Phosphorus", 
is not in fact so obviously a counterexample, suppose cnak 
someone understands of the pair of names only "Hesperus ,
(hie way of imparting to him an understanding of the name 
"Phosphorus^ is by telling him "Phosphorus is the planet 
Hesperus" or "'Phosphorus* is another name for Hesperus".
He will then acquire the knowledge that Hesperus is
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Phosphorus, doing so independently of experience (other 
than ohab involved in acquisition of a grasp on the senses 
of the expressions), hy deriving it from his understanding 
of the words. An a priori truth is, to repeat, one which 
can he knov/n independently of experience. Perhaps that 
characterisation can he qualified (to exploit the fact that, 
as the names are supposed to he have been introduced, it 
required observation to know they stand for the same object 
- cp.[60],p.73). No matter - one could pick other examples 
from Kripke's work not subject to this kind of consider­
ation^ . Moreover, Dummett is prepared to concede that 
there is no entailment from something’s being ontically 
necessary to its being a priori - provided that a realist 
interpretation of our language can be made out. In fact, 
his position here seems to allow the possibility, cultivated 
in the last section and to be discussed more fully in the 
next, of there being more to a metaphysical issue than can 
be extracted from a theory of meaning for our language.
The main example starts from the plausible assumption that 
were God to exist, his existence would be necessary in some 
metaphysical sense. Aquinas believed that this could not 
be reduced to any linguistic species of necessity stemming 
from our reflecting on the meanings of our words (cp. [29], 
p.118). Against this some infidel apparently argued that 
if a statement is to be necessary, it must oe analytic, and 
if that is to be so, since the statement "God exists" comes 
from our language, it must be analycic for us. Assuming 
with Aquinas that this consequence is false, it follows 
that God’s existence is, at best, contingent. Euu this 
argument is not compelling for one who takes the realist 
point that there can be more to a metaphysical issue chan
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meets tne semantical eye (at J.east as trained on our 
language). If we have to think of necessity as some form 
of analyticity, this means that there can he a notion of 
ontic analyticity distinct from epistemic analyticity. The 
infidel has offered us a conditional; if a statement is not 
analytic in one language (eg. ours) then it (ie, anything 
we ought to count as a correct translation of it) will not 
he analytic in any other language (eg. God's). What this 
ignores is the possibility of its conditions of truth 
being fulfilled transcendentally by our standards, and 
hence, if those conditions cannot but be fulfilled, that 
the statement is analytic in a language for which a realist 
interpretation is permissable (by the anti-realist's lights 
- ie. coincides with the account he would offer).
Another example to the same effect would be provided 
on the supposition of the correctness of the platonist view 
of a transcendent mathematical reality (C29J,pp.117-18,120). 
Since arithmetical statements are, if true, necessarily so, 
undecidable statements which are nevertheless true in 
virtue of that platonic reality would count as ontically 
but not epistemically analytic. The obvious example here 
would be an arithmetical statement involving unbounded 
quantification over numbers. As regards finite cases, the 
universal quantifier will be associated with the same 
direct and indirect means of verification in our language 
and God's, but with infinities only the indirect means will 
be shared. The statement will fail to be analytic for us 
because we are not in possession of a procedure bnat can 
only terminate in our recognising it as true - the direct 
means of verification, surveillance of the totality.
Surely, a truth can be known independently of
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experience only if no observation we could make could count 
against it, Tha.t is, ii/s not that an a priori truth can't 
Ibe verified a posteriori, its that it can't be falsified a 
posteriori. One might then think that, if in no experi- 
enceable situation it will come out false, in every such 
situation it will be true. Apriority would be a special 
case of epistemic necessity - truth in all situations 
compatible with what we know, once all the a posteriori 
knowledge is subtracted. But this conflation is unsound. 
Falsity in an epistemic situation should be recognisable as 
such, truth likewise; the fact that we could not experience 
a falsification does not mean that we cannot but verify it. 
We have just seen examples which for the anti-realist 
emphasise that there are statements which we cannot falsify 
a posteriori and which, because undecidable, are not 
verifiable at all, hence not a priori. The possibility of 
realism means we can add: unfalsiftable because undecidably 
true, ie, metaphysically necessary.
This still leaves the converse connection intact, 
from apriority to metaphysical necessity. It is the 
challenge to this which Dummett finds most objectionable.
A source of such antipathy is diagnosed by Kripke; if a 
statement belongs to a class whose memoers are, id true, 
contingently so, we should not be able to rule out the 
possibility of a falsifying state of affairs securing 
without recourse to checking the world ([59jîP*263) » V/nat 
this consideration ignores is that one can pick out a 
contingent state of affairs a priori by a judicious cnoice 
of wording (for more on this, see [39]). We all know ^  
initio that wherever we are, it will be correct to call 
that place "here", but this does not mean that we would
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regard "It is necessary that I am here" as true. Consider 
the query Dummett raises concerning the individuation of •... 
the facts involved - about what fact it is which is sup­
posed bo be both known a priori and contingently true ([29] 
pp.122-23). Ib is plausible to say that, for example, an 
utterance of "I am here" does not state the same fact as
where ex. and/3 are names of the relevant person 
und locality * The two statements clearly have different 
properties - the latter does not embed truthfully within 
the context "It is a priori that". But this is not enough 
to overturn Kripke»s challenge. What we are primarily 
concerned with is whether "I am here", although embedding 
truthfully within "It is a priori that", does not do so 
with "It is necessary that". It may indeed be that "It is 
analytic that I am here" is true - a case of modality de 
dicto, since one infers the truth of "I am here" from an 
understanding of the words. But this can only encourage us 
to think that the contingency of "I am here" is not a 
matter of the denial of a language-relative notion of 
necessity (which is perhaps even more apparent with an 
example like "I exist"). In the previous case, we could go 
along with making necessity a kind of analyticity, by 
appealing to the idea of a possibly transcendent language. 
The idea is inapplicable in this case. The fact that we 
may read "It is necessary that I am here" as false shows 
that we are prepared to treat it as an instance of de re 
modality, of the contingency of my being here.
So far, then, we have seen no reason to think that a 
suitably epistemologised notion of possible world (cp. the 
"non-realist" worlds suggested by Kamp in [54j) would not 
provide a better account, for the anti-realist, oi the
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notion of. necessity than an elucidation of it in terms of 
some overtly epistemic notion like apriority. At one point 
Dummett does suggest that such a notion would provide a 
properly cognitive representation of sense ([29],pp.134, 
135). Before considering what the anti-realist would regard 
as the unacceptable face of possible worlds, traditionally 
conceived, it will be worth reviewing their better side* 
Suppose that someone wanted to defend in detail the claim 
that Nixon could have been a used car salesman. The 
natural way to do this would be to find out the facts of 
Nixon’s past life, and then modify in thought those circum­
stances which inclined him towards a political rather than 
automative vocation. What our speculator does, in effect, 
is to stick the modality out front (eg. "Things could have 
turned out like this:..,") a?id then to describe in the 
indicative and in the detail he requires the way the world 
would have been. He could go on to spell out other possi­
ble denouements and make comparisons between them (which 
requires some means of cross-reference). All this provides 
more detail than our ordinary interest in modal matters 
requires, though we may suppose that military strategists, 
concerned as they are with what could nave or could happen, 
avail themselves of this mode of speech (albeit with possi- 
ble ’scenarios’ rather than ’worlds’).
One must keep a sense of proportion. The oechnique 
of exploring the modal realm by rewording things in berms 
of possible worlds gives rise to a bhat of
trans-world identification. We imagined a world in which 
Nixon was a used car salesman. But as it happens Nixon 
does ]not enjoy this property - so how, by Leibniz's Law, 
cEui the character in the counterfactual situation be
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identical to Nixon? Something must be amiss in this 
question, lor Leibniz's Law is not a modal principle; it 
tells us that a thing is. what it is, not in the sense that 
it couldn't be any other way than it in fact is (which is 
where ib leads, on the reasoning behind the question), but 
only in the sense that difference of properties suffices for 
the actual numerical distinctness of any two individuals.
Our problem was simply whether "v could have been a used 
car salesman" is true or false of Nixon, This is the basic 
issue - whether an entity a has a property <p in another 
world is nothing over and above the question of whether
<3>Cpa is true. If, by rewriting the problem in terms of
possible worlds we'find we are unable to describe a world 
in which Nixon has the desired non-modal property, this 
will count against ascribing the modalised property to him. 
It is not, then, that the method of possible worlds churns 
out negative answers to every question of the form "Is <^(pa 
true?" (where in fact iCpa) by automatic application of 
Leibniz's Law.
As Kripke says, we want just to stipulate that we're 
talking about Nixon in another situation. This doesn't 
mean that v/e can simply stipulate that an individual is a 
particular (p thing in an imagined situation, whatever the 
value of ^  , for that would amount to tne converse of the 
previous error, making ^(pa always true. Perhaps Kripke s 
point is this. When making ordinary, non-modal assertions 
if what we say is not true, its not that we have made a
true assertion about another world, we have made a false
claim about the actual state of things.. But when specu- 
lating couRterfactually. there is no question of our making 
a false claim about the world we want in that manner.
194
There ±s no independent way to refer to a non-actual world 
except through the description v/e make of it^. So we are. 
free to choose the, individuals we want to talk about, and 
describe them as having the properties we want to imagine 
them as having - provided, of course, that those descrip­
tions stay within the bounds of genuine possibility.
At least this much, then, can be said in favour of 
the jjnocuousness of possible worlds. Yet an anti-realist 
would find them objectionable on three counts, I think, as 
standardly used in the semantics of modality. Firstly, all 
the realist assumptions about this world are carried over 
to possible worlds, on the traditional conception. For 
example, Robert Adams explicitly characterises them as 
determinate ([1]), meaning by this that a) every world is 
such that exactly one proposition out of each contradictory 
pair is true with respect to it, and b) each world, if 
temporally ordered, is a complete world history. This
’maximal consistency' claim is shared by Plantinga, though
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formulated in terms of states of affairs^. The point here 
is simply that possible worlds will be vulnerable - 
susceptible to non-determinacy - at whatever points the 
anti-realist establishes a case independently of modality. 
And as such, they will be unsuited to be used in any theory 
of meaning which the anti—realist would put his name co. 
This is brought out nicely by a ploy of Newton-Smith's 
(L74],pp.68,233-34, and cp.83.4 below). Suppose we have a 
case of underdetermination of theory by (all possible) 
data; that is, two theories T., and Tg for which, while they 
apparently make incompatible claims about the nature of the 
world, there is no possible observation we could make that 
determines which one we should select. The realist may
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happily accept this predicament, as proof that the truth 
can, and in this case does, transcend our means of ascer­
taining it. If so, he will he inclined towards depicting 
it in terms of two definitely distinct worlds, A and B, 
corresponding to and respectively. Our difficulty is 
purely epistemological; we can't tell which one we're in.
The anti-realist, however, will reject this model; we have 
no justification for thinking we're in a possible world, if 
this is what they are, ie. determinately constituted 
conditions for the truth of one or other of T.^ and T^, 
independent of our epistemic abilities. (Here the divergent 
paths of Quine and Dummett (cp. section 3.1) momentarily 
reconverge. But there is a difference; for Quine, what is 
objectionable is not that, as it were, the worlds are 
determinate, rather that we should regard their identifica­
tion, through language and theory, A by T.|, B by Tg, as 
determinate. This remains realist in that the epistemolog- 
ical difficulties are our problem*) This.is the objection 
which Dummett has most frequently raised against possible 
worlds; their unsuitability to represent the cognitive 
notion which sense is (eg. at [33],pp.421-22). Only as 
aggregations of recognisable states of affairs could ib oe 
thought that they could contribute to such a project.
Secondly, and most importantly in this context, the 
episternology of modality is no easy matter. The idea bnat 
some truths are necessary is not readily accessible to an 
empiricist episternology, for the obvious reason that we do 
not perc€^ve necessity in the world. As Kant is oft 
quoted, "Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, 
but not that it cannot be otherwise". Even with Kripke's 
plausible candidates for the category of necessary a
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posteriori, v/e observe only that eg., Hesperus Ir Phosphorus 
— tl.i.at i c is established by the a priori argu—
ment that if a = b, then 0 ( a  = b) ' (cp.[59j, p.765). 
Similarly, it may be argued, we don’t observe that its 
possible tha.t Hesperus is Phosphorus, we just observe it «
It our world is but one among many other possible ones, it 
is in general known to us aa such via the mediation of the 
.Ë£se ^  posse principle* Cp O y .  Not too much should 
be made to hang on this notion of the directly observable 
though. Might it not be said that we can just see that its 
possible for the piano to go through this doorway? Or that 
its impossible for it to go through that one? The example, 
in the last section of the impossibility of the burnt up 
match stick dissolving in water illustrated, in its humble 
way, that a certain kind of possibility is open to empiri­
cal Investigation. But the important point is that v/e have 
no guarantee that we will be able to conclusively determine 
. all questions as to whether or not Of*, for instance^. 
Possible worlds, realistically construed, present to us a 
picture which conflicts with this. Recall Kripke’s remark 
that realism about possible worlds represents them as 
things "one looks upon ... as an observer" as if through a 
telescope ([59],pp.266,267). The image of an independent 
realm rendering objectively true all matters modal, 
awaiting discovery by astronomical means, compares with 
that presented by mathematical platonism (cp.[33]jp«229). 
But the idea of observation here is not one we can take 
seriously^ (especially if some causal link between per- 
ceiver and perceived is required. For how could *e recei\ 
a causal signal from some non-actual world./
Another point is that taking necessity as an
ve
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•unbounded quantifier over an infinity of worlds will only 
compouna the ills already accumulated (cp. section 3.1).
One might also wonder whether the anti—realist would query 
the very intelligibility of a possible worlds ML. For ex- 
ample, a conventionalist would query the idea of a once 
and for all domain of possibilities, the set V/ — even if 
one adopted an intransitive accessibility relation to 
define the modal concepts of the OL (to appease the con­
ventionalist’s presumed dislike of the S4 principle, DCp — > 
OCj(p) j the ML would still embody an absolute perspective 
on what is possible. But let us focus on the problem raised 
by Peacocke ([79],pp.480-81 ) that a homophonie satisfac-r 
tion-based truth theory for a first-order language with 
modal operators would serve up the wrong truth conditions 
for an OL sentence saying that there could be incompatible 
objects. - objects which could not coexist in any possible 
state of affairs. For it would require the possibility of 
a sequence containing a pair of such objects, and such,a 
sequence could not exist in any possible world. For it 
could only exist in a world in which all its members ex­
isted, and by hypothesis no such world exists. The se­
quence principle 1,2,12 would be an ontological correlate 
of the invalid principle (Y & Y)» v/hat
this line of reasoning ignores, however, is that the peace­
able coexistence of such possible entities in some set is 
already presupposed in the assumption that there is a do­
main of possibilia A over which the variables of quantifi­
cation range. Once we have such a domain, the idea of 
functions from fN  to its members must be acceptable. The 
point is that when dealing with such sequences we are not 
dealing with a perspective which is bound to a particular
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world. The problem serves to highlight the difference be­
tween a genuinely world-bound view of existence and one
which is modestly supramyndane♦ The difference is most 
vividly illus tratea by the assumption that there is a set 
of entities over which the possible worlds variables range. 
Clearly, such a set could not exist in/at any one world 
for, from a world-bound perspective on existence, that 
would require all its members to exist in that world.
Worlds are not the kind of thing which exist in or at a 
world. But to assume this much of a supramundane perspec­
tive - ie. simply to quantify over worlds - is not what is 
problematic for the anti-realist. Consider the temporal 
case.^As argued (§1.5), the use of quantifiers over times 
is a natural extension of our ordinary use of temporal, op­
erators, What the anti-realist finds objectionable in a 
realist construal of time is not such quantification per se 
but the tacit appeal to the powers of a being who tr an sends 
time and who views all times on a par (cp..[33],p.369).
That is the kind of ability the realist would have to ap­
peal to if he is to explain what knowledge of the truth .~
conditions of past tense statements consists in, considered 
as determinately fulfilled or not, irrespective of our in­
ability to discover which. Because tnis oeing stands out­
side of time, the essential point must be that it is im­
possible to add ordinary temporal indexicals to the lan­
guage it would speak - there would be no "now for Cod.
Such an existence is not one we have any serious conception 
of. The same mistake is made when we picture God's view of 
the modal universe - the set of all possible worlds - by 
analogy with a spaceman looking down on different planets. 
There is no genuine analog)' here. A possible world is a
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"bo tali by of lacts. A being for which all possible worlds 
are on a par, equally accessible, is thus one who st<ands 
outside all facts, from whose vantage point it would be im— 
possible to recover the perspective of the actual world.
V/e can summarise the anti-realist critique of the 
classical conception of possible worlds in the terms of a 
triune exorcism, Firstly, a being who can apprehend a 
wholly determinate totality of facts, as would be invoked 
by Adams's requirement b) for their determinacy through 
time, has powers which bear no real resemblance to our own, 
For can we empathise with a being who can directly perceive 
more than one possible world - even if restricted to ef­
fectively recognizable features thereof. And thirdly, the 
same goes for a being who watches over an infinity of 
worlds (and a non-denumerable one, at that). In all these 
respects adoption of a non-realist theory of meaning would 
lead to a revision of the concept of possible w or Id.
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4 : SEMANTIOS AFP META?HYSICS
In 1959, realism consisted in "the belief that for 
any statement tnere must be something in virtue of which 
either it or its negation is true" ([33],p.14). More re­
cent formulabions put it in terms of a statement's being 
either déterminabely true or determinately false (a stronger 
version of bivalence than the barely stated: every state­
ment is either true or false), irrespective of whether we 
could ascertain which (cp.[33],p.225). A realism is real­
ism restricted to a particular subject matter. Three im­
portant notions are operative within (a) realism: bival­
ence, potential verification transendence, and the guaran­
teed existence of the 'something in virtue of which*, It is 
clear how these ideas are supposed to mesh together: the 
last one justifies or entails the first two. Dummett has 
written:
a conception of meaning as determined by truth-condi- 
tions is available for any statements which do relate 
to an independently existing reality, for then we may 
legitimately assume, of each such statement, that it 
possesses a determinate truth-value, independently of 
our knowledge, according as it does or does not agree 
with the constitution of that external reality which 
it is about. ([33],p.228)
The kind of doctrine which provokes the anti-realist 
is thus depicted as, essentially, a specific met-aphysical 
conception of some part of reality finding expression in 
truth—conditional semantics-for the area of language con 
cerned with it. The notion of truth which is employed, as 
'agreement', is not itself under attack. Basically, that 
is the idea of truth as correspondence, as captured by what 
Dummett terms 'Principle O', (here strengthened to a 
biconditional):
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(G) A statement Is true if and only if there is something 
in virtue of which it is true.
This notion of truth is hut an innocent bystander, expe­
diting the anti-realist's reductio of some doctrine concern­
ing a facet of reality. To construe matters thus is to 
place Dummett within the great verificationist tradition 
of showing up certain metaphysical theories as nonsenses, 
conceptions neither theirs for the giving nor 
ours for the taking. And an inevitable consequence is that 
classical truth conditions cannot provide the fuel which 
v/ill in general power a theory of meaning over the whole 
linguistic terrain.
Consider the conditional
(1) If reality is determinate in certain respects, biva­
lence is guaranteed for the relevant class of statements 
An anti-realist would accept 1), and utilise it in a modus 
toilers argument, ie. when he has ascertained that bivalence 
is not guaranteed for some linguistic expression, The 
realist is also likely to accept 1), but argue the other 
way round - we are naturally inclined to take a premise 
about the constitution of reality and detach the consequent. 
We think, for example, that because the material world is 
determinate, any non-vague description of it we make will 
either hold or not, epistemological considerations being 
irrelevant. It also appears as an element in Lewis's 
realism about possible worlds. He has argued that because 
worlds are non-invented, autonomous entites, there are many 
facts about them he does not know, nor even that he knows 
how to set about discovering ([63],P.88). Nevertheless 
they remain .facts : just because worlds are: not figments ■ of 
his imagination, lewis implies, these facts are determinate.
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Ifc is not opsn to us to iiifluGnce them.
Consider now the converse implication;
(2) li bivalence is guaranteed for a class of statements,
then reality is determinate in whatever way apt.
The anti-realist need have no quarrel with this, since
bivalence does not necessarily entail possible verification
transcendence. He grants that it is unobjectionable to
attribute knowledge of classical truth conditions to a
language user, the obtaining of which will always be
recognizable. Thus Wright:
we do not ordinarily think of those aspects of reality 
which we are able conclusively to determine as any less 
of the world. All that is being suggested is that 
such aspects constitute the world - or, at least, those 
of its features to which we can give intelligible 
expression. ([113],?.226)
(Note the caveat in the final clause.) Nothing untoward is 
conceded by this (at least by the standards of moderate 
anti-realism), since the idea, of which the realist would 
like to avail himself, of a truth condition that can 
transcend all possible means of recognition will not be, ex 
hypothesi, one applicable to the usage of decidaole state­
ments, such as reports of observation. Finally, if it is 
part of the intuitive realist attitude to put metaphysical 
considerations first, the realist can also use 2), when 
reasons are adduced for rejecting the consequent. Fiction 
provides a standard example. We might grant that there is 
a sense of truth for which "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" 
is true. But given the belief that no actual or possible 
individual could be identical to Holmes (C59].p.764), 
we are likely to conclude that there are sentences con­
cerning- Holmes which are neither true nor laloe (cp.[32], 
p.385). So bivalence cannot be guaranteed for the notion
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of truth - if we are prepared to call it that - as applied 
to fictional discourse in general (in fact one could actu­
ally cite counterexamples to the principle).
If the preceding is right, then both the realist and 
the anti-realist agree on the equivalence, as defined by 1 ) 
and 2) together, of the semantical and metaphysical issues. 
This tallies with Dummett's position in ■Elements of 
Intuitionism (p.386): "the metaphysical question,.... what 
facts obtain [ie. "hard" facts, "those which constitute the 
substance of reality" as it is in itself [33],p.222] is the 
very same question as the question which statements we can 
suppose to possess a determinate truth value." The point 
is that the notion of fact is strictly correlative with 
that of true statement - there is no question of either 
disputant trying to analyse one notion (eg. truth) in terms 
of the other. But this potential for agreement is ob­
scured by what has emerged as a clear difference in method­
ology. The traditional realist prefers an approach which 
assigns a priority to the metaphysical issue. Perhaps what 
lies behind this methodology is the idea that reality 
itself existed prior to our coming on the scene and talking 
about it. It could have turned out that there were no 
beings with any linguistic abilities anywhere, so it is 
surely a contingent fact that beings with our language and 
our epistemological powers happened to show up. This makes 
it natural to think that, for all we know, there are 
features of reality which are beyond our ken^. But this 
general moral that we should not make reality itself turn 
on our possibly impoverished conception of it, is quite 
compatible with the methodological point that its not open 
to us to decide first what facts determinately obtain. The
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realist could anyway concede that the situation is more 
complex than would he represented by unidirectional moves 
from'reality to meaning. Take the intuitive opposition to . 
the determinacy of the fictional realm discussed above. 
Trivially, you can't get to a metaphysical thesis about 
fictional reality v/ithout knowing something about the lin­
guistic practice of writing fiction, telling stories, etc. 
And to appreciate that fully, you may have to contrast it 
with more normal discourse which, for the contrast to be 
effective, may in turn require mention of the non-fictional 
reality which it concerns.
The situation so fax would seem to be reflected 
perfectly by Dummett's characterisation of the Fregean 
doctrine of naming. He has written:
Frege's use of the ontological terra 'object' is strictly 
correlative to his use of the linguistic term 'proper 
name': whatever a proper name stands for is an object, 
and to speak of something as an object is to say that
there is, or at least could be, a proper name which
stands for it. ([29],p.53)
But we don't first comprehend somehow that numbers are
objects. Rather, there are certain syntactic tests by
means of which v/e can identify proper names, such as an
expression's permitting existential generalisation, having
no plural forms, and so on. If an expression passes the
test, then it is a proper name, and its sense and reference
will be fixed. Numerals pass the tests, so numbers are
objects for Frege. No further questions about the existence
of numbers arise - to think that they do is to make the
mistake of thinking that objects are objects independently
of our conceptualising them as such through the apparatus
of reference and. predication. It v/ould be, for Dummett, a
transgression of the Fregean edict not to inquire after the
205
Bedeutung of a word in isolation from the kind of lin­
guistic context in which it occurs (cp,[33] ?pp.40~41).
This more or less neat picture of the way the 
disagreement between the realist and his opponent is 
shaping up is destroyed when Dummett gets on to the ques­
tion of how a thesis about the externality of reality would 
relate to one concerning its determinateness, i e , a realism 
in his sense. Let us first fix a piece of terminology. An 
issue is ontological if it is of the former kind, ie, if it 
addresses the question of whether some facet of reality is 
external to us, or is indebted in some way for its exis­
tence to such thoughtful beings as ourselves. A meta­
physical (or metaphysical/semantical) issue focuses on the 
kind of question we have been discussing - the hardness/ 
softness of the facts, or equivalently (by 1) and 2)), the 
bivalency of the notion of truth for the relevant state­
ments, Dummett's contention is that an ontological thesis 
- if it can be given non-metaphorical content - cannot 
serve as a premise from v/hich to derive a metaphysical/ 
semantical conclusion. There would then be two senses in 
which an account of reality would be secondary to the 
relevant part of the theory of meaning - in the methodo­
logical way discussed above, and in this other sense, that 
we cannot a.dopt a stance on the ontological issue prior to 
determining the correct notion of truth. Having done so, 
one or other view of reality - external or dependant - will 
inevitably suggest itself as the natural one (op.[33], 
p.229).
In order to demonstrate his contention that meta­
physics doesn't follow from ontology, Dummett outlines two 
hybrid doctrines. As they are initially presented in Frege
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(pp.507-8), he does not address the question of how we 
would flesh out the content of the ontological half of each 
hybrid. For the one position, someone in effect says; 
"Numbers exist autonomously, nevertheless quantification 
over them is to be construed in terms of proof and disproof, 
ie, intuitionistically." For the other, they say: "I 
believe that numbers are mental constructions, nevertheless 
quantification over them obeys classical principles."
Given the latter halves of these two positions, it is 
natural to wonder if the former is not, as it were, an 
insincere mouthing of words. For obviously a dispute about 
objects doesn't arise for them stripped bare of every kind 
of property they enjoy, and this brings us back to the 
nature of the facts they participate in. From a prephilos- 
ophical point of view, these doubts may not seem entirely 
convincing, since a thesis about objects has plenty of 
intuitively comprehensible content. We have firm intui­
tions on the nature of objects, shaped by a paradigm: that 
of the spatio-temporal, physical object. This is surely 
one reason why the strand of formalist thought that denies 
outright that mathematical statements are about objects is 
intuitively appealing (cp. section 2.1). (From this 
perspective, the Fregean conception is deficient. Even 
though a generic "the lion" or a species name "panthera 
leo" may pass all the syntactic tests, we would prefer a 
semantic account which does not construe them as directly 
referring to a single object - a platonic Lion, presumably.) 
That thought is more appealing than either the picture of 
the mathematician as astronomer, or the picture of him as 
artist.' Dummett rejects this aspect of formalism on the 
grounds that to say that one kind of discourse is not about
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anthing, or any things, is to say that one totally fails to 
make statements in that area ([33]ip.xzv). He does not 
argue for this principle** In one sense it is unobjection­
able; by reference to the alternative, Fregean notion of 
object. It is indeed in such essentially semantical terms, 
rather than by comparison and contrast with the spatio- 
temporal paradigm, that Dummett develops the ontological 
halves of the two positions. It is then unclear why a 
formalist would or should not maintain that the thesis that 
numbers are objects is, on this Fregean conception, 
harmless - assuming that numerals encounter no difficulties 
with the syntactic tests. He would then grant it unobjec­
tionable to talk of our bringing numbers into being - 
wholesale, by laying down a system of axioms, rather than 
retail, 'as we go along*, ^//hether he would still resort to 
classical proof procedures would then be just the question 
of the coherence of the second position outlined above.
let us now try to develop these two kinds of hybrid 
in more detail, but by continuing the theme of possible 
worlds. In one case, possible worlds are not considered as 
existing "v/ay out there", as Kripke puts it, but as 
dependent on human thought. Suppose this means 'as we go 
along*, ie. that they exist in so far as we think of them - 
excepting, of course, the real world. Simultaneously, what 
is necessary and possible is deemed an objective matter - 
bivalence holds for modal statements, and they obey 
classical logic. So presumably necessity, being objective, 
constrains our construction, in thought, of other worlds.
As Dummett says, an object of imagination such as a fiction­
al character can only have those properties it is described 
as having. There is no question here of the choice of
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properties being constrained in any way. But, by assump­
tion, there is no such freedom in this case. The problem 
of the intelligibility of the position is not yet dispelled 
- to understand what is meant by saying that possible 
worlds depend, in this sense, on thought for their exis­
tence. If talk of other worlds is just another v/ay of 
talking about what is possible, and if the latter is 
objectively determined, then what stops us thinking, 
concerning any particular question of possibility, that the 
relevant worlds already existed prior to our thinking about 
them? It should be predetermined whether or not some 
description will count as a coherent description of another 
world. So what do we do to bring them into being, since we 
are not free to stipulate whether or not something is pos­
sible? It looks as if what this theorist really believes 
is that unactualised worlds don’t exist at all, like the 
formalist just discussed, and so that all talk of ’bringing 
them into being’ is, really, metaphorical, V/e get another 
angle on this problem by pressing the question: what 
justifies the theorist’s belief in the objectivity of modal 
discourse? It cannot be slavish adherence to bivalence, 
since by hypothesis he rejects that for statements of the 
form "There is a world such tha/fc ..." If he thinks that 
there is something - other than possible worlds - which 
renders it bivalent, then this other facet of reality must 
be the prime claimant to be what modal discourse is really 
about. This possibility is perhaps more evident with 
modality than mathematics, for in this case someone might 
well believe in its objectivity without thinking he thereby 
concedes the determinate existence of other worlds, pre­
cisely because he doesn’t believe that modal discourse
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carries commitment to them. Realism about possible worlds 
is not the only view that someone insisting on bivalence 
for modal discourse need appeal to for support. (This is 
not to say that one first adopts bivalence without any 
thought of the metaphysics required to justify it, as if 
the latter would simply be an afterthought.)
A more plausible, less extreme concoction along 
these lines would attempt to reconcile a non-provability 
transcendent notion of truth for worlds with the use of 
classical logic for modal discourse. If talk of our 
bringing worlds into existence is to make any sense at all 
in the context of an affirmation of the objectivity of the 
modal, it must relate to our bringing in the whole universe 
of worlds at once ~ a universe which could not excede what 
we have put in or could get out. The idea would be that 
although bivalence is not guaranteed for statements pro­
claiming the existence of possible worlds which are such 
and such - and, therefore, for their more ordinary operator 
counterparts - we would still be entitled to reason classi­
cally about modal matters. This would show that the issue 
which really counts in a dispute over realism, the question 
of what kind of logic we are entitled to adopt, could not 
be decided by the prior adoption of a stance on the onto­
logical issue (ala Kreisel’s famous dictum).
If this position is acceptable, there must be a 
justification for classical logic alternative to the 
principle of bivalence. One natural response to this chal­
lenge is to say its use is harmless - as harmless as its 
adoption when vague predicates are being used. Vagueness 
could set an important precedent, so it is worth consid- ■ 
ering briefly. Consider an object in the middle of the
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continuum of shades between red and orange. Given that 
"red" is a vague predicate, we cannot regard the statement 
"That is red" as either determinately true or determinately 
false. It is clear that this does not have anything to do 
with the possibility of our observations effecting a change 
in it - it will be ^  much red before as after. Neverthe­
less, one kind of defense for "Either it is red or it 
isn’t." is that, on any way of making the application of the 
predicate more precise, one or other of the disjuncts would 
come out true. So what harm can be done in assuming LEM 
here? (There is no question of an anti-realist raising the 
possibility of there being nothing which could count as 
evidence for one of the disjunpts - the object definitely 
has a colour.)
We get closer to the theory we are after by consid­
ering Dummett’s specifically Temporal anti-realist T, who 
distinguishes truth in a possible past world history from 
truth in all past world histories (ie, that which is still 
determined as having happened). A past tense statement may 
not be bivalent in the latter sense of truth, since the 
traces of the past which remain may not determine it as 
true or false. Nevertheless, T regards the statement 
disjoining it with its negation as determinately true in 
this sense, because he regards each possible past history 
as complete, and thus bound to verify one or other of the 
disjuncts. T’s defense of classical logic is very similar 
to the preceding one; although PSP may not (any longer) be 
determinately true or false, there is no harm in asserting 
pc^ V -«Py , since whatever possible past history was the 
actual one (cp. whichever sharpening of "red" you choose), 
it comes out as true. T’s concession to anti-realism is in
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a^eeing that, on the important notion of truth, bivalence 
is not guaranteed for past tense statements. Thus although 
he holds that it is indeterminate which history was the 
actual past history, because he regards each history as a 
maximal fleshing-out of what we currently know, whichever 
one it is it is determinately constituted.
What would be a comparable case for modality? One 
way to think of it would be this; if philosophers cannot 
conclusively settle such conceptual matters as individual 
essentialism, there can be no unique set of principles to 
guide our construction of possible worlds. We can there­
fore envisage there being standards which conflict over 
whether or not there genuinely is a world wherein ..., eg. 
individual a has property <jp , according to how liberal they 
are over what it is to be a. While admitting that Of^a is 
not determinately either true or false, the view under 
consideration would still hold to O f  a v -*0<j^ a because, by 
whichever standard you chose, there will be a world in 
which a has (p or there won’t.
It should be apparent that this form of argument 
will justify classical logic even if what is at stake is a 
highly subjective or evaluative matter. Thus; ’’Either this 
(work of art, course of action, ...) is good or it isn’t" 
is assertible, because however you qualify or relativise 
the predicate one or other disjunct will come out true. We 
would often find it highly objectionable to be confronted 
with insistence on LEM in a case like this - with, for 
example, a morally complex situation which has both good 
and bad aspects. In forcing us to choose between goodness 
and nongoodness, it forces us either to misdescribe the 
situation by coming down in favour of one side at the
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expense of the other, or to assert "Well, it is and it 
isn’t", which conveys no information - other than that we 
in effect decline to describe the situation in the terms 
offered. (Against the use of classical logic with a 
borderline vague case, again it may be protested that it 
does an injustice to our way of describing things. Here it 
is for the different reason that this idea of sharpening 
the application of a term, even if temporarily made for the 
duration of a particular context, does not correspond to 
our actual linguistic practice. Rather we acknowledge that 
it can neither be described as red nor as not red, by 
hedging the description, eg. "It is redish", or even, "It 
is (an) orangey-red".) Finally, for someone upholding the 
equation of truth with provability in modal discourse and 
who takes seriously the fact that our criteria for deciding 
modal issues may not enable certain questions to be con­
clusively settled, the use of LEM would seem equally 
objectionable. The general ethos of "Well, whichever sense 
you pick, its going to come out one way or the other" is 
objectionable here, as in the other cases, because of the
idea of picking one sense (or relativisation or whatever)
?at the expense of others . Surely the anti-realist would 
not find this form of argument acceptable. For someone 
might argue in the following manner about Jones. Either 
there is some evidence around concerning his ability with 
languages or there isn’t - the anti-realist did not chal­
lenge this instance of LEM. If the former, then there is 
something which we would count - if we found it - as 
settling the truth-value of "Jones was good at learning 
languages". If the latter, it would just count as a second 
kind of falsity for that sentence. So whichever way the
213
evidence turns out, the sentence will either be true or 
false. The whole point, for the anti-realist, is that the 
difference between the evidence and the no evidence case 
will not be one we are capable of recognising, so the 
appeal to the divide between the two cases is illicit in 
that it could not relate to the meaning we could have con­
ferred on the predicate^. The same goes for someone who 
would make a more direct and simplistic appeal to the 
supervaluational idea: however we were to complete the 
meaning of the phrase...
Let us leave this theoretical amalgam, still wanting 
coherent articulation, and turn to the other combination 
which Dummett considers. In its modal version, the onto­
logical picture is akin to Lewis’s, a belief that possi­
bility forms a further, fifth dimension through which are 
arrayed the countless possible worlds. Their independence 
from human cognition is taken to be significant: because 
nothing travels through this fifth dimension, unactualised 
worlds play no role in our procedures for determining the 
truth values of modal statements. Since the ontology of 
worlds is combined with anti-realist views about meaning 
which relate it to these procedures, ie. the conditions we 
are taught to accept and reject assertions under, bivalence 
is not endorsed for the modal part of our language. Since 
we are assuming free inter-translation between statements 
involving modal operators and the corresponding ones with 
world quantifiers it must be that there are classical truth 
conditions for modal statements, its just that the meanings 
we have conferred upon these statements do not consist in 
or relate to a grasp of them.
At first sight, it might seem that anyone wanting to
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maintain this combination would be confused. He wants to 
play God yet simultaneously assert that the rest of us 
cannot attain His perspective. How could he come to 
believe this? This is not just a psychological query: the 
obvious route to a thesis about the nature of possible 
worlds is via one about more normal modal discourse and a 
construal of the latter in terms of worlds. Bivalence for 
normal modal discourse would then be a prerequisite for 
regarding worlds as determinate. But suppose this problem 
is surmountable - the theorist perhaps takes the Everett/ 
Wheeler ’many worlds’ interpretation of QM as good evidence 
of their independent existence. The problem of coherence 
remains: what stops these worlds rendering our modal 
judgements true or false, if the latter are about the : 
former? To turn it around: it looks as if the worlds of QM 
are not the worlds of modal semantics. The anti-realist 
argument did not challenge the notion of truth in virtue of 
something in the world, it will be complained, but rather 
the general insistence on that something’s being there, for 
every statement, rendering either it or its negation true.
It will help to bring out the incoherence of the 
position if we return to the idea of God’s language, the 
advantage of which being, as before, its making possible 
the appeal to principles of translation. For instance, 
reformulating the position Dummett gives in connection with 
mathematics, we have a thesis about two languages. Since 
the theorist believes that natural numbers are ’’objective, 
indpendently existing abstract objects, to each of which 
the predicate P(x) determinately either applies or does not 
apply" (C32],p.383), he must believe that in God’s language 
3xP(x) is determinately true or false. At the same time he
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denies this for our language, convinced by the anti-realist 
attack on recognition-transcendent truth conditions. This 
involves a direct assault on the notion of truth which had 
been agreed upon, in particular its component 1). The 
problem with this is how vœ could give direct expression to 
a counterexample to the conditional 1 ) : if the anti-realist 
account of our language is right, we cannot presume to 
understand what God expresses by 3xP(x) in the way that he 
does. If God could speak, we would not understand him 
(aright).
Nevertheless there is something right about this 
position for the realist who, as mentioned earlier, wishes 
to emphasise that a reality external to us might transcend 
our capacities to determine it. Even if we cannot coher­
ently formulate a direct counterexample to 1), the 
(epistemic) possibility of one arising cannot be ruled out. 
Recall that at the beginning of this section realism was 
characterised in terms of three theses. This leaves room 
for a position calling itself realist in refusing to make 
truth an epistemic notion; ie, cleaving to its possible 
verification transcendence, but dropping the metaphysical 
insistence that there must be something in virtue of which 
any statement or its negation is true, and thereby also 
dropping bivalence and lEM. It is a position - renouncing 
actual verification transcendence (in the presence of non- 
effectively decidable sentences) - which is reached by 
McDowell in [67] (see especially section 6. For someone 
wanting to maintain a truth—conditional theory of meaning, 
we have seen that there are independent reasons - from 
consideration of eg. vague predicates - for shedding no 
tears at the parting of bivalence and LEM.)
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A move appealing to a realist, illustrative of his 
position, is to imagine beings with lesser epistemic 
abilities than our own, and then to point out that just as 
it would be foolhardy to base conclusions about the nature 
of reality on their impoverished conceptions, so it would 
be in cases where the anti-realist aims his attack at us 
(the (flies to wanton boys* move). Consider as an example 
Poincare's illustration of the conventionalist theory of 
geometry. He imagined a Euclidean two-dimensional world 
which consisted in a circular disk, the temperature of 
which varied uniformly from absolute zero at the perimeter 
to a degree of heat at the centre. Its inhabitants, 
wishing to determine the geometry of their space, start out 
with rigid rods that contract in direct proportion to 
reduction in temperature. The data collected by means of 
this technique would naturally lead them to infer that 
their world is Lobachevskian and infinite in size - unless, 
of course, they hit on the idea of the uniform distortion 
in their measuring apparatus. This challenges the implicit 
assumption that the rods remain invariant in length when 
transported. Given this idea, finite Euclidean space would 
be an equally natural explanation. This exhibits the 
conventionalist thesis, in that according to Poincare, from 
their standpoint only convention could decide which of the 
rival geometries should be adopted. But notice that, as 
the example is set up, ^  have perfect information: we know 
that their world is finite and has a distorting field. I 
don’t know whether Poincare intended to include a fact of 
the matter. Perhaps the conventionalist should abstain 
from commenting on that issue — the important point for him 
being that for them, as for us in the four dimensional
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case, the choice is a matter of convention.
The fact that there is no possible datum that could 
decide between two theories does not entail, without 
further argument, the fact that there could be no such 
datum. If the speculation about distorting fields could be 
given empirical content, the choice between the two 
theories in Poincare's world would become non-conventional. 
If the inhabitants of the world could control and measure 
temperature, ie. if they are not just passively subjected 
to it, they could measure the elasticity of their measuring 
rods and the temperature gradient of their world. Until 
such a point,, nothing they had put into the meaning of the 
theories determined any observable difference in the two, 
but at that point they should be able to ascertain that 
they inhabit the kind of possible world described by the 
second theory. Of course, it would always be open for 
someone to speculate about another kind of distorting 
field, but again, until that is given content, the theories 
would remain on a par with respect to the possible evi­
dence. This is a standard empiricist reply to Poincare:
that there is really just one theory with two different 
formulations. If a theory is just a device for correlating 
observations, this is obviously correct, but such holism 
would be unacceptable to an anti-realist such as Dummett, 
for whom the basic unit of meaning is the sentence. There
is a difference between the theories, but until the hypo­
thesis about distortion is given empirical content, we 
cannot ascribe to them a proper conception of what that 
difference is, and therefore, of what their world is really 
like. Nevertheless, ^  can see that there is a difference 
there, a difference which at one time transcended their
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powers of ascertainment. Likewise in our case, the view 
that spacetime is external to us makes it natural to 
believe that we do inhabit a definite possible world even 
if we cannot fully conceive how it is. We have no guaran­
tee that it does transcend our ability to ascertain its 
nature, but nor can we be sure that it does not.
This leaves us with a position in which metaphysical 
or ontological questions cannot be decisively settled by 
consultation of the theory of meaning for our language.
For example, we have no criterion by means of which to 
decide whether or not some aspect of reality - possible 
worlds, for instance - is external to us. This seems the 
correct position to me - theories about the nature of 
reality which are metaphysical in the sense of transcending 
the empirical are not capable of being settled conclu­
sively. As Prior says, "In doing metaphysics there is 
still no substitute for ’the choice of the soul*; or, if 
you like, prejudice" ([84],p.93).
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CONCLUSION
Someone who was looking for modality to provide 
something of a 'crucial experiment* to decide between rival 
semantic programmes might find the preceeding considerations 
a little disappointing, in that none of the three programmes 
discussed decisively fails to accomodate modal locutions. 
However we need not look for outright failure as the point 
of comparison between the theories so much as the manner in 
which they treat modality. In this conclusion I want to 
draw together the strands as far as possible by comparing 
the theories with regard to the kind of light they would 
have us regard modality in.
I would start by mentioning a measure of agreement 
between the Davidsonian and Montaguean approaches, in their 
distinguishing between objective modalities of a broadly 
logical or metaphysical nature and their epistemic counter­
parts. For the Davidsonian, the difference can be 
illustrated in the following way, based on the general case 
of interpreting one language within another:
(1) Wahr(Maybe there is a married bachelor, englisch) s
Vielleicht Wahr(there is a married bachelor, englisch). 
As far as the average German speaker is concerned, it may 
be that the sentence quoted on the RHS is true. We know 
better of course; the sentence quoted on the LHS, and hence 
the whole of the LHS, is false. This suggests that 
epistemic modalities, because prey to the Wallace argument, 
cannot be given the homophonie treatment of their objective 
alethic counterparts. On the Montaguean approach, epistemic 
modality is recalcitrant in not permitting substitution on 
the basis of equivalence in all possible worlds (§2.4).
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However, the agreement on this point masks a fairly crucial 
disagreement between the two schools.
On the natural account of the way the model theorist 
works (§2.1), a language is something whose expressions by 
and large could have had other meanings. But according to 
the standard justification for the use of broadly logical O 
to interpret itself, it is of the essence of a language 
that its expressions have the meanings they do. A con­
ception of language cannot simply be adopted or dropped as 
a matter of expedience, according to the kind of semantic 
theorising we are engaged in at the time. From the truth 
theorist's point of view, if Ocp is true in L, T(cp , L) 
must be regarded as strictly necessary. That could not be 
if we were also free to adopt the alternative conception 
of L.
Should we perhaps resolve the difference in favour 
of the truth theorist's conception of language? After all, 
on the PTQ style of semantics, the only language which 
receives a direct model-theoretic interpretation, and which 
therefore requires the conception which accompanies it, is 
the artificial language of tensed intensional logic, not 
English itself. The model-theoretic conception is suited 
to artificial languages, since typically the only expressions 
of such a langauge to have a definite meaning bestowed on 
them are anyway the ones whose interpretation is held 
constant from model to model.
But we are by no means in a position to dismiss the 
alternative conception of language. What about the kind of 
fact which Kripke cites, such as that Hesperus might have 
picked out a different planet to the one it in fact does?
In fact what Kripke says about this example goes against
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the conception - namely that such a usage would involve a 
different language ([60], p.91). Indeed that is a common 
enough thought - that to change the meaning of even a single 
word is 'to speak another language », But it is not com­
pulsory - we could reformulate it as 'to use the language 
in a different way'. Indeed it seems odd to make the 
identity of a whole language depend on the meaning of a 
single word. Part-whole essentialism becomes less plausible 
the more parts there are - it makes too much turn on too 
little. There is a spectrum ranging from artifacts 
fashioned from a single lump of matter to those of the 
order of the ship of Theseus. Its unsuitability in the 
case of natural language can be illustrated by the fact 
mentioned by Dummett ([29], pp.584-85), that speakers are 
unlikely to agree on the definition of every word, ie. on 
the sense they attach to them. (Most dramatically: no two 
speakers are likely to share exactly the same lexicon of 
proper names.) In consequence, there would be no shared 
language but a multitude, one to each speaker.
Is the alternate conceivability of the language 
under study enough to invalidate the truth theorist's homo- 
phonic treatment of modality? Here we have to distinguish 
between saying of the language which is the OL of the 
semantical theory that we can choose to conceive it in 
different ways, and saying that the choice is between 
different (kinds of) languages to serve as the OL of the 
theory. The former option is not consistent with an S4-like 
conception of necessity (since there would be some facts 
about the language, English, which were necessary but not 
necessarily necessary), yet S4, regardless of its other 
merits, is virtually indispensible to the theory (op.[48],
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p.451). Rather the truth theorist takes the latter option, 
of choosing a language which could not he conceived other­
wise (what is conceivable is another language, similar to 
it except that it bears its semantical attributes contin­
gently) , Both the model theorist and the truth theorist 
study object languages which are proxies for English; the 
difference between them discussed here lies in the 
different natures of these proxies.
Of course, this also leaves the truth theorist
with the options of treating alethic modality using either
possible worlds, like the model theorist, or the methods of 
1
parataxis. To some extent these treatments raise the 
question of the place of analysis in semantic theory.
Possible worlds, for instance, because, as I tried to show 
in §1.5, talk of them represents an increase in expressive 
power over plain modal operator talk, albeit a gradual one.
It is generally agreed that model theory is better suited 
to the business of analysis than truth theory (eg. by 
systematising its results, as in §2.3), and of course in 
aiming for homophony the truth theorist wants to leave the 
conceptual resources of the OL untouched as far as possible 
( § 1 . 1 ) .  However Davidson does not rule it out; he proposes 
that analysis, at least of particular expressions, should 
be "preceded by or at any rate accompanied by" an account 
of logical form ( [ 1 3 ] ,  p.3 1 7 ) .  But for kinds of expressions, 
or particular constructions, such as quotation, it is un­
likely that an account of form could ever properly precede 
some sort of analysis. Consider by way of example 
Davidson's spelling account of quotation. It is a tech­
nically adequate account of form, in that it permits us to 
derive the reference of an infinity of quotations. But
223
whether it could serve as a basis for an analysis of what 
is going on in quotation is another matter. Illiterate 
people can quote the words of another, by attending to the 
words they hear; clearly then, at least as far as mastery 
is concerned, spelling is not necessary for quotation. It 
is an overdiscernment of structure - in general, we only 
want to cut as fine as the words, not the letters which 
comprise them. (As such, of course, someone could reply 
that it would be ruled against by Davidson's own criterion 
C) (from §1.1).)
Aside from this (bland point about analysis in­
forming our selection of form proposals), there remains a 
doubt as to whether certain accounts of logical form are 
not artifacts arising from the need to mould sentences into 
a form suitable for processing by truth theory. Consider 
the paratactic theory. In its original, non-quotational 
version it does not seem very attractive - the claim that 
that functions as a perfectly ordinary demonstrative, for 
instance, is belied by the fact that propositional-level 
phrases like the belief that have no individual concept 
level correlate (I use the terminology of §2.2), eg. the 
man that. (Where that, of course, does not introduce a 
subordinate clause but should be acting as a demonstrative.) 
Indeed we cannot use belief that etc. in a demonstrative 
manner either, as the Wilde analogy would suggest, eg. 
there is a possibility that (cp. 2.2.15), or the thought 
that amuses Bill (instead we would use the qualified 
demonstrative: that thoug^ht amuses ,Bill). So let us turn 
to the quotational version distinguished in §1.3 and ask of 
it: does it provide the basis for an analysis of intensional
contexts?
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It is important to distinguish several different
aspects of quotational treatments of these contexts.
Firstly, from a philosophical point of view a quotational
treatment is always possible. As Geach has put it
oratio recta can be used metaphorically to report what 
somebody thought, 'said in his heart* ... such con­
structions are frequent in the Authorised Version of 
the Bible; "The fool hath said in his heart * There is 
no God*" ... Clearly we could always describe judge­
ments in this way; oratio obliqua is logically 
superfluous. ([43], p.ÔÔ)
Secondly, a quotational treatment is apparently 
required by the presence of certain phenomena. In [116], 
Barbara Partee classified prepositional attitude verbs 
according to what they permitted by way of substitution 
within their scope. At one end of the scale were placed 
the * emotive* verbs like repret that, be surprised that, 
for which logical equivalence suffices. At the other were 
the verbs of communication such whisper that for which, 
since they "emphasise the manner of communication, it is 
not surprising that the form as well as the content of the 
embedded clause is significant" ([116], p.326). So even if 
we had a stable notion of proposition, certain of these 
verbs would not permit substitution of content sentences on 
the basis of their expressing the same proposition, being 
quasi-quotational in nature (recall the ’green ink* example 
of 81.2). Moreover, there are certain phenomena from 
within the content sentence, as it were, which call out for 
some kind of quotational treatment (cp. §2.4). They there­
fore call into question somewhat Partee*s scale of 
propositional attitude verbs. Of Kripke*s peripatetic 
Pierre we might wish to say that he regretted that he had 
come to London, but not that he regretted that he had come 
to Londres. On one natural way of describing the situation.
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he couldn't regret that, since he wasn't aware of it. But 
this does not affect Partee*s central conclusion, that we 
should see propositional attitude verbs as sentence-taking 
rather than proposition-taking ([116], p.335). Those verbs 
one might have taken to be proposition-taking would really 
be sentence-taking verbs which (by and large) allowed 
substitution on the basis of expression of the same propos­
ition. The point is already suggested by Geach's "said in 
his heart", ie. "said something amounting to this;... ", 
with varying standards of 'amounting to*. The point is, 
though, that once we are dealing with any intensional idiom 
which is not as objective as strict necessity, there is the 
danger that substitution on the basis of necessary 
equivalence will be problematic.
Finally, we can ask whether a quotational treatment 
will provide an analysis, or explanation, of all the 
interesting aspects of propositional attitudes. This all 
depends. It may be, for example, that the explanation of 
the failure of substitutivity salva veritate of necessarily 
equivalent expressions of a certain type within these con­
texts involves a quotational element. For even if two 
names are as close to synonymous as one could hope to find, 
they will not be everywhere intersubstitutable, as the 
following construction of Mates's serves to remind us. If 
cp a n d d i f f e r  only in that each contains one of the pair, 
then of the following two sentences, the first will be true 
and the second false;
(2) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that Cp believes 
that ^ .
(3) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that Cp believes 
that Cp^ .
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In other words, if believe was proposition-taking, we would 
have two synonymous sentences with differing truth values. 
One reason someone could have for entertaining the doubt 
expressed in 3) is that they are thinking of failures of 
competence (eg. in a person who only properly understood 
one of the names). But this need not be the case, as the 
examples of §2.4 show. It appears that their simply being 
different expressions is sufficient for their non- 
substitutivity salva veritate in these contexts. With 
other kinds of expressions, eg. equivalent logical or 
mathematical expressions, this is not the explanation we 
would look for. Here it is not that they are different 
expressions per se which is important but rather the fact 
that they are constructed in different ways out of differ­
ent units. This is obviously not a point which needs the 
adoption of a quotational point of view for its 
appreciation.
A quotational treatment certainly should not be 
taken to be an analysis of propositional attitude contexts 
in the sense of proposing that we should take the particular 
sentence quoted as something the subject of the attitude is 
directly related to. As has often been pointed out, he 
need have no inkling of it (cp. eg. p.42 above). To the 
extent that we want to say that animals have beliefs, for 
example - and surely we do want to say that the dog expects 
that it's about to be taken out - we cannot treat these as 
attitudes directed towards sentences.
Having.found this area of convergence between the 
Davidsonian and Montaguean approaches - something apparently 
forced on them by the nature of the subject matter, psy­
chological modality itself - let us turn to compare them
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with their anti-realist rival* One kind of realist is a 
semantic theorist who, if only implicitly, adheres to the 
principle of bivalence. In undecidable cases the only 
means to support this adherence would appear to lie in the 
appropriate conception of a determinate reality. In effect, 
the theorist becomes committed to a certain metaphysical 
conception, according to the anti-realist. It is commit­
ment without support, since there is no further route to 
support the metaphysical picture. Alternatively, we may 
consider a realist who is primarily a metaphysician and 
who, if he engaged in semantic ascent, would find himself 
committed to bivalence for the realm of discourse concerned. 
Either way it is with the principle of bivalence that the 
anti-realist's critique begins, with its failure to square 
with the facts of language usage. But there are different 
informal formulations of that principle. It may well be 
that the latter kind of realist cannot quibble with the 
occurrence of 'determinately' in the form of the principle 
he is committed to, as in 'Every sentence is either deter­
minately true or determinately false', but there need be 
nothing in the kind of truth definition discussed in the 
first two chapters which commits them to this rather than 
the simpler formulation which omits the word. There is an 
even weaker principle, 'Every sentence can be regarded as 
either true or false', which might be thought of as a form 
of bivalence, at work in certain theories, in that these 
theories, while validating classical reasoning, do not rely 
on the previous, standard formulation of bivalence. A 
borderline vague sentence, according to such a theory, can 
be regarded as true or false because, for all practical 
purposes, we can set the standards within:any particular
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context which will decide which way it is to he counted.
How does this affect the semantics of modal 
notions? Let us start with dispositions. In §3.2 we saw 
that there is a case for allowing that sentences involving 
certain disposition terras can be regarded as either true or 
false even though it may be beyond the current means of the 
language community employing them to determine which. Take 
the idea of a soluble thing as that which would dissolve if 
it were immersed. What is it for the latter to hold; what 
sustains that subjunctive? Recalling .Carnap's rather 
elementary model, we need to know how to progress, in our 
application of the predicate, from the immersed to the 
non-immersed. It was argued in §3.2 that what allows the 
application of the form of bivalence lately distinguished 
was, to put it simply, the possibility of there naturally 
existing a distinction which it is for the community to try 
to uncover. This kind of realism is of course familiar 
from the work of Kripke, Putnam and others on natural kind 
terms. In normal circumstances our ordinary, phenomenal 
criteria for distinguishing tigers, say, do not come into 
conflict with a classification of them according to a 
genuinely scientific account of what those creatures are. 
But our ordinary, phenomenal stereotype does not constitute 
a definition of 'tiger'. More importantly, we hold our 
usage accountable to the findings of the scientific ac­
count. Tigers are 'that kind of creature' (cp.[59], p. 
319), where this is not defined in advance as whatever is 
quadrupedal, yellow with black stripes, etc..., (compare 
the example of fool's gold); it is for the scientist to 
discover if he can what constitutes that kind of animal.
One thing this points to is the fact that the
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principle 'meaning is use' is not as uncontroversial as 
Dummett would have us think. I merely note here that a 
case can be made against it (for Putnam himself has recently 
([86], Part 3) rejected the idea that his earlier work 
poses a challenge to it). The principle is naturally 
allied to an emphasis on the person-to-person, communicat­
ive side of language, and fits naturally with a certain 
analogy with chess pieces and the moves they make (cp. [33] 
p. 216). But words are not solely like chess pieces, which 
can be moved around without accountability to an external
reality. Words are not mere pawns ; it is the function of
some to make reference to the real world. A simple illu­
stration of the challenge posed is provided by Kripke's 
examples of our use of a name being accountable to the
referent at the end of the causal chain, whatever that
might turn out to be, rather than the 'meaning' extractable 
from current usage, ie. the property commonly associated 
with the name (cp. the discussion of Godel, [59], p.294).
If this is along the right lines, then such ex­
pressions, including terms for physical dispositions, do 
provide something of a test case for the realist and anti­
realist, allowing the former to meet the latter's challenge 
in a limited but fairly direct manner. The realist could 
say that the meaning of the term is not necessarily deter­
mined by its current usage, ie. may transcend in a restric­
ted way the conditions of application so far worked out by 
the community, or he could say that its contribution to 
truth conditions may transcend the (usage-determined) 
meaning it has. However, it was noted at the end of §3.2 
that psychological dispositions do not furnish such a clear 
test. Here usage does not exhibit to the same extent the
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assumption that there is some underlying property as yet 
only partially uncovered - obviously a precondition for 
saying that usage is held accountable to such a property.
Where there is an external reality, then, there is 
hope for realist assumptions to be borne out. Where there 
is none, ex hypothesi there can be no natural distinction 
for our terms to aim to relate to. This is how it appears 
to be with our use of ordinary modal words - for example, 
in relation to the postulated domain of possible worlds. 
There can be no empirical proof of their existence, since 
any 'world* we have access to must, by definition, be part 
of actuality. The best-known attempted non-empirical 
proof, Lewis's much discussed section 4.1 of [63], is not 
as convincing as might first appear. For instance, in his 
attempt to show the ordinary speaker's commitment to the 
existence of possible worlds, Lewis construes 'there are 
many ways things could have been''as a quantification over 
'ways things could have been'. A better reading of the 
expression, however, is as a quantification over 'ways', 
ie. properties, of 'things', ie. such that things could 
have been those ways rather than the way they are. 
(Stalnaker has made a similar point.) Commitment to 
properties is less controversially a feature of our 
ordinary talk. While possible worlds can provide a useful 
façon de parler, their reification does not illuminate the 
nature of modality. Whereas in a discipline like arith­
metic, proof of necessity is more or less conclusive, this 
is not the case with the conceptual truths of philosophy.
In such a discipline there is no conclusive verification of 
what must hold in every possible world. If we have no firm 
reason for overturning the commonsense belief that there is
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no such external modal reality, the line of defence 
considered for the realist will not he available.
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SOME NOTATION
Even if a reconciliation in the content of the 
theories were possible, a reconciliation of their rota­
tional styles is not. I have tried to cobble together a 
notation and apply it uniformly, though this has led to 
some characters playing two or more roles. Here are some 
of the more notable ones;
T - the most important semantical predicate, of truth, 
which is subjected to a number of different relativi­
sations, signalled by different subscripts. T^, for 
example, is the predicate of truth relative to a model,
T is also used to denote the set of moments of time, t.
R - complementing T, and relativised in the same style,
"the reference of ..."
TR - expresses the translation relation.
A - the domain of entities (possibly; possible entities).
A also figures as an actuality operator.
W - the set of possible worlds, w.
@ - a constant denoting the actual world.
□  - expresses necessity (itself the theme for several
variations).
O  - expresses possibility.
P - "it was the case that ..."
P - "it will be that ..." But E is also a variable over
language fragments (Ch. 1), an assignment function 
(§2.1) and stands for various syntactic operations 
(§2.2).
Q-^ - the subjunctive conditional (not necessarily contrary- 
to-fact).
Quotation;
 - is a means of quasi-quotation; so eg. necessarily <p =
the result of writing "necessarily" followed by .
The typist's answer to the boldface used in Montague 
Grammar, it is typically the quotation a theorist would 
make of the expressions of the OL he is studying.
' - single quotes are either quotation marks belonging to
the OL, or scare quotes.
" - double quotes are a general, all-purpose device of
quotation. When quoting other authors, I have some­
times taken liberties in adapting their notation to
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mine.
To further confusion, autonymy is also used (not to 
mention mentioned).
Abbreviations :
"OL" for "object language", "ML" for "metalanguage", 
"LHS" for "left hand side", "RHS for "right hand side", 
"L.E.M." for "the law of excluded middle".
Numbering:
a number thus: "12)" refers to the example numbered 
twelth in the section in which it occurs; thus: "1.3.7" 
to the seventh example of section 1.3; thus: "[2]" to 
the second entry in the bibliography.
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FOOTNOTES
SECTION 1.1
09], p.84, whereat a neat summary of this first formu­
lation of the Davidsonian project is to be found.
I ignore certain complications concerning tense.
This seems to be the setup envisaged by Wiggins in 
sections V and VI of his [ill].
Compare here Quine’s remarks in [91] .
 ^ [30], p.105. It will be clear that I disagree with
Dummett’s stated reason for wondering this.
SECTION 1.3 
1
[25], p.17, ie. both propositional attitude contexts in 
general and also the various moods of sentences.
2
ie. following Davidson’s paratactic treatment of mood - 
see [25], p.18.
"pragmatic" in a sense which is not inimical to the
application of truth theory - cp. [_17], fn.4.
 ^ [13], p.307, though at [15], pp.147-48 he gives his
support to the concept of indeterminacy.
 ^ cp. [25], p.18.
An example of the latter half of this dilemma would be 
the point made by McGinn, in [71], p.203, that 
Baldwin’s analysis of propositional attitudes will 
license the problematic substitutions.
It is therefore assumed that a truth theory will be 
augmented by a translation manual delivering the 
pairings required by this rule.
6
SECTION 1.4
 ^ In [107], Wallace hints that 1.2.3 might work for some
special cases, but doesn’t say which. In [108], he
promotes the use, in the ML, of an operator "It is a 
matter of meaning alone that".
 ^ [109], p.293, my emphasis - see also the comparison
with abilities, [110], p. 107.
 ^ Baldwin also has difficulties understanding this term.
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[6], p.11. It should he clear that 15) is really only 
a first stah at conveying property modification.
^ It might he suggested that because "satisfy" is a term
of art, we have a certadn amount of freedom in what we 
understand by "noisily satisfy" - so why not say that 
to noisily satisfy eat an apple just is to noisily eat 
an apple? But this ignores the fact that properly 
speaking the predicate to be modified in the ML is "be 
true in L relative to s", for which this reading is 
less plausible.
 ^ Cp. McDowell’s [69], p.221, where he gives the idea a
personal twist; two people speak the same language if 
sufficiently many equiform utterances of theirs mean 
the same.
SECTION 1.5
 ^ [19], p.83. All this under the proviso that we wish to
account for certain inferences as valid.
SECTION 2.1
 ^ Cp. the kind of criticism voiced by Strawson, in [97], 
and cp. [16], p. 759.p
The idea of models as possible dictionaries for a lan­
guage is especially clear in IMT; cp. [73], pp.209-10.
SECTION 2.2
 ^ Or would be, if the PTQ fragment contained adjectives; 
cp. [73], p.193.
 ^ Plausible because intuitively a possibility is a state 
of affairs, one satisfying some appended description.
A state of affairs can be thought of as a set of 
worlds, as can our propositions p.
 ^ Plausible because the is semantically inert - it 
doesn’t refer to anything, and in thatCpS we have 
something already syntactically and semantically 
complete. The practical value of placing the ’mod- 
ality’ 6 at the front is illustrated by the very 
sentence in the text - with a very long that-clause
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the object of the verb would be hard to ascertain if 
the order was reversed.
SECTION 2.3
1
This thought seems to be lying behind Wiggins’ words:
"The point where our intuitions begin to falter about 
the notion of necessity which we express by 
[necessarily] is, I think, just beyond the frontier 
marked by Lemmon’s system SO.5" ([109], p.312).
2
Iteration in natural language is less of a clue to our 
ordinary conception of necessity than the usual 
systems of modal logic might lead us to believe. In 
ordinary speech the repetition of a word may simply be 
pleonastic. For unambiguous amplification we use words 
like very, absolutely, etc.
 ^ "I shall investigate the sort of constraints that would 
have to be placed on the alternativeness relation ... 
[reflecting] the natural or naive modal concepts of 
ordinary language discourse" ([57],p.3).
^ The must form "has an implication that [the generality]
results from an essential characteristic" ([75],p.155).
 ^ Cp. [73], p.112, an idea originally proposed by Scott, 
investigated since by Aqvist, Burgess, Chellas and 
Kamp.
^ If instead of 26) we had, say, "That is not an option
for me", we would be less inclined to think that there 
was a shift of sense involved, but the dispute would 
still have arisen.
SECTION 2.4
What Montague actually accepted was a weakening of the 
principle which Carnap had originally adopted, of 
taking assent to be only non-conclusive evidence of 
belief.
^ Dummett attributes it to Kripke, [29], pp.112-13. Cp. 
our discussion of Kripke on yellow, §3.2 below.
 ^ Whether all description theorists would accept this 
dichotomy is another matter. Those who see the 
relation between description and name as criterial
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presumably would not. For the notion of criterion, 
see eg. [4], though for Kripke’s understanding of it 
cp. [62], fn.3.
SECTION 3.1
1
Dummett acknowledges a connection between 1) and his 
principle C) (cp. §3.4 below): "if it were in princi­
ple impossible to know the truth of some true state­
ment, how could there be anything which made that 
statement true?" ([31],p.99).
And compare the comparisons of McDowell, [67], section 
11, and McGinn, [70], pp.32-33.
"in point of meaning ... a word may be said to be
determined to whatever extent the truth or falsehood 
of its contexts is determined" ([87], p.89, my 
emphasis).
SECTION 3.2
 ^ Cp. [33], p.224, and also the example Lewis gives, [63] 
p.80, of 8) being consistent with the denial of 2), 
where there is no correlate of , of 4) and 5) .
[72], p.55 - a contrast Mellor goes on to repudiate.
^ In this case we have what Carnap calls a bilateral 
reduction sentence, ie. Cp —> (cp = ^).
^ Cp. Mellor's example of nuclear safety precautions, [72]
p.62.
 ^ Cp. Sartre’s discussion of the paederast, [94], Pt.1, Ch. 
2, section III.
SECTION 3.3
 ^ Of course, if sense is equated with extension in every 
possible world, imparting any (non-trivial) necessary 
truth will count as imparting sense. Although Kripke 
may seem committed to such an equation (cp. §2.4), what 
he says about " Tf " on p.278 of [59] shows that he 
rejects it (although given his stipulation of analytic 
= necessary + a priori (fn.21), its not clear why.)
^ "A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions
2
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we associate with it" (Kripke, [59],p.267).
 ^ That maximal consistency embodies a classical, realist 
conception of worlds has been pointed out by, amongst 
others, G. Baker in [4].
^ If philosophy is "the science of the possible" (Russell), 
philosophers should appreciate this from the tentative­
ness of their own conclusions. The kind of conceptual 
issue philosophers are concerned with - individual 
essentialism, for instance - are by their nature not 
susceptible to conclusive verification. But even if 
we suppose such a doctrine true, it is still worth 
pointing out that it would not necessarily render 
determinate every matter of possibility. Suppose, for 
example, it is claimed essential to Nixon that he came 
from the sperm and egg he in fact came from. A 
question we may ask is: how much freedom is there to 
tamper - in thought - with these gametes? Eye colour 
is a genetically determined trait. If we are prepared 
to grant truth to the supposition that Nixon’s eyes 
could have been a different colour, not only do we 
countenance Nixon’s potentiality to have been different 
but, ceteris paribus, we also recognise the very 
gametes from whence he sprang to have that right. But 
surely the identity of a gamete will not survive a 
hypothetical total enucleation and replacement of 
genetic material. So how much change is permissable? 
Cp. Wiggins on general essentialism, [110], p.124.
 ^ "the expression ’a direct insight into counterfactual 
reality’ provides no picture of what these powers 
[of]observation consist in" (Dummett, [31], p.100).
SECTION 3.4
 ^ "Against the fundamental intuition of Verificationism... 
the contrary intuition of realism: that human experi­
ence is only a part of reality, that reality is not 
part or whole of human experience" (Putnam, [85], 
p. 273).
 ^ Which would make a possible exception of the past - on 
the assumption that it is determinate that there was 
just one actual past history, even if it is
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indeterminate which,
3
As Dummett says, there is no challenge to the principle 
that "there can be no circumstances in which a state­
ment can be recognised as being, irrevocably, neither 
true nor false" (C33J, p.xxx).
CONCLUSION
1 Perhaps this is a good point to clarify my attitude to 
Gupta. It is implicit in my discussion of his work 
(p.56 above) that Gupta can explain his truth predicate 
Tg for the homophonie treatment of □  by appeal to 
ordinary English, eg. as ’truth relative to what the 
sentence actually means’. But this conflicts to some 
extent with the case in §1.5 for the redundancy of the 
ordinary actually - the significance here being that it 
is not strong enough to secure the truth of Q  T\(2+2=4, 
English), say,(since "’2+2=4* might actually have meant 
something false in English"). So on this construal we 
must stick to the more explicit ’actual world’ idiom 
which Gupta himself adopts.
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